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ABSTRACT

GANDHI AND MAO AS COMMUNICATORS
A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory

Kusum Jitendra Singh
Supervisor: Prof. George Gerbner

This study is a comparative analysis of the communication practice and theory of 1fohandas Karamchand Gandhi and
Mao Tse Tung during the period in which they were the major
leaders of the national liberation movements in India and
China.

In broadest terms, the problem dealt with is hOll they

succeeded in communicating with hundreds of millions of illiterate peasants without the use of such modern means of communication as radio and television.

If they had not solved the

problem of communication, they would have been would-be
leaders with very few followers and their movements would have
been doomed to failure.

The major method is th'at of content analysis in the
context of the broader patterns of historical change in the
countries involved.

The first step, therefore, is a panoramic

summary of the socio-economic and political situations in India
and China during the period between World Wars I and II, the
growth of the Indian and Chinese movements for independence
from foreign control, and the detailed phases of national
struggle during the critical war-time years of 1942 through
iii

19qq.

The next step is a detailed content analysis of the

major themes in almost all the recorded messages of Gandhi
and Mao in the 19q2-qq period.

The quantitative analysis shows

that, despite many differences with respect to other themes,
the various themes relating to leadership style, received the
greatest amount of attention from both.

The qualitative analy-

sis shows that, despite important differences, both Gandhi and
Mao discussed leadership in terms that dealt not only specifically with channels of communication but also with goal values
as alternatives to the perceived conditions of crisia, -two
broader themes that helped establish a sense of communality and
understanding between the leaders and the led.
pulls together the communication theories of both J..iao and
Gandhi, a presentation based not only on the content analysis
for the 19q2-q4 period but also on explicit statements over a
longer period and tacit premises which are inferred from more
general statements.

It is suggested that the operational doc-

trines of both Gandhi and Mao have important implications for
communication theory and that the more specific communication
of each is a version of what, in Mao's terminology, has been
called "the mass line."

Finally, conclusions are reached concerning the multimodal, multi-directional communication behavior of both Gandhi
and Mao and their emphasis on the necessity that the communicator identify himself with the needs and even the life-styles
iv

of the recipients.

These conclusions, it is suggested, have

possible implications for future research on the vital connection between communication and development and particularly on
the possibility of non-charismatic leadership in so-called
"developing" countries.
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CHAPTER

I·

THE AIMS AND lJETHODS OF THIS STUDY

This study attempts to identify the communication
practice and theory of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and

~;ao

Tse-tung, leaders of two largest national liberation movements
in the history of the world.

It is a comparative analysis of

their communication practice and theory directed toward mass
participation in Indian and Chinese natiodal movements during
the period between the 1920'" and 1940's.

In doing this, the purpose has been to avoid the one
extreme of concentrating entirely on the Gandhi-Hao messages
and theories and the other extreme of concentrating on the
broad social movements in which they played leading roles as
communicators.

This requires not only an objective content

analysis of major messages of the two leaders hut also the
placing of these messages in the context of the broader systems
of society, action and thought within which they operated and
to which they contributed.

This report will first sketch the two liheration movements in a broader historical perspective, and then, to help
determine the basic elements of Gandhi's and Mao's communication theories, it will make an empirical analysis of samples
of their own writings.

More specifically, the project has

1

2

been concerned with the question: What were the explicit and
implicit communication theories of these two leaders that
could be discerned in their daily national struggle, and how
were these theories reflected in their work?

To make the

problem manageable, this part of the analysis will concentrate
on two of the critical phases of their movements, namely, the
'Quit India' movement in India and the 'Rectification' movement
in China.

Both movements cover approximately the same period

from 1942 to 1944.

The movements in India and China raise the question of
obvious connections between communication and the shaping of
two different kinds of national movements pursuing two different
kinds of economic and social development.

Gandhi's movement

sought independence from the British and took the form of social
and moral reform, while Mao's sought radical restructuring of
the system.

To some extent, therefore, this study is not only

of communication and development but also of national liberation movements against the established systems within the respective countries, and thus involves socio-political conflict.

A

n~tioaal

liberatiou struggle subjects leaders to un-

usual lcadershi? challenges.

This study necessarily addressed

itself to the '!uestion: "How di,I Gun<lhi and Mao succeed in
building a mass movement against tremendous odds without access

3
to modern media of communication?"

It does not deal, however,

with the anti-liberation forms of communication that were
mounted by their opponents.

Nor does the study claim that

the communication skill of these two leaders was solely responsible for liberating their nations.

There were pre-existing

conditions, an evolution of events, economic phenomena, and so
on.

A host of sociological and other factors will have to be

left to one side so as to bring sharply into focus the communication behavior and theory' of the leaders under study.

The main focus of this study has been on thOse elements
of communication styles of Gandhi and Mao whiCh increased mass
participation and national consciousness, overcoming not only
powerful adversary communication systems but developing sucessfully their own countervailing means of communication.

The

most significant element appears to be the method of "mass
line" communication, a term often used by Mao to emphasize
direct contact with the masses,

Although Gandhi never enuncia-

ted such a phrase, his ac.tual practice was very similar to
Mao's.

Basically, the "mass line" is a non-elitist guiding

concept which aims at what might be called "leadership without
elitism."

To what extent was the "mass line" style of communi-

cation significant in overcoming communication barriers between
leaders and led?

And what were the similarities and the diffe-

rences in Gandhi's and Mao's use of mass line communication?

4
Although the investigator cannot hope to answer these
questions definitively, the aim has been to develop some tentative answers that might serve as a basis for future research
in various Third World countries on the long-neglected subject
of the relation between communication and national liberation
movements, as well as between communication and social, eConomic and cultural development.

Communication and Development

Over the last decade special attention has been given
to the role of communication in the developing countries.
Despite many differing viewpoints on the various connections
between communication and development, all Western writers in
the field are agreed that the connection between the two is
intimate.
For some reason, however, no one thus far has studied
the communication efforts of any liberation movement that
helped start the development process in a former colonial
country.

In other words, most studies focus on development

after liberation.

This study emphasizes liberation as a

~

lude to development and distinguishes.between two kinds of
liberation; one anti-imperialist only and the other socialist
or communist.

Gandhi's movement was mainly the former, while

5
Mao's movement embraced both.

This definition includes a

behavioral distinction as well as a value orientation.

Communication researchers such as Schramm, Lerner and
Pool, have somewhat given less attention to the "action frame"
of media content.

Their focus has been more on discrete images

and isolated messages rather than with "the role of the communications media in defining broad types of forms of action".l
This approach tends to ignore political parties, factions, and
pressure groups as channels of communication.

The premise of most of communication research of the
last twenty-five years or more is that development occurs
through the spread of cultural elements from the developed to
the developing countries, and obstacles that prevent this flow
are namely: illiteracy, poverty, popUlation explosion and
above all, the traditional attitudes in the developing world.
To put it in Lerner's words, "Asian ethnocentrism is not merely
a self-indulgent nuisance but actually a major obstacle to
development progress."

2

The assumption is based on the belief

l J • L • Peacock, "Religion, Communications and l~odernization :
A Weberian Critique of Some Recent Views." Human
Organization 1, 1969
2Daniel Lerner, "International Cooperation and Communication",
in Communication and Change in the Developing Countries,
pp. 103-125

6
that mass media are characteristic of advanced society, and
therefore will promote advance in traditional society which has
been shown to be not so.'

New technology is also seen as the

solution to the problems of underdevelopment, without any
attempt to define the social, economic, and political systems.

4

This view tends to underplay the development structure
of the social system within which the communication and cultural change takes place. 5

In other words, it is not so much

a matter of advanced countries transferring technology which
produces a change in the social structure, as it is the transformation of the social structure which permits change and
development.

In short, most research is urban-biased and con-

cerned with transmission of new skills and equipment, regardless of whether the structural situation of the intended audience makes development ·possible or impossible for the majority.
'Sultana Krippendorff's unpublished dissertation, Communication Approach to Political Development: A Critique with
Examples fro;!! India, (liniversity of i.llinois, 1971) gives an
insightful analyses of the consequences of 'more communication'.
4Feltehausen, "Conceptual Limits of Development Communication
Theory." Paper prepared for presentation at tbe annual
meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism,
Columbia, S.C., August, 1971
'Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment,"
Monthly Review, Vol. 18, No.4, September, 1966

7
Besides the structural constraints operating on the
social-class structure and on the agrarian and industrial
relationships within the Third World countries, there is yet
another constraint implying political subordination due to
increasing dependence on foreign aid.

Just as a concentration

of purchasing power in the hands of the ruling elite distorts
the demand bias ("demonstration effect" whereby the consumption patterns of the rich countries tend to be emulated by the
elite of the poor countries resulting in an increase of import
of foreign goods and imbalance of foreign exchange) ,6 so the
dominance of Western communication theories tends to limit cultural autonomy and to distort indigenous development, making it
extremely difficult to break away from the vicious circle of
subordination.
The power elites in the developing countries, who try
to intellectualize their communication policies, are found to
pursue two interrelated views simultaneously.

On the one hand,

they see high technology media as exciting instruments for
rapid development; on the other hand, they want to control
change and move with utmost caution, so as not to upset the

6

Thomas E. Weisskopf, "Capitalism, Underdevelopment and the
Future of the Poor Countries", The Review of Radical
Political Economics, Vol. 4, No.1 Winter, 1972, pp. 1-35

8

established pattern of social relations. 7

To support the

latter view, which in any case dominates, the elite rely on
equilibrium models of the West in which order predominates and

.

change is controlled.

8

There appears to be a consensus, however, that development means structural change and not merely a variation of
policy.9

There is also agreement that the structural change

must be autonomous to the socio-political system of the nation
and not something imposed from outside.

10

Views differ mainly

on the questions whether development, as defined by Western
theorists,11 necessarily means progress for developing countries, no matter what the pattern of development or what contribution communication might make.

7Gunnar Myrdal, The Challenge of World Poverty. Pantheon Books,
New York: 1970, passim
8Rajni Kothari, "Values and Paradigms in Indian Social
Sciences," paper submitted to the twenty-ninth International Congress of Orientalists, Paris, July 1973
9Gunnar Myrdal, Against the Stream. Pantheon Books, New York:
1972. See also E.P. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful. ;:arper &
Row, 1973, passim
10Herbert I. Schiller, "Authentic National Development versus
the Free Flow of Information and the New Communications
Technology," Communications, Technology, and Social :olicv.
G. Gerbner, et aI, John Wiley & Sons, 1973. pp. 467-480
llW.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth. Cambridge
University Press, London, 1962

9
Recently many analysts concerned with this problera
have been trying to liberate their discipline from pre-conceived
notions of development or from attempts to predetermine the
norms and values of developing nations.

These new approaches

deal with the overall operation of the cultural processes
which mark developing societies with some of their most distinctive characteristics.

They permit the analyst to raise

basic questions within the context of the total system; they
take into account the social structur"

values and behavior

opatterns of the larger system within which development is
observed.

Such approaches permit the analyst to build a frame-

work for critical discussion of purposes and goals in an ongoing historical process.

This is somewhat contrary to the

approach of established theories which generally take the
social system as given °and treat troublesome issues as settled.

Communication problems in the developing countries
cannot be approached without conceiving of development as
systemic change.

Particularly under the prevailing conditions

of crisis that this study is investigating, these changes are
expedited when there is a widely shared perception of common
goals and leaders who know how to share their goals and the
perception of crisis with others.

Accordingly, the messages

of liberation leaders may be regarded as battlegrounds of the
contending forces on the social stage.

To bring about change

10
in the social, political bases and economic goals, Gandhi and
Mao developed countervailing messages powerful enough to
transform the national environment.

Gandhi used his strate-

gies to fight a colonial regime; yet others were used by
to develop socialism in his country.

~ao

One may ponder over the

implications of these two kinds of successful movements for
more recent movements of national liberation and social change
in the developing countries today--particularly in countries
where the media are used to 'support the existing institutions
to prevent change other than through those institutions,

This

subject, however, is beyond the scope of this study.

Methodology
The study combines an historical analysis of the two
liberation movements during the entire period from 1920 through
the 1940 I s with a content analysis of Gandhi I sand 1,'ao I s recorded communications during the crucial years of 1942-44.

The interconnection between these two methods of
analysis becomes essential when one considers the unintended
and even unrecognized consequences of some actions which may
perform significant functions.

12

Thus, many actions that are

12Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe,
Illinois: The Free Press, 1957, pp. 19-84

11
not recorded in formal communications may have a latent communication function just as important, or even more important,
than the manifest content of formal communications.

For

instance, Gandhi's prayer meetings may perform the "latent"
function of reinforcing national identity, just as Fao's
rent reduction campaign against the landlords performed the
"latent" functions of establishing peasant's identification
with the Chinese Communist Party.

Fuller discussion of these issues is left to chapter
III, entitled "The Gandhi-Mao Themes, 1942-44," but they
illustrate the importance of combining two methodologies to
understand the communication behaviour and theory of leaders
of liberation movements.

Historical analysis of

Gandhi-~lao

liberation movements

For the purpose of historical analysis the study surveys Gandhi's three major national campaigns, spaced roughly
ten years apart: 1921-22, 1930-32, and 1942-44.

In the case

of Mao, the survey covers the continuous struggle with its
ebb and flow during the years of 1927, 1934, and 1941-42.
These experiences provided the foundation for the final stages of struggle and were, in a sense, a preparation for
Gandhi's Quit India movement in 1942 and
campaign of 1942.

~fao'

s Rectification

The struggle itself, of course, continued
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in both countries well after 1944.

It was in 1947 that India

finally achieved her independence from the British.

In China,

after the defeat of the Japanese, the Civil War was fought and
won by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949.

The historical

analysis provides background for contrasting the differences
and similarities in the two kinds of movements.

Primary sources include all available publications
(speeches, correspondence, articles, and other documents) of
Gandhi's and Mao's writings, eovering the period from 1920
upto the time of independence of each country.

Other related

sources appear in the bibiliography, together with selected
list of the major historical studies upon which this study is
based.

Content analysis

Content analysis is a process of summarizing the contents of messages in such a way that an analyst may make useful inferences from the summary.

Its first stage involves

transforming raw data into units which permit systematic and
objective description of the meaning of messages.

Krippen-

dorff points out that,
One of the most distinctive features of messages is
that they provide indirect (vicarious) information
to a receiver, that is, information about events that
take place at a distant location; about objects that

13
have existed far in the past, and about ideas in
other people's minds •••• the ability of a message
receiver to -regard sensory data as indirectly
informative about a source is what content analysis
must cope with explicitly.13

Content analysis on its own, however, does not guarantee against invalid interpretations.

Serious effo::-ts,

therefore, have to be made to relate content inferences to
other aspects of the social system, for instance, leadership
style.

Such comparisons must also take note of multiplicity

of function in various types of social behavior.

To put it

differently, it is essential in this kind of study to supplement (or complement) content analysis with other analytical
methods dealing with the broader historical context within
which the messages have appeared or with the individual characteristics of the source.

Perhaps no single method by it-

siHf is sufficient to give us the knowledge, insight, and wisdom necessary to understand complex communication processes.

Choice of sample
For content analysis of messages, the entire set of
recorded messages by Gandhi and !lao have been used covering a
three year period from the beginning of 1942 to the end of 1944.
13K • Krippendorff, "Models of Messages: Three Prototypes,· in
The Analysis of Communication Content: Developments in
Scientific Theories and Computer Techniques, pp. 69-106
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In dealing with this period, the 'Study relied mainly on the
following volumes:
Mahatma: Life of Mohandas I:aramchand Gandhi. Vo 1. VI
by D.G. Tendulkar, published by the Go~ernment of
India, 1955
The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. IV
English edition based on the Chinese edition,
People's Publishing, Peking, July, 1952
(Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., London, 1954)
There are many reasons for using all messages of this
period, rather than some random set of messages over a much
longer period.

The content analysis is more meaningful if

not wrenched from the context of a specific historical period.
The period chosen (the most critical years of World 1'-ar II)
happens to have represented a decisive turning point in the
liberation movements in both countries and a major challenge
to the mobilization and communication efforts of Gandhi, ,:ao
and their associates.

Gandhi's own writings have been more extensively
published than Mao's, but there is no one text of Gandhi's
writings fully comparable to Mao's Selected Works.

The his-

torieal record as published by the Government of India,
Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, in
closest approximation.

1953 is the

This consists of Gandhi's own writ-

lngs in Young India and Ilarijan (newspapers), statements and

15
interviews to the national and international press, and his
correspondence with the British Government and other heads of
states and influential friends and sympathisers.
Howeve~,

it should be pointed out that Vol. IV of

Mao's works are by no means a complete collection of his
works of this period.

They represent a selection of what

Mao and his editors thought to be important texts for study
in the period after 1949.

Furthermore, all of the texts were

edited, Mao's rich language was toned down and some changes
were made in meaning.
As shown in Table 1, "Gandhi-l:ao ·l.:essages, by Type of
Documents, 1942-44," (page 16), the record shows 58 messages
for Gandhi during this period and only 16 for 1lao.

The

average Mao message, however, was much longer; the total
number of words for Mao's 16 documents adds upto over 57,000
as contrasted with about 50,000 of Gandhi's 58 documents.

16
TABLE 1
Gandhi-Mao Messages, By Type of Documents, 1942-44
Gandhi
Number of Documents
(by type)
Speeches

4

Editorials

3

7
5

16

2

1

2

Interviews or Press conferences

15

Letters

19

o
o

58

16

Number of words

50,077

57,600

Number of pages

158

111

Articles
Directives or

Re~olutions

TOTAL

SOURCES:

Gandhi: Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi
(8 vols., 1951-54) by D.G. Tendulkar, Vol.VI,
published by the Government of India, 1953
Not included: "Death of Kasturba" (his wife)
pp. 293-309: (purely personal)
Gandhi-Jinnah Talks" and some
letters. pp.338-356:
(purely communal)
Mao:

English edition of The Selected Works of
Mao Tse-tung, Vol. IV, based on the Chinese
edi tion, People's l"ublishing House, .t·eking,
July, 1952 (Lawrence.:: Wishart Ltd., London,
1954)
Not included: "Appendix: Resolution on some
Questions in the history of our
Party. " Probably drafted by
l:ao and adopted in 1945 (purely
party document)

NOTE:

For details see Appendix 'A'.
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Greater variation, however, is found in the type of
message.

Most of Mao's came in the form of speeches and

editorials in the party press.

Most of Gandhi's came in

the form of either articles, interviews, press conferences
and letters.

It is interesting to note that

~ao's

letters are

not available neither are there any records of press conferences or preserved in his selected works for this period.

Gandhi's writings are originally in three languages:
Gujrati, Hindi and English.

Most of the major Gujrati publi-

cations have been translated into Hindi and English, the two
langnages in which the investigator is proficient.

Also the

investigator had an opportunity to listen to the original
disk recordings available at the national archieves in New
Delhi, which reflect Gandhi's direct humor combined with a
relentless skill challenging his audience.

Needless to say,

much of this intimacy that Gandhi had witb his audience is
lost in the English translations of his speeches.

Also lost

is the religious and philosophic overtones of some of the
Sanskrit terms, such as Gandhi's most characteristic .doctrine,
nonviolence or ahimsa, and satyagraha, more literally "truth
force," discussed in Chapter IV.
This must be particularly so in the case of Lao's
writings where the study has had to rely solely on English

18
translations.

14

The official translations may often seem

curiously shrill in tone and purely ideologi cal, especially
to Westerners because of their own cultural and political
bias.

For instance, "imperialism" may appear as an incendiary

and extreme term but to some one living in a colonial or
semicolonial country it is a natural statement of fact.

In

other words, the English translations have to cope not only
with the Chinese language but also with 1:ao's version of
Marxism-Leninism in the Chinese context.

This means two

language barriers, the Chinese barrier and the Communist barrier.

l:ao's available writings, in any case, are far from

adequate, as the archives

of revolutionary literature were

either destroyed deliberately by the Kuomintang or dispersed
or lost during the years of war,1 5 or simply never reissued
in print.

Analytical Scheme
The analysis focused on how Gandhi and \!ao defined
the conditions of crisis confronting their nations and helped

14Professor Allyn Rickett of the University of Pennsylvania,
who is well versed in the intricacies of the Chinese
language, has often commented on the stilted translation
of Mao's "earthy colorful" phraseology.
15According to the Publisher's note to Selected Works of
Mao Tse-tung. (Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., London, 1954)

19
establish certain goal values which could be realized in
practice through improved leadership style and effective use
of available channels of communication.

The attempt has been

to distinguish between the content, style and channels of communication reflected in Gandhi's and I,cao' s practices and wri tings for the purpose of making comparisons.

The rationale for

developing the scheme was that the leader's ability to articulate and to symbolize, and then to communicate and share
with the people his perceptions of the crisis and his strategy of resolving it, was crucial to the success of the liberation movement.

A simple count of words and symbols seemed not to be
justifiable as this study emphasizedconcepts.

Therefore,

the theme was selected as the unit of analysis and the entire
document as the context of unit.
themes was

Classification of these

done on four major categories on the instrument

of- analysis described in Chapter III, "The Gandhi-!.cao Themes,
1942-1944."

The analytical measure of attention indicated the

presence and frequency of subject elements in the themes.

The

many themes appearing in the written documents of 1942-44
period have been classified into four broad categories dealing with conditions of crisis, desirable goal values, leadership style, and channels of communication.
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The reliability of the analysis was achieved by
measuring agreement between the investigator and Valerie
Jaworski of the Annenberg School of Communications, using
Scott's inter-observer agreement coefficient for nominal
scales.

16

The agreement coefficient achieved in this study

was .8227 and therefore, a high degree of reliability was
demonstrated.
Plan of study
As an essential background for the content analysis,
Chapter II "The Context of the Gandhi-1;ao Communications"
presents a broad historical review of the :ndian and Chinese
liberation movements and then narrows down to the 1942-44
phases of national struggle.
Chapter III, "~he Gandhi-Lao Themes, 1942-1944",
summarizes the results of the content analysis, with a
quantitative and qualitative discussion of each of the major
categories - namely, conditions of crisis, goal values, leadership styles, channels of communication.

In Chapter IV, "Communication 'fheories of GandhiMao", inferences concerning the communications theories of

16W•U • Scott, "Reliability of Content Analysis: The Case of
Nominal Scale Coding." Public Opinion Quarterly,
19 (1955) pp.321-325
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the two leaders have been presented.

These inferences are

based on both their explicit statements, as presented in
Chapter III, and their statements and behavior over the entire historical period of the two liberation movements.
In Chapter V, "Gandhi and Mao as Communicators:
Summary and Conclusions," two levels of conclusions are presented: some specific, but still tentative, propositions on
the communication behavior of Gandhi and 1!ao, and some possible implications of these findings for future theory and
research on the relationship between communication and
development.

CHAPTER

II

THE CONTEXT OF THE GANDHI-MAO Cml1illNICATIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the socioeconomic and political situation as it prevailed in India and
China during the World War I and II period.

This will provide

an historical perspective to the analysis of Gandhi's and

~ao's

central messages during the later stages of the national movements and to the development of their communication theories.
The underlying assumption is' that the social system has to be
understood as a context for the messages, and this requires
explicit description of the special nature of Indian and
Chinese societies.

The discussion will touch on these points:
(1)

What historical factors contributed to the emergence of the two national liberation movements?

(2)

What were the major barriers, difficulties, and
problems in communication?

(3)

What prerequisites were available in these countries for conducting a national liberation movement, and what channels' and modes of communication were used?
22
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The Gandhi-Mao Liberation Movements
A fundamental element common to India and China was
the two World Wars, which were decisive factors·in the emergence of revolutionary situations in both countries.

The wars

caused general ·upheavels and economic and political pressures,
creating climates conducive to national demand for radical
change.

And yet a "revolutionary situation" by itself does not

guarantee a national movement unless there are leaders capable
of seizing the opportunity for decisive action.
The setbacks suffered by the Western powers during
World War I somewhat cracked the armor of invincibility of the

.
1
Br1't'18 h emp1re.

Then came two great events.

The first was

the Russian Revolution of 1917, beginning as a hopeful liberation movement against

~he

greatest of the surviving despotisms,

The Russian disavowal of imperialism was appealing to colonial
countries allover the world.

The second event was American

intervention in the war in 1917, which led on to President
Wilson's enunciation of his Fourteen Points supporting national
freedom and self-determination of peoples.
If the course of the war disillusioned Indians and
Chinese about Western civilization, these two events nonetheless
Iperceival Spear, India. The University of Michigan Press,
Ann Arbor: 1961, p.364 Also the Japanese victory over
Russia in 1905 had impact on both India and China
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emboldened them to demand self-government in the name of fundamental principles accepted by the Allied Powers.

The war, in

other words, brought about a mental revolution in both countries
and created a climate for, genuine national movements.

The dif-

ferences between the two movements are briefly highlighted in
Figure 1, "Two Liberation Movements: India and China" (page 25).
In this chart the investigator has shown some of the essential
similarities and differences in terms of the socio-political
situation, the general characteristics of each movement, the
forms of struggle, the base of each and the consequences for
both the countries.

Fuller discussion follol1s.

India

The outbreak of World War I formed for India a dividing line between the old and new worlds.

At the beginning of

the 19th century India had lost both political freedom and her
cultural pride.

2

After 1914 the picture changed; there was

a new awakening partially due to the revolutionary activity
of Gandhi.

During World War I Britain needed the men and wealth of
her colonies, and although India supplied both, antagonism
continued to increase.

2

Britain's wartime needs to curb the

R.C. Majumdar, (Ed.) The Ilistory and culture of the Indian PeopIe.

Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Part II, Bombay,1951, p. 149
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FIGURE

1

Two Liberation Movements: India and China
India
Socio-poli tical
situation in
country

Direct colony;
large; illiterate
economic underdevelopment

China
Indirect colony;
large; illiterate;
economic under-

development

Characteristics
of movement

Nationalist;
pacifist

Socialist; nationalist;
non-pacifist

Forms of
struggle

Satyagraha;
non-cooperation;
civil disobediance

Agrarian reforms;
warfare

Base

All classes
(landlords, business,
professionals,
peasants and
workers); urbanbased

Peasants, workers,

Consequences

Independence from
British rule

soldiers, and alliance with petty
bourgeoisie and
national bourgeoisie; rural
based
Socialist revolution
followed independence
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terrorists and win the support of the Congress Party of India
brought promises of eventual self-government within the empire.
However, in 1918, the British passed the Rowlatt Acts, which
were an effort to stop terrorism by empowering the government
to secretly try suspected offenders without the benefit of a
lawyer or a jury.

It was in response to the Rowlatt Acts that

Gandhi dedicated himself to the nationalist movement which was
to be transformed into a powerful force under his leadership.
"The Rowlatt Act was the parent of the Non-cooperation },iovement,"
said Sir Surendranath Bannerjea, one of the national leaders. 3
It was these Acts more than anything else that brought Gandhi
to the center of the Indian politcal scene.

April 13, 1919, was another turning point in the liberation movement.

Brigadier-General Regionald E.H. Dyer carried

out the Amritsar massacre killing 379 men, women and children
and wounding 1,137 by the official British count.

This further

eroded the myth of British justice and fair play.

When the British raised the tax on salt which Indians
were no longer allowed to make, Gandhi and his 70 followers
walked from his dwelling to the sea, almost 200 miles away.
The number of followers grew along the route, and upon reaching
JClark D. Moore & David Eldredge (Ed), India Yesterday and
Today. A Bantam Pathfinder Book, 1976, p. 163
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the shore, they scooped salt water and evaporated salt in
symbolic defiance.

These gestures were recorded in the press

and newsreels around the world.

So active were his followers

that British jails were bulging with an estimat~d 50,000
Indian nationalists in 1930.

Arrests stirred Indian and foreign

opinion against the imperial policy.
With World War II, the British continued to offend
those whose support they needed.

They declared war for India

against Germany and Japan without consulting the Indian leadership.

Furthermore, the British Parliament passed an act which

suspended the rights granted in the Government of India Act of
1935, and Winston Churchill declared that the statement of war
aims contained in the Atlantic Charter (which among other things
respected "the rights of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live") did not apply to India, but
only to those countries overrun by the Axis powers.

In reaction to these events the Indian Congress Working Committee adopted a lengthy resolution on September 15,
1939.

It took the gravest view of the British proclamation of

war without the consent of the Indian people, protested against
the exploitation of Indian resources for imperialist ends, and
openly declared that India cannot associate heres,:.!f with a war
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said to be for democratic freedom, when that very freedom is
denied to her
The Working Committee therefore invites the British
Government to declare in unequivocal te~ms what their
war aims are in regard to democracy and imperialism,

and the new order that is envisaged, in particular how
those aims are going to apply to India and to be given
effect in the present. 4
The All India Congress Committee endorsed this view on October
10, and demanded that "India must be declared an independent
nation and present application must be given to this status to
the largest possible extent.· 5
In order to enlist more enthusiastic support from India,
the British government sent Sir Stafford Cripps to India in 1942
with an offer of independence at the end of the war.

Until this

time, there had been no recognition by Britain that independence
was a legitimate Indian goal.
The Cripps plan, however, was rejected by the nationalist leaders for two reasons.

First, it would have left

Britain in control of India until the war's end.

Second, and

more important, the plan would permit the provincial governments
and the princely states, some of each controlled by Muslims, to
become independent of a united India.

'The Indian Annual Register, 1939, II, 226-8

5 Ibid • p. 231
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At· Gandhi's urging, the Congress response to the
Cripps mission was to pass a "Quit India" resolution and promise civil disobedience if Britain did not comply.

The British

responded by imprisoning 60,000 nationalists including most of
the leaders of the Congress.
This effectively muzzled the Congress for the duration
of the war and left an open field for the development of the
Muslim League.

The League had been encouraged by the Cripps

plan which transformed their slogan of a Muslim state into a
realizable goal.

At the war's end, the League was a force

with which to be reckoned.

In 19q5, the British Labor Party, which was pledged
to Indian self-government, swept into control of Parliament.
Two years later independence within the Commonwealth was
granted to India and the Muslim state of Iakistan--despite
better opposition from Gandhi who had always worked for a
unified, independent India.

China
Unlike India, China was saved from outright domination
by the intense rivalry of the foreign powers.

China was

pressed on all sides by competing powers anxious for its trade
and territory: Russia from the north, Great Britain (via India
and Burma) from the south and west, France (via Indochina)
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from the south, and Japan and the United States (in part, via
the Philippines) from the east.

6

In this sense, China was a semicolony under the simultaneous influence of several imperialist powers (in contrast to
India which was a colony controlled by a single imperialist
country).

Both the countries were, however, semifeudal. 7

In the beginning of the 20th century, the Chinese
government attempted reforms in order to develop internal
strength to resist foreign intrusions, especially against
Japan who had already established a strong foothold.

The 1911

Revolution was a turning point in the history of China:

If there is one word to describe China since 1911,
it is revolution. Revolution is the sweeping away
of an old order--an ancient political system, a
traditional culture, an uncreative economy, a ruling
class which only exploits, and a system of social
organization whi.ch no longer satisfies men. China
has undergone all these revolutions. S

6Harry Magdoff, "Colonialism" (1763-c.1970) Encyclopaedia
Britannica. Helen Hemingway Benton, Publisher, 1974
fifteenth edition. p.897
7A ·semifeudal" country is one in which elements of feudalism
exist side by side with elements of capitalism
8Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, Republican China,
Vintage Books, 1967, p.xiii
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From 1911 to 1925 China floundered in one of the most
chaotic, confusing, and disunited periods in her history.
C.P. Fitzgerald points out how the disintegration of all central control into warlordism discredited the ideals of republican government, "the Chinese became completely disillusioned
with the false Gods of the West.
some other solution.,,9

They turned restlessly to

Therefore, the new doctrine of the

Bolshevik Revolution could not fail to attract.
After the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925, the

~uomintang

became an ideological vacuum; in spite of several abortive
efforts, Chiang Kai-shek never succeeded in endowing it with
. an d persuas1ve
. .1 d eo 1 ogy. 10
a d ynam1c

The war against the

Japanese and the extermination campaigns against the Communists
threw the country into serious confusion and tended to magnify
all the inadequacies and shortcoming of Chiang's regime to
the advantage of the Chinese Communist Party.
The period of collaboration with tbe Kuomintang against
the warlords and imperiali~ts (1924-26) has been designated by
the Chinese Communist Party as the "First Revolutionary Civil
War."

In the following ten years (1927-1937) the Chinese

9 C• P • Fitzgerald, The Birth of Communist China.
Penguin Books, London: 1964, pp.43-54
10Franz Schurmann et aI, op. cit., p.5
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Communist Party pursued a course of armed insurrection, called
"The Second Revolutionary Civil War.·

ll

The Kiangsi Period,

as the years from 1927 until the Long hlarch in 1934 came to be
known, were years of hardship and struggle for :the Communists.
By 1934 the pressure on the Communists had grown too great, and
bursting out of Chiang's blockade line, they performed the
spectacular feat known as the Long 1,larch, which ended the
Kiangsi Period.
The survivors of the Long March finally settled in
Shensi Province in Northwestern China at the end of 1935.
These years are known as the Yenan Period, named after the new
Communist capital where the Communists developed modern Chinese
Communism's organizational and ideological foundations.

The invasion of China began in 1931 with the Japanese
occupation of Manchuria and the ensuing series of encroachments which finally led to the. long and disastrous SinoJapanese War (1937-45).

Chiang was reluctant to get involved

with Japan before resolving the Communist problem.

Shortly

before the outbreak of war, however, as a result of the Sian
Incident in which Chiang was kidnapped by his own generals, a
new United Front had been formed.

l1Franklin W. Houn, A Short History of Chinese Communism
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc .• 1967, p.35
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It was not until 1945 that the Japanese occupation
army surrendered and left Chinese '1oil, but their departure
did not resolve China's internal conflict.

No sooner had they

laid down their arms than the smoldering rivalry between the
Communists and the Nationalists erupted with renewed fury,
plunging the war weary Chinese people into five more years of
destruction and deprivation.
The United States government was committed to Chiang's
Nationalist regime, but as the Civil 'Var raged

Oll,

it became

increasingly obvious which side had people's support.

The

Communist takeover of China finally took place in 1949 after
the collapse of Chiang's regime.

Communication barriers

The communication problem that confronted Gandhi and
Mao was not only the enormous power of their imperialist and
native adversaries (particularly in China, foreigners themselves represented only part of the problem), who controlled
most channels of communication but also the fact that their
countries were poor and backward, almost totally lacking in
the prerequisites for conducting a national liberation movement: namely, a common language, adequate roads and
railroads to tie the land surface together, literate people
capable of communicating over great distance,an effectively
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organized political party to mobilize the masses, and radios,
newspapers, telephones, and telegraph to provide normal modern

. t.10n. 12
commun1ca
The colonial policy of the British in India sought to
strengthen and

~reserve

the communal and ethnic divisions, as

well as create religious and status differences.

These barri-

ers made it almost impossible for the national leaders to communicate their ideas to the people, and they were also unable
to assess people's political and social aspirations.

The

leaders of the Congress Party were all members of the urbanized educated elite and were isolated from the 80 per cent
of the population that lived in villages.

Briefly, the Indian and Chinese societies were marked

by two distinct systems of communication: the villages pursuing the traditional communication network based upon personal
relations, and the elite in the cities communicating through
print media and radio.

This situation reflected social dist-

ances of such magnitudes that large sectors of the population
had no contact with one another.

1lliile the gap provided

12A •R • Desai, Social Background of Indian Nationalism.
Popular Book Depot, Bombay: 1959, pp. 201-211
Alan P.L. Liu, Communications and National Integration in
Communist China.
University of California Yress, 1971,
pp. ix-xvi
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stability for the ruling regime, it created a tremendous
sense of isolation and frustration on the part of the national liberation leaders.
The biggest communication barrier in both India and
China was the European orientation of their leaders, which
was far removed from the mundane world of the common people
in their own countries.

Ironically enough the prestige of

these leaders within their party and among their opponents
depended on their capacity to identify themselves as closely
as possible with the aspirations of the common people as well
as with traditional values.

More important, if the national

leaders were to represent their countries in the face of foreign

~ggression

they had to obtain the support not only of the

elites but of all the major elements of the population.
Absence of a common language or a language with many
dialects created complex problems in India and China; the
number of languages spoken created many social and political
barriers,

Not only was there a gulf between the written lan-

guage and the spoken, but knowledge itself was jealously guarded
in an esoteric language by the brahmin and the mandarin intelligentsia in a status-conscious society.
It was dnring this trying period that leaders like
Gandhi and Mao appeared on the scene who could speak to the

common people as well as the elites.

While the intellectuals

discussed and wrote papers and articles about how to approach
problems and organise mass organizations, Gandhi and Mao were
out among the people creating genuine mass movements.

While

the majority of the party members catered to the interests of
the middle class, Gandhi and Mao were out campaigning on behalf
of the depressed peasants, and thus, mobilizing people's support that the Congress party of India and the Chinese Commnnist
party lacked.
Leadership style
The fact that communication obstacles were overcome
and that Gandhi and Mao successfully communicated highly controversial messages to huge masses of the people dispersed over
vast areas before the ,era of radio and television (as did every
other charismatic leader before mass media were invented)
raises interesting questions as to how they did it.

Communication to be conducted successfully across vast
geographical distances with groups of people speaking different
interests, requires alertness on the part of the communicator,
no less to the meaning of one's own speech than to the expectations of such an audience.

It also requires organization

and communication networks to forge a link between the leaders
and the led.

Above all, a leader's success in establishing
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reciprocity between himself and the people at large is part
of his communication skill.

. t eres t'1ng passage exp I alns
.
. R enou13.1n an 1n
L OU1S
Gandhi's "inner voice," upon which he claimed to rely for
decisions and ·direction, as a feeling of what the masses expected of him.

Ran Suyin

14

notes that the "intuitiveness"

of Mao was really his desire to be totally integrated with
his own people.

In an article, "Why India Follows Gandhi"

R.N. Brailsford explains it by saying that in India the leader who can control and discipline himself is considered capable of commanding the universe.

15

In other words, Gandhi

sought to combine his appeal to the spiritual elements in the
Indian make-up with his understanding of India's political and
social problems.

This is why, Sir Reginald Coupland maintains,

·what gave the Congress its present strength was its conv.ersion from a movement of the intelligentsia into a movement of
the people; and that was Mr. Gandhi's doing, almost singlehanded."

16

C.F. Andrews, who knew Gandhi intimately for many

years, had this to add:
13Louis Renou, "Gandhi and Indian Civilization," Gandhi Memorial
Peace Number. Visva Bharati Quarterly, 1949, p.231
14Han Suyin, The Morning Deluge. Little, Brown
Boston: 1972, p. 188

& Company,

15H • N • llrailsford, ·Why India Follolfs Gandhi," The Forum,
lXXXV, May, 1931 passim
16 Sir Reginald Coupland, The Indian Problem. 3 vols. in one;
Oxford University, London: 1944, p.92
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Thus Mahatma Gandhi remains rooted in the soil of India.
He is not deracine, like so many of those who have
stayed for a long time away from India and. have adopted
wholesale Western customs, His mind stretches out in
ever wider and wider circles •.• but the centre of his
being ever remains fixed in Hinduism itself, which is
his first and only love.li 7
.
As for Mao's charismatic tie to the Chinese people, Lucian
Pye maintains that the psychological link between Mao's private
relationship to words and his public appeal helps to explain
his extraordinary charismatic powers.

18

Schiffer believes

that 11ao had the ability to convince the Chinese people that
China can be restored to its righful position of greatness
in the world if only she would submit to demanding moral
standards of struggle and sacrifice.

19

Undoubtedly these

comments are biased by hindsight because it was not until the
1960's that Mao's charismatic quality in the traditional
sense was generally recognized.

Cultures, however, do differ in their responsiveness
to different leadership styles.

17C •F • Andrews, Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas. Macmillan, N.Y.:
1930, p.52
18Lucian W. Pye, Mao Tse-tung. llasic nooks, Inc., Publishers,
New York: 1976, pp. 229-260. Pye's hypothesis is that
Mao's vast range of prihlary experiences best explains Mao
both as rebel and as charismatic leader.
19Irvine Schiffer, Charisma: A Psychoanalytic Look at hlass
Society. University of Toronto Press, Toronto: 1973, passim
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Culture, as a preference for certain modes of behavior, involves a preference for certain personality
structures rather than others; the kind of person
favored in one culture maybe condemned in anotber. 20
In other words, leadership style is in fact a d·ynamic process
"adjusting ideas to people and people to ideas.-

21

In the

Indian culture' politics may easily lose out to religious values; an Indian critic of Gandhi pointed out that -behind
his politics there was always the touch of the old Indian
tradition of leadership, entirely different from what you
understand in Europe.

We in India understood it._22

Or, as

Gandhi himself once remarked to a friend, -:,:ost religious men
I have met are politicians in disguise.
.
th e gUlse

0

I, however, who wear

f a po l1· tlclan,
··
am a t h ear t a re 1"1910us man. _23

In Chinese culture the relationship between religious
thought and public affairs always had a curious ambivalence.

24

Wi th his imaginative use of Marxism-Leninism, 1:ao provided
the Chinese with a new set of ethics not merely to replace
20Charles Morris, Signs, Language. and Behavior. N.Y.:
1946, p.209
21

Donald C. Bryant, -Rhetoric: Its Function and its Scope,Quarterly Journal of Speech, 39, Dec., 1953, pp.401-424

22y.R,Jayakar, Talking of Gandhiji, 0rient Longmans, 1957,p.14
23Speeches and Writings of Mahatma Gandhi. Hatesan, 1918,
2nd ed., p.xxiv
24Robert T. Oliver, Communication and Culture in Ancient
India and China. Syracuse University fress, 1971, p.79
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traditional Confucianism and Taoism but to fuse what was
hitherto inadequate.lY joined.

25

Furthermore, 11ao's slogans

gave an essentially religious dimension to his words and
ideas.
Gandhi's and Mao's leadership of their parties was
significantly different.

Although Gandhi was a decisive in-

fluence in Congress he never held any official position in
its hierarchy.

It was a leadership style peculiarly Indian

and surely unique in the history of revolutions.

In China the

link between !Jao and Chinese Communist Party was institutionalized though it had an extra party leadership element because
of !Jao's intensely personal style.

Gandhi and Mao were both

however important links between the party and the people.

Communication channels

The anti-liberation forces had almost a monopoly on
the mass media and therefore Gandhi and Mao had no other choice
but to use non-media communication forms in addition to the
press.

They communicated with the masses through detailed

intimate organizations and this is why organizational modes of
communication were such powerful weapons in. their movements.

25Jerome Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution. Oxford
University Press, London: 1965, passim
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Party organization.

The Party is a key communication

link with the people, and therefore a task fundamental to the
liberation movement was to build the party organization.
Gandhi set out to bring about a complete change in the
Congress organizational constitution in the 1920 Nagpur session.

Congress party units were established at the lowest

village level, at the district level, and at the provincial
level.

26

A whole super-structure of authority was created,

along with the appropriate chain of command and lines of communication.

In Nehru's words,

He (Gandhi) made it democratic and a mass organization. Democratic i t had been previously also,
but it had so far been limited in franchise and
restricted to the upper classes. Now the peasants
rolled in, and in its new garb it began to assume
the look of a vast agrarian organization with a
strong sprinkling of the middle classes. This
agrarian character was to grow.· Industrial workers
also came in, but as individuals and not in their
separate, organized capacity.27
The Chinese Conununist Party organization went through
a radical change at the time when Chiang Kai-shek broke with
the Conununists in 1927.

28

Driven fron the cities, the center

of the movement shifted to the newly established rural areas
of the inland hills.

But the shift was more than geographic:

26pattabhi Sitaramayya, Historv of the Indian National
Congress. S. Chand & Company, New Delhi: 1947, p.207

27J.

Nehru, The Discovery of India. John Day, N.Y.: 1948, p.23

28Franklin W. lIoun, A Short History of Chinese Communism.
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1967, p.40
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an almost complete change in leadership went hand in hand with
a sharp change in Communist revolutionary practice.

Old revo-

lutionaries like Ch'en Tu-hsin and Li Li-san, were replaced by
advocates of peasant revolution, like Mao and chu Teh. l\:ao's
leadership changed the Party into a real mass organization.

29

In countries like China and India, where the vast
majority of the population come from the peasant class, an
aggressive land reform policy is sure to elicit popular support.

It is of significance, therefore, that Gandhi and l,'ao

chose peasant grievances for their initial campaigns in their
respective countries.

Gandhi launched the Champaran and the

Khaira peasant campaigns

30

which established him as a prominent

leader of Indian nationalism, gave him an effective protest
weapon which he used to link the peasantry with the Congress,
and inspired and brought important new leaders into the
Congress.

31

Mao's first important report was on the peasantry

in which he made the poor peasantry the "revolutionary vanguard. "

32

29Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, Republican China, Vintage
Books, A Division of Random !louse, H.Y.: 1967, pp.113-177
30As described by Gandhi in his autobiography, The Story of my
Experiments with Truth. Washington: Public Affairs Press,
1960, pp. 99-102
1
3 R .1. Crane, ")fodern India: A Background," Dniversi ty of
Chicago Magazine, November, 1956, pp. 10-11
32·Report of an Inve stigation into the Peasant l:ovement in
Hunan." Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol.I, 1:arch,
1927, pp.21-59
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The difference of course is that the Chinese Communist
Party never regarded agrarian reforms as anything more than a
phase in the building of a mass base, a stage enabling them to
develop the revolutionary struggle toward the conquest of power
and the ultimate realization of socialist changes.

Gandhi, on

the other hand, was looking for moral victory against injustice,
that is, to bear out his belief that one man with truth on his
side could wield immense moral power.

There was an ambivalent

element in his attitude toward the place of power in politics.
Because he always looked at politics more from the
standpoint of the rebel than of the ruler, of freedom than of authority, of the individual than of
the State.33
What is important, however, is, that by bringing peasants into their concept of the communication process Gandhi
and Mao unleashed the enormous creative power of the masses,
For the first time in the history of the liberation movements
in India and China, the Chinese Communist Party and the Congress Party became mass orgaoizations, in the sense that national
awakening had not only penetrated to the people at large, but
also made them active participants in the struggle for freedom.
As contributions to this process,Gandhi and 1'ao promoted
three main criteria in the organization of their parties:

33Raghavan Iyer, The Moral and Political Thought of l.!ahatma
Gandhi. Oxford University Press, New York: 1973, p.53
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(1)

The party must represent the interests of the
masses;

(2)

The masses must be treated as equals;

(3)

The masses must be aroused and educated and led
by the correct methods.

These three criteria were addressed to the party workers,
because the responsibility for articulating and maintainiag the
communication link belonged to the leaders, not the led.

The

party can fulfill the tasks of. mass mobilization i f i t abides
by these criteria.
The press.

Gandhi and lIao looked upon the press as a

potent weapon in the struggle to educate and persuade public
opinion both inside and outside the country.

However, a press

based on mass circulation needs a high rate of literacy in society,
and literacy, in turn, depends on a national government which is
committed to such a goal.

Repressive government policies, lack

of equipment and facilities, illiteracy, and general apathy were
some of the obstacles that Gandhi and Mao had to overCOille before
the press could playa significant role in national movements.
The structure of the press in India was rather complicated during the national movement.

The prominent newspapers

which generally supported the views and actions of the British
government in India were The statesman, The Times of India, The
Civil and Military Gazette, The Pioneer, and The 1[adras Fail.
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Some of the nationalist papers supporting the Indian National
Congress were: Amri ta Bazar Patrika, The Hindustan Times.
The Hindu, The Leader, The Indian Social Reformer, The
Modern Review were some of the outstanding journals reflecting
the liberal school of nationalism.

The most important for the

movement was the Party press, organized at national, regional,
and local levels, corresponding to the organizational structure of the Party.
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Jawaharlal Nehru guided the policy of the

National Herald launched in August 1938, an English daily supporting the Congress.

In Bombay, there was a Congress news-

paper in the Bombay Chronicle, and the Free Press Journal.
These newspapers pursued a policy of supporting the Congress
party.
Harijan

Gandhi had his own newspapers, Young India and
35

which presented his views mainly.

He stated in

one of his editorials:
I would like every Congressman who desires to serve
in the Satyagraha Sena (nonviolent army) to read
my two speeches made at RaLlgarh (at the subjects
committee meeting of the party) as well as whatever
else I may write in Hari,ian on the struggle, and_to
carry out the instructions meant for him or her 3b

As the national struggle proceeded Indian vernacular
newspapers assumed a new tone in attacking the government;
4
3 S • Natarajan, A Historv of the Press in India. Asia
Publishing House, 1962, p.50
35 Uari ,ian was to- appear in three languages: lTarijan in
English, llarijanbandhu in Gujrati and Harijansevak in Ilindi.
36Hari,ian, March 3D, 1940
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the press became an influential factor

i~

molding public

opinion, as there were twenty newspapers published in English
and some two hundred in Indian languages.
Mao had no access to the national press which was primarily pro-Western.

The basic principle of the press structure

of the Chinese Communist Party was of course integration of
the press with the Party structure.

The functions of the press

were specifically propaganda and agitation.

!,:ao told the staff

of a communist newspaper, "Your job is to educate the masses,
to enable the masses to know their own interests, their tasks,
and the Party's general and specific policies"37

the press

was directed to emphasize mass political agitation, " .•.. the
press should carry editorials on rent reduction and reports
of good examples.

As rent reduction is a IDass struggle by

the peasants, Party directives and government decrees should
guide and help it instead of trying to bestow favours on the
masses ...... .38

The first charge of sedition brought against Gandhi in
1922 was based upon four articles he had written in Young India.
In his defense at the trial he said the following:

37Selected Works of !.lao Tse-tung, vol. IV, pp. 225-227
38Ibid, pp. 126-130
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••••• it has been a precious privilege for me to be
able to write what I have.in the various articles
tendered in evidence against me .•.•• I am here, therefore, to invite and cheerfully submit to the highest
penalty that can be inflicted upon me for what in
law is a deliberate crime and what appears to me
to be the highest duty of a citizen ..••. 39
Against the government's order to shut down his newspaper, he
declared in

th~

columns of Harijan on October 24, 1940:

Let everyone become his walking newspaper and carry
the good news from mouth to mouth ..... telling my
neighbour what I have authentically heard. This no
government can suppress.
It is the cheapest newspaper
yet devised, and it defies the wit of government,
however clever it may he.

During the Civil Disobedience movement of 1930, Gandhi
brought out unregistered mimeographed sheets of news.

As

early as 1919 he had remarked on the possibilities of written
newspapers which "need not occupy more than one side of half
a foolscap."
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It had the advantage of not needing large

finance and Gandhi was insistent that the national movement
must be as independent of finance as possible.

Commending

thesd newspapers as a potential power for "transmission of

pure ideas in ~ concise manner 1' (without advertisements), he
reminded his public of the tradition of India of "imparting
instruction of oral teaching."

Furthermore, Gandhi advocated

acceptance of responsibility for these sheets by advising the

39Young India, March 23, 1922
40 Jag Parvesh Chander, (Ed.) Teachings of }~ahatma Gandhi.
Indian :Printing Works, Lahore: 1945, p.45
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writer to place his name and address on every copy (expressing
open defiance to the suppression of the press and inviting
arrest by the government).

This was also in accordance to what

Gandhi had written in Young India on January 10, 1922 when he
referred to the policy of the government in restricting individual liberty:
I believe that an Editor who has anything worth saying and
who commands a clientele cannot be easily hushed so long
as his body is left free. lIe has delivered his unfinished
message as soon as he is put underduress .•.. Let us break
the idol of machinery and leaden type. The pen is our
foundry and the hands of willing copyists our printing
machine ••• Let us use ·the machine and the type, whilst we
can, to give unfettered expression to our thoughts. But
let us not feel helpless when they are taken away from us
by a "paternal" Government, watching and controlling
every combination of types and every movement of the
printing machine. But the handwritten newspaper is, I
admit, a heroic remedy meant for heroic times ••. We must
apply Civil Disobedience for the restoration of free
speech, free association and free press is almost the
whole Swaraj (freedom).
Gandhi also made full use of the growing number of
vernacular papers and persuaded them to pledge to the nationalist cause.

Each such paper, with its local following, was in

a position to publicize Congress goals and educate the public
on important developments.

More important, the vernacular

press could expose local grievances to which Congress needed
to be attuned, thus bringing a variety of issues effectively
before the high command.
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Mao's attention to newspapers began early in his life:
I had acquire.d a newspaper-reading habit, and from
1911 to 1927, when I climhed up Ghingkangshan (his
guerrilla base area) I never stopped reading the daily
papers of Peiping, Shanghai, and Hunan. 41

Mao published an article in a national journal even before he
was out of school, and found the Hsiang-chiang p'ing-Iun himself the year after he graduated from Normal School.

42

article in the Hsiang River Review in 1919 spoke of need for a
cultural revolution to change society--"the only way to emancipate millions of people and their energy and to carry forward
the ultimate aim of liberating the country from im,erialism
and all capitalists.
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An article by him On Radicalism stated

that armed struggle was the only way a revolution could succeed.
This resulted in a ban on Mao's weekly by the provincial governor of Hunan, and the Student Union was disbanded.

He contri-

buted articles to another student paper, New TIunan, which too
was suppressed in December 1919.

44

In the Hsiang Chiang Review, New Hunan, and other papers,
Mao's articles covered the whole spectrum of change, of revolt
41

Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China. Grove Press, Inc., N.Y.:
1938, p.150

42Lucian Pye, OPe cit., pp.242-243
43Han Suyin, The Morning Deluge, Lao 'rse-tung and the Chinese
Revolution 1893-1954. Little, Brown and Co., Boston: 1972, p.76
44A Concise History of Chinese Newspapers. Hong Long, 1957, p.173
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against tradition and the breakthrough of a generation into a
new world.

The first issue of the Hsiang River Review con-

tained his article "The Women's Revolutionary Army," which
evoked response from the girl's schools and according to Ran
Suyin led to the establishment of "an alliance of women students" to "fight imperialism, militarism and capitalism, and
all supersti tion'~ 45

In 1926 Mao wrote in the Communist 'Yeekly

Guide on "The Bitter Sufferings of the Peasants in the Provinces
of Kiangsu and Chekiang, and their Anti-feudal, Anti-landlord
Movement," in 1930 he advocated "without investigation no right
to speak,"
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and advised workers and students to study the situ-

ation first hand bef ore writing anything.
In the prevailing illiteracy and poverty of the masses,
however, Gandhi and Mao, as leaders of mass movements, had to
link the written word to the spoken; that is, link newspapers
with face-to-face communication.

Erickson gives an apt illus-

tration of how Gandhi became a "living, walking newspaper":
Luther's pamphlets, in all their formidable formality,
could count on the fast multiplication and distribution
of printed matter--.hot off the press. But Gandhi
entrusted himself to the railroads, and while loudly

45Han Suyin, op. cit., pp. 75-78
460ppose The Party 'Eight-Legged Essay' (February 8, 1942)
Selected Works, Vol. IV, pp. 46-62
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complaining against the miserable conditions of thirdclass travel, he made the very most of joining the masses in motion, in stations, and especially in the compartments where they were thrown toget:ler most indiscriminately, often far away from home, and yet sure
to return there or to arrive in new places with such
news as spreads from rail centers to villages via oxcarts and camelback. And then Gandhi stopped and
stayed and talked, a quiet, almost tender orator, but
a man of the most intense and convincing presence, and
a speaker who could make intimate contact with each
particular audience.47
Mao emphasized collective newspaper reading among workers and
peasants so as to establish a degree of genuine identity of
interest between the party and. these two social groups.
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Although the Congress Party and the Chinese Communist Party
used the press for political and social education of their more
literate activists, they had no choice but to rely on face to
face communication to communicate effectively with the illiterate rural society.
Mass organizations.

Of all the means of communication

linking leaders with followers, mass organizations were perhaps
the most significant in the Congress Party's and the Chinese
Communist Party's strategy of national mobilization.

In India

operations such as the Mass Contacts Programme of the midthirties had strengthened contact with the public.

It was

47Erik H. Erikson, Gandhi's Truth. W.W. Norton & Company,
Inc., New York: 1969, p. 278

48

F.T.C. Yu, Mass Persuasion in Communist China. Fre<lerick
A. Praeger, New York: 1964, passim
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through volunteer organizations that the message of freedom
by non-cooperation was spread among the masses.

According

to the official report, "the members of volunteer organizations
spread themselves over the countryside, inspiring rustics,
only a shade more credulous than themselves, with contempt for
constituted authority."49

In addition, the Village Construc-

tive Programme, on which Gandhi had put so much emphasis through
the years, had borne its fruit in organizational groupings that
linked the Congress structurally with the masses.
true also of the Congress youth program.
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This was

Though the membership

of the Congress fluctuated during the Gandhian era, membership
figures were always higher than in any previous period of
Congress history.

Mao maintained that "democratic centralism" can be widely
and effectively practic,d in mass organizations only when its
efficacy is demonstrated in revolutionary struggle and the
masses understand that it is the best means of mobilizing their
forces and is of the utmost help in their struggle.
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All the

organizations, including unions, peasant associations, national
salvation associations, were organized on the basis of democratic centralism; that is, they had a broad mass base but
49 R • C • Majumdar, History of the Freedom Vovement in India. Vol.III,
Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta: 1963, p.205
50Robert I. Crane, "Leadership of the Congress Farty," in Leadership and Political Institutions in India, 1959, p.185
1
5 Ilpyong J. Eim, "Hass Mobilization Policies and Techniques
developed in tne period of the Chinese ;;Qviet Republic," in
Chinese Communist Politics in Action, 1969, pp.78-98
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lower levels submitted to orders from higher levels and the
individuals submitted to organizational discipline.
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These mass organizations were devoted to mobilizing
the masses for assisting the Party in national struggle and
social construction.

In recognition of this service, the

Congress Party and the Chinese Communist Party assisted, the
organizations financially and by providing them with meeting
places and equipment.

In other words, the Congress party53

and the Chinese Communist Party54 were in firm control of
these mass organizations, most of which its political workers
had initially organized.
Both, Gandhi and Mao had almost a mystical reliance
on the masses, and the techniques for mass mobilization, simpIe yet thorough, depended primarily on face to face contact.
Gandhi I s campaigns

0

f "going to the peopl e" 55 and 1,; a 0 ' s

"to_the_village,,56 were far more effective and widespread
than ever before in the history of India or China.

~ao

con-

stantly exhorted party members to get close to the masses,
52James R. Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China,
University of California Press, Berkeley: 1967, pp.736-764
53Robert I. Crane, op. cit. pp. 169-187
54Charlmers A. Johnson, Peasant :-;rationalism and Communist Power.
Stanford University Press, 1962, passim
55 M• K • Gandhi, 'fo.ards Non-Violent Socialism. Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad: 1951, p.8
56Mark Seldon, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China.
University Press, 1971, p.21Q

Harvard
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both physically and psychologically, and to listen to all
popular opinions and de.mands. 57

The "Resolutions

Oll

th" Feasant

Movement" adopted at the enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee
in July, 1926

58

told Party members to adopt the peasant's style

of speech, action, living conditions, and dress.

By June 1, 1943,

the Chinese Communist Party mass line in China appeared in a form
that has remained virtnally unchanged Go-m to the present time,
Briefly, the Congress Party's approach and that of the
Chinese Communist Party to mass mobilization was infused with a
new element that was of decisive importance in the success of the
two parties.

This element was nationalism, accompanied by a

sense of urgency that created a united front against a foreign
enemy.

During this period of struggle, the public pronouncements

of Gandhi and Mao always included emotional and nationalistic
appeals for total mobilization against a power.ful enemy.

The

nationalistic orientation placed mass participation in the service of a cause that transcended group interests and the cla.s
struggle.

57Mao , "Rectify the Party's Style in Work," Selected Works, IV,
pp. 42-43
58 C • Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, eds., Documents on
Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, 19181927. New York: 1956, pp. 298-302
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The 1942-44 Phases of National Struggle
As already indicated, the national liberation movements
developed over a long period of time between the 1920's and
1930's.

In both cases a critical turning point in the deve-

lopment of their struggle was in the 1940's.

This is no acci-

dent because this period was the hardest fought period of
World War II
China.

fighting which had a big impact on both India and
A brief historical sketch of Gandhi's

'Quit India' movement and Mao's 'Rectification' campaign which
culminated in the final struggle for freedom

will provide

the basis for analyzing the messages of each during the 1942-44
period in the next chapter.
The 'Quit India' movement of 1942
The action of the British Government in sending Indian
troops abroad, to the Middle East and Singapore and later of
issuing a proclamation of war, without consulting central or
provincial legislatures was criticized by the Congress Party
as an act which dragged India into the war without her consent. 59
The action was no doubt strictly constitutional but it was
certainly against the spirit of the Act of 1935 under which,
though Defence and Foreign Affairs were reserved subjects, the
Governor-General should have consulted responsible ministers in
59The Working Committee Resolution dated September 14, 1939,
p.12

the matter of a declaration of war.

The Congress withJrew its

members from the central legislature as a protest against the
sending of troops wi thout its consent and when war was proclaimed, Congress provincial ministers resigned from seven out of
eleven provinces.

The Haripura Congress meeting in 1938 had

already declared that India would take no part in Britain's
war and would resist the employment 01 India's manpower and
resources.

The conflict between the Indian people and the

British Government becahle increasingly sharp during the war
which finally culminated in the 'Quit India' movement led by
Gandhi.

He demanded freedom of India before Britain's victory;

the government wanted victory first before it was willing to
grant India's independence.

By 1942, the Japanese had swept swiftly through Southeast Asia to the borders of India and threatened to invade.
The Congress party affirmed in a manifesto that India "will
gladly associate herself with other free nations for mutual
defence against aggression and for economic co-operation ... "

but only as a free nation could India be effective.

The British

government, however, had no intention of giving India freedom,
independence, Dominion status, or even lesser rights.

Winston

Churchill was Prime Minis ter and he was always guided by his
famous dictum o'f November 10, 1942, "I have not become the
King's First Minister in order to preside at the liquidation of
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the British Empire."

He had said in 1935, "Gandhism and all it

stands for must ultimately be grappled with and finally crushed,:60

From the time Churchill became the l:ing' s First

Minister in 1940, to the day in 1945 when he was ousted from
office, he waged an unceasing war wi th Gandhi.

This explains

the failure of the mission undertaken by Stafford Cripps on
behalf of the British government in the middle of 1942.

Fiasco of the Cripps 1iission.

The Cripps ;:ission was

a curuulative result of several factors.
threat of Japan to India.

The first was the

During the period from DeceJober 7,

1941, when Japan struck at Pearl Harbor, to hlarch

7, 1942,

when Rangoon fell, Japan completed the occupation of the whole
of South East Asia.

With Pearl Harbor and· the rapid loss of

Malaya, Singapore, and Burma resulted in a greater inclination to act on the part of the British and a greater disposi.
61
tion to co-operate aillong Indian leaders.
The Indian government started releasing Indian leaders
from prison under the stress of Japanese conquest and on ,:arch
11, 1942-- four days after the fall of Rangoon -- Churchill
announced the Cripps Mission giving as his reason that: "'£he
crisis in the affairs of India arising out of
60LDuis Fischer, Gandhi: His Life and Message for the World.
A Signit Key Book, 1954, p. 135
61Perceival Spear, India. The University
Ann Arbor, 1961, p. 395-406

.of

Michigan Press,
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the Japanese advance had made us wish to rally all the forces
of Indian life, to guard their land from the menance of the
.
d e~-.
-" 62
1nva

A second factor was the pressure of Preaiient Roosevelt.
Roosevelt talked to Churchill privately at the time of his
visi t to Washington in December, 19 1,1.

lIe

again sent a cable

to Churchill on March 10, in which he went so far as to suggest
a concrete solution to the Indian problem on the lines of an
analogy of U.S. history between 1783 and 1789.
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l'he next day

Churchill announced the Cripps hlission.

Developments in India also demanded some measure of
settlement.

The first was the growing frustration in India

with the advance of the Japanese and the economic effects of
the war which culminated in an awesome famine in Bengal in 19!±3
when millions of people died like flies.

Also the Axis pro-

paganda (from Berlin) was proving very effective in rousing
the masses who would rejoice every time the British suffered
reverses.

6q

The second development was that the Congress hroke

with Gandhi (who was opposed to the war effort) and offered

62Amba Prasad, The Indian Revolt of 19!±2. S. Chand & Company,
Delhi: 1958, p.1!±

63 R • C •

Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India,
op. cit., p. 199

61±R. Coupland, Cripps Mission. London, 19!±2, pp. 28-29
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cooperation in the war effort so as to arrive at some settlement.

Furthermore, public opinion in England was nOil turn-

ing overwhelmingly i~ favor of reconciling India.

Cripps

assured the British parliament that the "Government was much

.

concerned as was everybody else';
upon the government the
ment.

ur~ency
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The Labor party impressed

of forming a national govern-

The reasons why Churchill agreed to Cripps pro;!Osals,

as explained by him in a letter to the Viceroy of endia, were
two: assuaging American opinion by showing British sincerity
of purpose, and organizing better defence of India.

66

Cripps arrived in India on March 22, 1942, and left on
April 11, 1942.

In these twenty days, high hopes were raised

which amounted to nothing in the end.

The main lines of the

proposals may be summarised as follo>ls.

An Indian Union with

Dominion status, under a new Indian Council was to be set up
immediately after the war.

Freedom to draw up the constitution

would include the right of secession from the Commonwealth.
The Indian states would be free to join the linioll, and provinces
could withdraw if they wished.

Disputes arose, however, over

the precise powers of the new council, particularly with regard to defense.

65R •

Coupland,

Ibid., p. 187

66 Lord Halifax, The Indian Problem.

New York: 1942, pp.200-211
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Gandhi's reaction was unfavorable, particularly to the
prospect of a divided India.

lIe felt that Cripps had allowed

himself to become a part of the machinery of British imperia1ism and so advised Cripps to "take the first plane home."
Some of the leaders, like Nehru were for acceptance, but, the
final word was spoken by Gandhi, who travelled to Delhi to urge
rejectioa.

He described the offer as a "blank cheque on a

failing bank."

And so by April 1942, Gandhi had already evolved

the demand that "the British shoul:1 leave India now in an orderly manner," and in June he told an American journalist,

"1 am not interested in independence after the war.
independence now.

1 want

That will help Britain win the war."

This

demand developed into a call for a "short and swift open rebellion" in which all patriots, including the soldiery, would
participate.

He was faced, he said with "a drastic situation

requiring a drastic remedy. ,,67

Briefly, the Cripps Miss,ion ended in a fiasco because
68
of Britain's unwillingness to accede to India's minimum demands.
The deep-seated distrust between the government and the Indian
leaders was finally responsible for the Mission's complete
failure.

The refusal of the government to declare its war aims,

67Tendu1kar, op. cit., pp. 89, 93, 99, 117
6f1liren Mukerji, Gandhi,ji: A Study. National Book Agency
(Private) Ltd., Calcutta: 1958, p.140
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the Atlantic Charter statement of Churchill and the past
record of British policy towards the Congress all made the
Congress suspect that Cripps was a tool of the arch-imperialist Churchill.
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Gandhi and the "August Revolution".

'l'he failure of

the Cripps mission brought about a dramatic change in Gandhi's
communication style.

The writings of this period reflect new

anti-war, anti-British sentiments, very different from the
earlier stress on accomodation and cooperation between the
people and the government.

A systematic content analysis of

the period before 1942 might reveal different findings from the
1942-44 period we will be analysing in the next chapter.

Our

study shows that from 1942 onwards, Gan:lhi acted with new
urgency.

For instance, he spoke of nonviolence for the first

time in a different tone:
I have decided that even at certain risks, which are
obviously involved, I must ask the people to. resist
the slavery •••. There is ordered anarchy all round and
about us.
I am sure that the anarchy that may result,
because o.f the British withdrawal or their refusal to
listen to. us and our decision to. defy their authority
will in no way be worse than the present anarchy.
After all, tho.se who are unarmed cannot produce a
frightful amount of violence or anarchy, and I have
a faith that out of this anarchy may arise pure nonviolence. But to bea passive witness of the terrible violence that is going on, of the terrible
anarchy that is going on in the name of resisting
a possible foreign aggression, is a thing I can't
stand. It is a thing that would make me ashamed of
my ahimsa (nonviolence)7 0
69 J • L • Nehru, Discoyery of India. New York, 1946, p.472
70 quo ted in Hiren Mukerji, op. cit., p. 145
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It was about this time that Gandhi began to popularise his
dramatic slogan "Quit India.,,7

1

Early in Lay, 1942, he said

in the course of an interview:
From the frustration of every effort made to bring
about unity by me among others, has arisen this
logical step for me that not until British po.ver
is wholly wi thdrawn frolD India, can there be any
real uni'ty, because all parties will be looking
to the foreign power ••. Therefore, I have come to
the conclusion that real heart unity, genuine unity,
is almost an impossibility unless British por'er is
withdrawn and no other power takes its place. 72

Gandhi sponsored a Congress resolution urging struggle
for freedom "with all the armed as well as oth'3r forces at her
(India) command."7}

The government policy, after the failure of the Cripps
mission, was to postpone the constitutional issue to the end
of war, and in the meanwhile, to penalise any revolt and to
prepare Indian and world opinion against the Congress, by propaganda.

It was "a policy of three P's--postponement, pena-

lisation and propaganda.,,7

4

1
7 • The original idea of asking the British to go," Gandhi said
to Louis Fischer in June 1942, "burst upon me suddently.
It
was the Cripps fiasco that inspired the idea." 1:ahatma
Gandhi, The Last Phase, p.l}O
72Uari,ian, May}, 1942
73J • Nehru, The Discovery of India, pp.480-85
74Amba Prasad, op. cit., p.8}
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Matters now came quickly to a crisis.

Congress, under

Gandhi's guidance, declilred nonviolent resistance demanding
thilt the British "Quit India".

The sanction behind this de-

mand was mass civil disobedience.

The new slogan gathered, in

one rush of feeling, all the humiliations and resentments in
the country of the last many years.
like 'Long Live Revolution, '
to Mother India,'

To the traditionu3

'Victory to Gandhiji,'

slogans

'Victory

'Long Live Free India,' Gandhi added new

ones like 'We shall do or die,' and 'Quit India.'

The new

slogans demanded complete withdrawal and ex<,ressed determination
to die in the fight for freedom.
The aims and objects of the movement were stated in a
Congress Working Committee resolution passed at Wardha on
July 14, 1942, and adopted at the meeting of the All India
Congress Committee at Bombay on August 8.

Nehru stated that

the reso lution was s I,onsored by Gandhi himsel f and into it
went all his beliefs and ideas. 75

Three objects were stated

in the Wardha resolution and three more were added in the
Bombay resolution.

These were as follows:

(1)

To overthrow foreign domination of India

(2)

To build up a spirit of resistance to aggression
among the people and to release that energy and
enthusiasm to defend India

(3)

To achieve communal unity at the withdrawal of
the British

75J • Nehru, op_ cit., p.484
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The Bombay resolution added three more:
(1)

To throw all India'-s resources against Nazism
and Fascism to win moral SIlPPOl't of all oPl'ressed
humanity

(2)

To help Asiatic nations fighting colonialsm
regain their freedom

(3)

To bring about a world federation which would
enSJlre disarmament and pooling of the world's
resources for humane purposes.

The Resolution had the overwhelming suppo:ct of the
Congressmen and was passed with only 13 opposing it out of
300 members of the Congress Committee that were present.
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The Resolution included sanction to enforce a mass
civil-disobedience campaign.

"After all," said Gandhi,

"this is open rebellion," it looked as though the peak of the
crisis was coming in October.
struck hard.
nization.

At this point the government

The whole Congress was declared an illegal orga-

There followed a short but sharp outbreak of vio-

lence which caused widespread dislocation, especially in Uttar
Pradesh, Bihar, and Bengal.

Official figures reckoned over

1,000 killed and 3,000 injured by the end of the year, while
more than 60,000 were arrested.

The government described it

as the Congress Rebellion and tried to connect Congress leaders
with it; Congress ascribed the violence to the intolerable
strain imposed by government intransigence on popular feeling.
76Indian Annual Register, 1942, Vol. II, p.244
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It was clear to both, however, that Gandhi had succeeded in
shaking India out of her lethargy and the torpor of centuries.

It seemed as though the government had triumphed but it was
not very difficult to perceive that the tremendous underground
reservoir of national feeling was awaiting a release by war
pressure in order to come to the surface.
The 'Rectification' movement of 1942
Since 1938 Mao had hinted several times that a great
·study· drive for Party building was essential.

It was neces-

sary to reorient, correct, strengtheu and stabilize the Party,
especially now that it showed overwhelming expansion in the
three years after the outbreak of war in 1937, there was a
twenty-fold increase in party membership from 40,000 to 800,000
with consequent defects.

And it was also necessary to settle

some unresolved "historical questions,· that had arisen since
January 1935, when at the so-called Tsunyi conference Mao was
first voted into pOlVer.

Furthermore, a great many intellec-

tuals who were politically unseasoned due to their bourgeois
background, had come to Yenan.

In Decelllber 1939 1;ao had stated

the Party's need for intellectuals "who serve the working class
and the peasantry; without the participation of intellectuals,
the Revolution cannot be victorious."

Mao's "rectification"

66
movement therefore becull,e urgently necessary.

As the shor-

tages and material difficulties temporarily added to the disunity factors, the subsequent Production Drive also created
the conditions in which rectification could occur.

The theme

of the Hectification moveme"t became the union of "the universal
truths of 1:arxism-Leninism with the reality of the Chinese
Revolution. ,,77

In June 1941 I:itlcr's forces invaded the lSSR.

This at once cleared the confusion in Communist minds arisiilg
from Stalin's non-aggression pacts with both Hitler and Japan-which Hao had defended.

In December 1941 occurred Pearl

Harbor; with America in the war, China became of enhanced
importance.

The U.S. did not want Chiang to start another anti-

communist onslaught like'the one against l:ao' s New Fourth Army
in January 1941.

The Chinese Communist Party under Mao's guidance was
the main force pinning down Japanese armies, and now the next
step had to be the solidification of power.

And for this, a

Rectification movement in Mao's view was essential.

It was a

total preparation of the P~rty for total victory; reorienting
its attitude to the masses, reshaping its style of communication, streamlining it, throwing out opportunists, enemy agents
and other "undesirables," quelling "factions," and writing
Party history,

It was a tremendous political education project.

77Boyd Compton, llao's China, Party Reform Documents, 1942-44.
University of Washington Press, 1952, p.xxxix
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To this Mao gave his attention for the next three years and
it bore fruit as planned.
This campaign paints a picture of Mao's Party as it
was molded and trained in the Anti-Japanese '.rar Bases to win a
startlingly swift victory in the Civil War.

~ao

took great

pains to educate leaders and most of his writings during this
period speak about Party problems and are addressed to a Party
audience.
In two speeches of February 1, 1942, launching the campaign officially, Mao set forth guidelines which were followed
during the next two years.

His major theme was the role of

ideology in the Chinese revolution, particularly in "the study
of current affairs ••• historical research, and ... the application
.
L
..
o f MarXlsmen1DIsm
. ,,78

.

Mao launched a broad three-front attack

on errors in the Party's' style of work and thought.

He criti-

cised subjectivism in thought, sectarianism (separation from the
masses) in Party relations, and formalism in literature and art.
Mao's harshest comments were reserved for those who "study the
theories of Marx,

Engels, Lenin, and Stalin abstractly and

aimlessly, and do not inquire about their connection with the
Chinese revolution ••• it's merely theory for the sake of

theory.~9

78Mao Tse-tung, "Reconstruction of Our Studies," in Compton,
Mao's China, p.62

79 Ibid ., p.64
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The greateit significance of the Rectification dampaign was

Mao's insistence that Marxism be made Chinese.

lie saw Marxism

as an "arrow" and the Chinese liberation movement as a

Tlturge~ll

The principal enemy of the Rectification movemen.t ',vas the
dogmatist:
In speech they can appear more Marxist than anyone
else ••. they invariably base their actions on books,
on set phrases of Earx, Engels, Lenin, or Stalin~ •.
Their decisions ••• are from book formulas, historical
comparisons, or from similar events in Russia and the
countries of ,','estern Europe. 80
Mao's February speech was not the signal for an entirely
new Party policy.

It came rather as the formalization of a

development which began with the war.

In 1940, in "The New

Democracy," Mao presented a detailed interpretation of the
Chinese revolution.
of Marxism.

Here again he focused on the sinification

The lines of thought leading to the Rectification

movement were further developed in 1941 with Mao's speech on
"The Reconstruction of Our Studies" and a Central Committee
resolution on "Strengthening the Party Spirit."

The culmina-

tion was in Mao's February, 1942, speech and the formal movement which started in April.

The Yenan Period.

The Rectification movement marked a

major turning point in the Chinese Communist Party; indeed,
for many students of Chinese Communism the Rectification
BOLiu Shao-ch'i, "Liquidation of ilenshevik Thought in the
Party," Compton,
Ihid., p.255
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movement for all practical purposes

~ the Yenan period. 81

It was the Party's most creative epoch that culminated in its
final triumph.

The probl.ms that emerged were in the base

areas and the tensions implicit in New Democrati.c politics.
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Under conditions of guerrilla warfare throughout North China,
and with only primitive communications linking the"]} with Yenan,
blind obedience to party directives was not encouraged,
although the Thectification movement did attempt to strengthen
the chain of command.

Guerrilla conditions required a maximum

of flexibility and decentralization of control and authority.
Therefore, it was critically important that local leaders
share the goals and ideas of the movement.

In other words,

the Rectification movement sought to "harmonize the two

COll-

flicting imperatives of 'conscious action' by individuals and
impeccable social discipline".83

Toward this end the party

launched a cadre education campaign to instill primary loyalty
to the movement in the face of powerful enemy fo=ces and conflicting personal bonds.
81

The slogan "Unified leadership and

Mark Seldon, The Yenan Period.
1971, p.188

Harvard University Press,

82 New Democratic politics constituted new approaches to mass
participation, local leadership, and administration, which
sought initially to stabilize and then gradually to transform the institutional fabric of the border region.
83Stuart R. Schram, !.fao Tse-tung.
Penguin, 1966, p.269

Harmondsworth, England:
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decentralized administration" defined the control exercised-overall authority and leadership were concentrated in Yenan
but local initiative was encouraged, a system whicb required
a high level of political education.
During 1941-42 there emerged a constellation of policies associated with the "mass line" out of the devastation
brought about by Japanese aggression coupled with Chiang's
blockade against Communist-led base areas.

Yenan, capital of

the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, served as the Party's
headquarters throughout the War of Resistance against Japan.
The mass line politics of 1943 represented a synthesis of policies containing in a developed form virtually every significant
element of the Chinese Communist Party's distinctive approach
to the war of liberation.

84

The scope an d intent of the policies implemented throughout the base areas at the time of the Rectification movement are
suggested by the major campaigns launched simultaneously by the
party and government.

Viewed as an integrated program, the

Yenan period represents a distinctive approach to economic
development, social transfor;:nation, and liberation war.

lIere

we may suggest the dimensions of the major campaigns that make

up the
84

Rectification movement.

Mark Seldon, op. cit., p.177

85Mark Seldon,

Ibid,

p.210
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(1)

The campaign for simple.administrution, the purpose

of which was to reduce costs for the taxpayer, to
transfer power to local communities, and to encourage a style of communication in .line with the
national liberation movement.
(2)

The "to-the-village" campaign designed to destroy
barriers between an educated elite and the most
deprived people in the countryside, as well as
between mental and manual labor.

(3)

The campaign for the reduction of rent and interest
aroused the peasantry in areas where there had been
little or no land revolution.

(4)

The cooperative movement, based on traditional
forms of mutual aid, was the party's first major
effort, to reorganize the village economy.

(5)

The production movement introduced a variety of
new approaches tn the economy of the border region.
One of these was an "organizational economy" in

which every organization and every cadre participated in tasks ranging from management of neW industries to collecting manure for the cooperative
vegetabla garden of the local party branch.
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(6)

The popular education movement expanded the scope
and modified the form and content of education,
spreading literacy and introducing new ideas to
remote villages.

Briefly, it was during the Yenan period that a communication style of leadership in the liberation movement was raised
to the level of theory as the mass line.

The mass line

repre~

sents the most important contribution of the Chinese experience
to the theory and pructice of conducting liberation movements.
This linking of theory and practice in the context of
intense struggle was the hallmark of the chengfeng
(rectification) movement. The result was to forge a
working consensus both on ultimate values and immediate
action within cadre units, to increase communication

between leadership and lower-ranking cadres as well as
between cadres and the people, and to heighten cadre
awareness of the integral part their own work played
in a unified revolutionary movement. 86
Commitment to the party and the movement was particularly critical during the civil war period that follo"ed and during the
intensification of rural revolution when the support of large
numbers of cadres from an elite background, who had initially
joined the party to fight the Japanese, had to be retained.

The

Rectification movement helped create an institutional context
for individual education and change.
Preparation for total victory.

The central purpose of

the Rectification movement was to build the Party's ability to
86Mark Seldon, op. cit •• p;195
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conduct a n.tional war leading to total victory.

The reconstruc-

tion and transformation of the stagnant agrarian economy was the
key to the success of the movement.

From 19'2, in Shen-Fan-

Ning the movement's primary tas!, lay in transforming the structure of social and particularly economic life at the village
level.

Shortly the drive spread to every base area in North and

Central China.

In the final triumphant years of the war of re-

sistance against Japan, the mass line took root in the base
areas and on the battlefields throughout China.

This prepared

the movement for its final victory during the civil war.

CHAPTER

III

THE GANDHI-MAO THEArES: 1942-44
The previous chapter has provided the broader context
of the Indian and Chinese liberation movements

an~

the speci-

fics of the national struggle in both countries during 1942-44.
The task of this. chapter is to provide a quantitative and
qualitative message analysis of the basic themes used by the
two leaders during this brief but critical period.

The next

chapters will draw certain inferences from these findings
concerning, first, the more latent (as contrasted with the
more explicit or manifest) communication theories of uandhi
and Mao, and second, -- as part of the general conclusions -their communication behavior.

Analytical Scheme
The statements o'f Gandhi and 1Iao on communication
have been classified with the concept of mass line as the
central element.

The concept of mass line may be defined as

a non-elitist approach initiating genuine mass participation
and linking the leaders and the masses through multi-modal
communication networks.

The attempt is to distinguish between

the content, style and channels of communication reflected in
Gandhi's and Mao's practices and writings for the purpose of
making comparisons.
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Careful reading of the materials suggest that the
following categories - all of which tend to heighten the
sense of national identity and focus on the people's needs and
demands - are among the most salient elements of their statements during the period of 1942-44:
A.

Conditions of Crisis deals with a situation in
which severe deprivation, oppression, violence are
inflicted or threatened.

It is a statement of

expectation or fact about the enemy and the context of the conflict.

The subheadings are as

follows:
1.

Political:

conditions of crisis in the poli-

tical scene were coded as themes on:
a
b
c
d.
e
2.

imperialism
fascism
feudalism
capi tal ism
communism

Social:

the following subheadings reflect

conditions of crisis in the social scene:

e
f
g
h

i
j

civil war
violence, repression, oppression
illegal i ty
immorality
incompetence
illiteracy
poverty
exploi tation
passivity
false propaganda
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3.

Party:

the conditions of crisis within the

Congress Party of India and the Chinese Communist Party as perceived by Gandhi and Mao
were coded under the following headings:
bureaucracy
intellectualism
sectarianism

subjectivism
warlordism
B.

Goal Values

deals with the substantive demands

that the leader is making on behalf of the liberation movement under the following subheadings:

C.

1.

Nationalism (united front, harmony, solidarity
etc.)

2.

Power (political, ideological etc.)

3.

Material well-being (economic, safety etc.)

4.

Morality (concern with ends and means,
spiritual etc.)

Leadership Style

deals with the leader's response

to crisi s and wi th the techniques of mobilizing
the masses in terms of methods of persuasion etc.:
1.

Trust the masses

2.

Trust the elites

3.

Personal example and deed

4.

Integration of theory and practice

5.

Toleration, moderation, flexibility

6.

Self-reliance, fearlessness
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D.

7.

Sacrifice, discipline

8.

Serve the people

9.

Conf idence

10.

Uniqueness (of methods, situation, or struggle)

11.

Truthfulness (not bluffing people)

12.

Nonviolence-

13.

Noncooperation

14.

Civil disobedience

15.

War

16.

Anarchy

Channels of Communication

deals with modes or

means of communication that the leader suggests to
achieve goals of the movement:
1.

Personal contact

2.

Mass media

3.

Party organization

4.

Mass organization

5.

Education

6.

Art and literature

After the selection of content based on a formal, predetermined, unbiased plan and precise definition of categories,
the units of measurement must be specified clearly, so that the
results can be duplicated.
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The unit of analysis.

One promising approach is to

study themes that are manifest in a cluster of words, and
therefore, the theme has been selected as tbe unit of analysis
and the entire document as the context of unit.

In its most

simple form, a theme is a statement about a subject matter;
it takes the form in which issues are usually discussed.

The

method was to select all major themses from each document:
this brought a total number of 301 themes (see Appendix B).
Classification of these themes was done on four major categories on the instrument of analysis described above.

The cate-

gories developed for the present research reflect an attempt
to reach a "balance between reliability of the procedures on
the one hand and the meaningfulness of the categories on the
other."

1

Terms of the analysis.

The term of analytical measure

is that of attention, which is the result of selection of
phenomena to be attended.

A measure of attention is an indica-

tion of the presence and frequency of subject elements in a
message system:
The significance of attention as an aspect of the
process of message-production and image-formation

is that it stems from, and, in turn cultivates,
assumptions about existence; it provides common
conceptions about what "is" . 2
lBernard Derelson, "Content Analysis," Handbook of Social
Social PSl)chol ogy, ed. Gardner ,"indzey. Heading: AddisonWesley Pu llshlng Co., Inc., 1954, p.514
2George Gerbner "Toward' CuI tural Indicators': The Analysis of
Mass t'ediated PUbl ic !.:essage Systems." Audio Visual Communication Review Vol.17, No.2, Sumer 1969, p.I45
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The common awarness of public issues forms a basis for social
interaction.

In other words, the assumption is that leaders want

to seek contact with masses, and assuming that their behavior
is ulOti va ted by thi s, the frequencies are interpreted with which
a leader chooses to talk about or make references to a phenomenon
as a measure of attention.

The definition is based on the rationale that before a
movement takes national dimension the leader must begin with
attention appeals to particular values in order to make contact
with a mass public.

In other words, before leaders can expect

the masses to understand the "whole message" or its "purpose"
they have to secure their attention.

The means of securing

attention in a national struggle are not technical ones, but
are instead values from the ideology whose dissemination is the
leader's main concern.

These means for gaining attention have

.been characterized as goal values--that is, demands of the
particular community.3

The function of these ideological

appeals is to accomplish psychological softening or hardening
of the mass public before the real purpose of the message is
achieved.

These fundamental values are closely related to

beliefs and sentiments people admire in their community.

The measure of attention, therefore, indicates the
presence and frequency of relatively simple concepts and symbols
3Karin Dovring, Road of Propaganda.
New York: 1959, pp.25-81

Philosophical Library,
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in a leader's messages making public appeals for identification
and demands,

At tbiB stage, there is less concern for factual

discussion of complex or controversial issues as the focus is
on appeal to general community values so as to achieve national
support.

The attention measure therefore conceals many conflic-

ting interests which may co:ne to the fore after the m07ement
has developed to a later stage.

Reliabil i ty

Scientific research should be replicable.

Replicability

means that any other coder reaching the same findings if the
procedure is repeated, using different coders.

Cne method of

testing replicability in message analysis research is by giving
a reliability test to

inde~endent

ing agreement coefficients.

coders, and then calculat-

If one reaches a high degree of

intercoder agreements, reliability of the procedure is established.

Problems may arise for the simple reason that on the

one hand training coders is necessary for significant reliability, on the other hand such training may influence them to
the idiosyncrasies of the research design.

According to

Krippendorff,
If the observers are independent, than such measures
assess the extent to which the recording instructions
are uniformly interpreted and operationalized across
individuals.
But since observers can agree on describing an event in wrong terms -- for example, because of implicit experiences that are not shared

81

with the research designer - replicability cannot
assess whether an instruction is applied as intended. 4

It seems difficult to achieve perfect agreement above
the .9 level

and reliability of research would be doubtful

if the level is very low.
Briefly, this is how the investigator approached the
problem at hand:
To summarize the content briefly and reliably it was
first noted and counted in the margin every theme expressed
by the two leaders in all the documents

duri~g

1942-44.

Then

a set of categories was developed to represent all themes.
Thus a preliminary qualitative analysis provided the hasis for
the set of categories to be explored in a more rigorous kind
of quantitative message analysis.

The purpose of any quanti-

tative research, h01rever, is to derive meaningful inferences
which are of a qualitative nature.

Alexander George points

out that the relationship between the two is a circular one,
each providing new insights for the ongoing analysis.

5

The instrument of analysis used in this study has four
major categories which are further subdivided, as shown above.

~;essage Analysis" (I'he Annenberg School of Communications, University of l'ennsylvania,
Philadelphia, January 1973) p.16 (1iimeographed.)

4 K • Krippendorff, "Reliability in

5Alexander George, Propaganda Analysis.
son, and Co., 1959, passim

New York: Row, Peter-

82
The attempt is to describe with a maximum of objectivity and
at the same time with a maximum of relevance to the underlying
cOlllL1unication dynamic s as revealed in Gandhi-l,:ao statements of
this period.

The set of categories are

mutuall~

exclusive and

exhaustive.
An experiment preliminary to the reliability testing
was conducted in September, 1976, under the guidance of 1:ichael
F. Eleey, member of the staff at the Annenberg School of CommUnications, University of Pennsylvania.

Agreement between

the two coders (the investigator and Valerie Jaworski, also a
member of the staff of Annenberg School) for the experiment
test was .93 on Gandhi's themes and .93 on Mao's themes.
After the preliminary experiment a final set of categories was developed for the classification of themes.

The relia-

bility test was conducted under controlled conditions, supervised
by Professor George Gerbner, of the Annenberg School of Cocmunications.

To increase reliability of classification an attempt

was made to ,specify as clearly as possible the characteristics
of statements that were to he placed in a given category.

The

reliability of the analysis was achieved by measuring agreement
among the investigator and Valerie Jaworski using scOtt
inter-observer agreement coefficient for nominal scales.

6 W• ll • Scott, "Reliability of Content Analysis:

6

The Case ,of
Nominal Scale Coding." Public Opinion Quarterly, 19 (1955)
pp.321-325
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We accept variables as reliable if

is .7 or larger .

The agreement coefficient achieved in this study was

. 8227

and therefore, a hig~ degree of reliability was demonstrated.
(For further details see appendix C)

Findings
As pointed out above, the many themes appearing in the
written documents of this period have been classified into four
broad categories dealing with conditions of crisis, desirable
goal values, leadership style, and channels of communication.
This general classification is the basis of Table 2, "Frequency of Themes," (page 84) which summarises the findings and
gives percentages referring to proportions of frequency, as
well as the rank order of major themes indicated by the frequency.

The Tables 3-6 present the findings of the most fre-

quent themes by subcategories and rank order.

As shown in Table 2, leadership style was the most
frequent theme for both Gandhi and Mao.

It accounted for 46%

of the total themes used by the two leaders.

By 1942-44, a

relatively late date in the two liberation movements, the conditions of crisis and the goal values were probably so well
known and appreciated that over-emphasis upon them would not
contribute enough to the process of liberation.

On the other

hand, there was also a difference with respect to channels of
communication.

For Mao, this subject ranked second in
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TABLE

2

Frequency of Themes

Themes

Gandhi
No.
%

Rank

Mao
No.

%

1. Conditions
of crisis

31

18.5

3

26

19.9

2. Goal values

47

28.1

2

15

11.2

74

44.3

1

65

48.8

4. Channel s of
communication 16

8.9

4

27

20.3

Rank

Total
No.
%

57

19.0

62

20.6

1

139

46.3

2

43

14.0

3

3. Leadership
style

Total

168

100

133

100

301

100
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frequency, as contrasted with last place for Gandhi.

This

might perhaps be explained by the fact that 1lao had less
access to the established channels of communication than did
Gandhi and therefore had to give this subject much more
attention.
A more detailed analysis of these themes, however,
requires looking at each major category separately.
Conditions of crisis
In Chinese the word "crisis" is written with two
characters, one signifying "danger," the other "Oppol"tunity."
In the history of liberation movements this two-sided aspect
of crisis is obvious.

History proves tbat not all revolu-

tionary crises end in freedom from oppression; in fact they
may lead to greater tyranny of the governing class or they may
merely replace one despotism by another.

On the other hand,

crises may give the best opportunities to leaders to introduce
radical changes.

A national crisis therefore helps leaders to

prepare the grounds for mass movements by discrediting prevailing creeds and institutions and detaching from them the allegiance of the people and making it possible to take action
against powerful groups which are normally well

entrenched

and invulnerable.
Gerbner, in his study of cultural indicators, points
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out that"

"most critical public consequence of mass

communications are in defining and ordering issues.,,7

This

study indicates that Gandhi and Mao defined the crisis as a
struggle for survival; they linked the struggle for independence to the improvement of the condition of the common man
and woman.

Gandtii's most potent slogan was "Do or Die",

which freed the people from fear of death itself.

People

became susceptible to the appeals of social movements only
after Gandhi and Mao succeeded in making them not only aware
of the crisis but also to make them believe that change was
possible.

For instance, in India and China people had to be

made aware of pervasive social injustice and exploitation and
they had to be convinced that the mighty power of the British
and the Kuomintang could be challenged and overthrown.
The articulation" of nationalistic themes by Gandhi and
Mao evidently strengthened preexisting desires for political
independence and at the same time it inspired quite a new set
of political expectations among the people of India and China.
The imposition of alien authority generated tremendous traditional resistance that Gandhi and Mao subsequently transformed
into nationalist rebellion.

Natural disasters, such as famine

7George Gerbner, "Toward 'Cultural Indicators': The Analysis
of Mass Mediated Public Message Systems," AV, vol.l7, No.2,
Summer, 1969 pp.85-l08
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and wars, inflicted abnormal hardships on the people making
them susceptible to their messages of crisis.
If we look at Table 3, "Themes on Conditions of Crisis" (p. 88)
of the major

we will find that imperialism is seen as one
con~itions

leading to a political crisis.

Both

Gandhi and Mao give this equal amounts of attention, and here
we may only infer their concern by their frequent reference to
it.

The themes, however, indicate that they both do not talk

of imperialism in the same way·.

This will become clear as

the analysis proceeds.
Gandhi's conception of imperialism was really the
logical extension of a line of thinking that had begun in
1920's:
I said to myself, there is no State run by Nero or
Mussolini which has not good points about it, but we have
to reject the whole, once we decide to non-cooperate
wi th the system.
"There are in our country grand public
roads, and palatial educational institutions," I said
to myself, "but they are part of a system which crushes
the nation.
I should not have anything to do with them.
They are like the fabled snake with a brilliant jewel
on its head, but which has fangs full of poison".
So,
I came to the conclusion that British rule in India had
crushed the spirit of the nation and stunted its growth,
and so I decided to deny myself all the privileges,
services, courts, titles. The policy would vary with
different countries but sacrifice and self-denial are
the essential points. 8

8

Young India, June, 1921
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TABLE

3

Themes on Conditions of Crisis
Themes

Gandhi
No.
%

Rank

Rank

1~ao

No.

%

6
2

23
7.8

3

2

7.8

3

2
1

7.8
3.8

3

Total

%

1. Political
(a) imperiali sm

7

22.6'

2

(b) fascism

1

13 22.8
2 3.5

(c) feudalism
( d) capitalism

2

3.5

(e) communism

(f) socialism

2. Social
(a) civil war
(b) violence

12

38.7

1

q

12.9

3

q

2 3.5
13 22.8

(c) illegality
(d) immorality

q

7.0

1
3
3
1

1.7
5.2
5.2
1.7

(e) incompetence (f) illiteracy

2

6.5

5

(h) exploitation 3
1
(i) passivity

9.6

q

3.2

6

6.5

5

(g) poverty

1
1

3.8 q
3.8 q

2

7.8

3

q

7.0

q

15.3

2

q

7.0

3.8 q
7.8 3
3.8 q
3.8 q

1
2
1
1

1.7
3.5
1.7
1.7

57

100

(j) false propaganda

2

3. Party
(a) bureaucracy
(b) intellectualism

(c) sectarianism (d) SUbjectivism (e) warlordism
Total

31 100

1
2
1
1
26

100
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In the 1930's Gandhi concluded:
The British people must realize that the Empire is to
come to an en.d. Thi s they wi 11 not real ize unl e s s we
in India have generated power within to enforce our
will. 9
By 1940's Gandhi declared imperialism to be so "satanic" that
it threatened to explode in hatred toward the

British:

Imperialism is the greatest of evils
-Document 22, Theme 62
We must fight imperialism and not the British people
-Document 41, Theme 115
Imperialism is the enemy facing our country
-Document 1, Theme 3
Furthermore, Gandhi made imperialism a moral issue:
I have said more than once in these columns that the
Nazi power had risen as a nemesis to punish Britain
for her sins of exploitation and enslavement of the
Asiatic and African races.
-Document 17
Britain is morally indefensible, while she rules
India
-Document 18, Theme 50
It is not right for any nation to hold another in
bondage. India has ancient culture, ancient civilization, such variety and richness of languages.
Britain should be ashamed of holding these people
as slaves.
-Document 25
Britain cannot win the war as long as she holds India
in slavery.
-Document 24
9Young India, April, 1930
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With this subversive image of the opponent Gandhi sought to
justify cutting off important sources of the British power by
withdrawing cooperation and obedience of the Indian people:
A Government is an instrument of service only
in so far as it is based upon the will and
consent of the people.
It is an instrument of
oppression where it enforces suhmission at the
point of the bayonet.
Oppression therefore
ceases when people cease to fear the bayonet.10
GandhJl s satyagraha (truth force) was therefore a well-conceived
communication technique to fight against political and economic
domination and injustice.

l'ao I

S

concept ion of imperial i sm is somewhat diff erent.

He explicitly identifies imperialism as the chief instigator of
revolutionary movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries.
A chief characteristic of the imperialist penetration of China,
Mao maintains, was "the collusion of imperialism with the
feudal forces to arrest the development of Chinese capitalism."ll
The image of the opponent thus ,includes not only the imperialist
forces, but also the feudal elements.
Japanese imperialism is daily menacing China
-Document 15, Theme 113
The Kuomintang is collaborating with the Japanese
Imperialists
-Document 9,Theme 61
10Young India, October, 1919

11· The Chinese Revolution and Chinese Communist Party,"
December 1939. Selected Works, II, pp.306-13
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Mao's political themes, therefore, call attention to the
consequences of imperialism:
Under the twofold oppression of imperialism and
feudalism, and especially as a result of the largescale invasion of Japanese imperialism, the Chinese
people, ani particularly the peasants, have become
more and more impoverished and have even been
paupe-rized in large numbers, 1 iVing -in hunger and
cold and without any political rights. The poverty
and lack of freedom among the Chinese people are on
a scale seldom found elsewhere. 12
The power of imperialism is however seen as transient which
will soon collapse, although, from the short-term perspective
it is still powerful and in possession of the mechanical means
of mass destruction:
Japanese imperialism is mustering up all its strength
for a dying kick
-Document 16, Theme 120
Therefore, Mao argues, war is an inescapable consequence of
the imperialist policy:
War is our first priority in our struggle
-Document 16, Theme 121
Liberation wars are differentiated into those waged against
imperialism (national liberation wars) and those waged
against domestic reaction (civil or class liberation struggle).
The basic distinction between a people's war and a counterrevolution war, says Mao, is that the former is rooted in, and
waged by, the broad masses of the people.

The decisive role
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of the

peopl~

in determining the character and outcome of war,

Mao believes, stands in direct contrast to the false imperialist the,ory that "weapons decide everything."

~'ao's

faith in

the ultimate victory of the national liberation movement is
therefore based on the power of the masses.
We will overcome obstacles and crush the Japanese
imperialists
-Document 12, Theme 82
We shall finally defeat the enemy
-Document 4, Theme 33
The world will enter a great age of liberation
-Document 11, Theme 75
The dawn of victory is in sight
-Document 6, Theme 41
Imperialism is doomed, according to 1:ao, because it is decadent
and retr0 6 ressive,

Its fundamental weakness is that it is sepa-

rated from its "people,"

The "logic" of imperialism, that is,

aggression, oppression, and exploitation, is incompatible with
that of the masses,

It is "riddled with insuperable contradic-

tions"; it is "sitting on a volcano" and it is its own
"gravedigger."

Mao, therefore, developed an adapted version of MarxistLeninist theory to apply to the "colonial, semi-colonial, and
semi-feudal" China and developed broad forms of struggle to
fight his opponent,
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Table 3, "Themes on Conditions of Crisis", (p.88) also
shows that for Gandhi another crisis that looms large is violence embedded in the prevalent social conditions due to
foreign control, while 35% of l.iao's themes on conditions of
crisis refer to the crisis within the leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party.-

p

This is not unexpected as we know that ;: .. ao

,

S

Rectification movement aimed to create an environment of struggle in which fundamental values and perceptions could be reexamined and challenged hyrevolutionary ideals.

,:ao insisted

that the tendency of some Party members to look dOim or ignore

non-Party elements was a form of "sectarianism" which led to
isolation of the Communists from the total Chinese population: 3
His focus therefore, was on organizational and educational
methods to overcome these communication barriers between

leaders and masses.

The serious barriers, according to Mao,

were bureaucracy, intellectualism, warlordism, and sectarianism:
Bureaucracy leads to communication barriers with the
masses

-Document 12, Theme 89
Warlordism is the result of isolation from masses
-Document 12, Theme 90
Formalism has no content
-Document 2" 'l~heme 16

13nRectify the Party's Style in \','ork", Selected Works,
IV, pp.i<2-i<3

~!ao's

barbs ·against Party formalism were directed primarily

against his Moscow-train.ed rivals in the Russians Returned
Student group whose po,"er was curbed hy the Sixth Plenum.

The

19!!2 Rectification movement, therefore, focuse·d on intensive
education, small-group study, criticism and self-criticism to
bring the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party closer to
the Chinese population.

The movement represented a final stege

in Mao's consolidation of leadership.

Gandhi's frequent reference to violence can be explained
by the fact that as the government became more repressive the
people responded with increasing mil i tancy.

\',hat is interest-

ing, however, is that despite Gandhi's insistence on nonviolence, there is a change in his attitude toward the peoi,le
resorting to violence.

Violence appalled Gandhi to the extent that whenever it
occurred in the 1920's or even 30's he was "actually and literally praying for a disastrous defeat (of the liberation movement)."

In other words, nonviolence above everything else--

even above the independence of India, so it seemed.

He sought

to harness the potential force of the masses into peaceful
channels, "I know that the only thing that the Government dreads
is this huge majority I seem to command.
I dread it even more than they."

They little kno\V that

In 193!!, while explaining his

view of the reasons for the failure of nonviolent movements,
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Gandhi

stat~d quit~

~xplicitly

an important element of

communication theory:
I feel that the masses have not yet received the
message of satyagraha owing to its adulteration
in the process of transmission.
It has ~ecome
clear to me that spiritual instruments suffer in
their potency when their use is taught through
non-spiritual medi~ ... The indifferent civil resistance of many •.•. has not touched the hearts of the
rulers. 14
Furthermore, in his effort to touch the heart of the rulers
Gandhi went to the extent of transforming mass civil disobedience to individual civil disobedience in 1940:
Satyagraha needs to be confined to one qualified
person at a tihle.
In the present circumstances
only one, and that myself, should for the time
being bear the responsibility of civil disobedience. 15
In other words, it was a symbolical battle, calling the attention and sympathy of the whole nation, and permitting participation in spirit of mill ions upon millions, resul ting in resurgence
of moral strength.

This would have dissipated in a series of

sporadic actions (inviting ruthless repression in helpless
people) allover the country if people had taken to the streets.

It is not the number that counts but the quality, Gandhi maintained, "more so when the forces of violence are uppermost."
HI! arl.lan,
..
J une, 1934

15"Ibid' ., September, 1940
16pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, The Last Phase. 2 vol.
Ahmedabad: Navjivan, 1958, p.107

16
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On August 8, 1942, however, while launching the

'~uit

India' movement Gandhi crystalized the prevailing mood of the
people in these words, "there was a desperateness in it, an
emotional urge which gave second place to logic and reason or
a calm consideration of the consequences of action." And he
went on to state in a mood. of near frenzy,
I want freedoL immediately this very night, before
dawn, if it can be had.
F'reedom cannot now wait for
the achievement of communal unity .... Fraud and untruth

today are stalking the world.
I cannot be a helpless
witness to such a situation.
I heve travelled all
over India es perhaps nobody in the present age has.
The voiceless millions of the land saw in me their
friend and representative, and I identified myself
with them to an extent it was possible for a human
being to do.
I saw trust in their eyes, which I now
want to turn to good account in fighting this empire
upheld on untruth and violence. however gigantic the
preparations that the empire has made we must get out
of its clutches •.. here is a mantra, a short one, that
I give you. You may imprint it on your hearts and let
every breath of yours give expression to it. fbe
mantra is: 'Do or Die' ',;e shall either see free India
or die in the attempt; we shall not live'to see the
perpetuation of our slavery •...
Gandhi's perception of conditi6ns of crisis in 1942-44 was
serious enough to include the possibility of violence.

He

squarely held the British responsible for any eruption of violence in the country:
Britain practices the most organized and successful
violence in India the world has seen
-Document 31, Theme 87
The Government repression is breeding discontent
-Document 44, Theme 122
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The Government encourages violence when the people
want to proceed peacefully
-Document 49, Theme 136
Gandhi was responding to a very wide mass-awakening allover
the country, the extent and intensity of which was a revola-

"

tion, both to the Indian leaders and to the government.
Goal values
Every society has its own value system.

The communi-

cation system of a given society, therefore, is part of its
total culture and can be understood in that context.

Culture

provides people with symbols, myths, values and information,
and forms their general attitudes towards what is desirable or
undesirable.
In a struggle of national dimensions, leaders set
standards of high morality to meet the public need of a picture
of its own ideal self.

Lasswell defines value as "the word we

use to indicate that there are some impulses with which we
associate our ego symbol at a given time.,,17

The leader must

also simplify communication by the use of fundamental values in
times of great stress when a nation is fighting for liberation
and needs the support of the whole population.

The daily experience both for the leader himself and for
17H • Lasswell, 'Yorld Politics and iersonal Insecurity.
Free Press,Glencoe, Illinois, .1950

The
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his people is the struggle for existence; not only a struggle
for material well-being .but for human dignity and spiritual
well-being as well.

These two goals comprehend, in fact, all

other values demanded.

Our study shows that Gandhi and Mao

repeat this theme in various forms when referring to nationalism,
political power, material well-being or morality.

Many of the

themes appear in slogan form: let us unite for action, liberation will end poverty.

The slogan itself is not literally

mentioned in the text, but it is involved in the message by
synonymous references, repeated over and over again in varying
ways, identical in function, and dominant because of its frequent appearance.

In countries, like India and China, largely

populated by illiterate masses it is far easier to capture,
communicate, and popularize the essence of a struggle in a
slogan than to try to explain its intricacies in a jargon style.
The masses are more receptive to language they easily understand
and their sense of commitment is more easily touched.

The use

of slogans is also consistent with traditional Indian and
Chinese practice, wherein the ancient rulers communicated their
orders in similar, easily understandable terms.

A slogan ·has

been defined as follows:
Comprehension of a current public demand referring· to
the community value.
This characterization of a slogan
explains its great suggestive effect on the public mind,
since the demand is the fundamental condition for establishing the community mind. 18
18Karin Dovring, Road of Propaganda.
New York: 1959, p.30

Philosophical Library,
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The differences in social and linguistic background and in circumstance due to the wide geographical dispersion of India and
China were in fact obstacles that made the appeals to the
national goal values still more necessary for attention to the
actual message.

It is not possible to appeal to a mass audi-

ence without starting with the well-known values of the people
and then link them to what the leader wants them to do.

Gandhi

and Mao sought to narrow down conflicting interests within groups,
classes and castes by focusing on common values.

They used the

facts of poverty and want as a means of identification for common action.

The demand for freedom from poverty was transfor-

med to demand for national freedom.

Whether independence might

relieve the poverty in the country was still an unsolved problem, since a skillful communicator leaves the verification of
his message to public experience.

As shown by Table 4, "Themes on Goal Values," (page 101)
Gandhi gave most frequent attention to morality and Mao most
frequent attention to nationalism.

Another difference is that,

as one might expect, Mao gave much more attention to material
well-being than did Gandhi.

Nonetheless, each of these four

themes on goal values were highly important.
Nationalism.

llere are some of the nationalistic themes

common to both Gandhi and Mao:
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TABLE

4

Themes on Goal Values

Themes

1. Nationalism

Gandhi
No.
%>

Rank

Mao
No.

Rank

;rotal

No.

%>

%

11

23.4

2

7

47.8

1

18

29.1

9

18.2

4

2

12.2

3

11

17.7

3. Material
well-being

10

21.2

3

5

32.2

2

15

24.1

4. Morality

17

37.2

1

1

7.8

4

18

29.1

Total

47

100

15

100

62

100

2. Power
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We must be united to achieve independence
-Gandhi, Document 20, Theme 58
National unity will end communal disharmony
-Gandhi, Document 39, Theme 111
All patriotic forces must unite and save China
-Mao, Document 11, Theme 78
The first principle of the united front is
disciplined unity
-Mao, Document 16, Tbeme 127
The various sectors of the Indian and Chinese population
which supported the Congress Party and the Chinese Communist
Party had their own special interests, peculiar grievances, differing objectives, and unique ideologies.

But so long as India

and China remained dependent, the various interests could submerge their differences because the winning of independence was
the critical factor in solving all other problems.

This may

explain the speedy diffusion of nationalism and receptivity of
the elite to the elaborated symbols of identification with the
common people of India and China.

For instance, Gandhi and 1·:ao

insisted on "language of the. masses" or service as modes of
behavior.
Briefly, Gandhi and Mao stressed the importance of maintaining a dialectical relationship between unity and social and
economic change.

The primary focus of their activity consisted

in mobilizing the masses and seeking an alliance with the
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intellectual elite and other groups as a move to oust foreign
domination.

They both succeeded in solving the triple problem

of national identity, independence, and legitimacy, but while
Gandhi failed to achieve a decisive revolutionary break from
an imperialist past, Mao succeeded in bringing about a real
socio-economic revolution.

This was the major difference between Gandhi's and
Mao's nationalism.

The nationalist movement in India was

essential.ly a bourgeo is movement and Gandhi was the representative functioning inevitably within the nationalist ideology.
Mao's nationalist movement was operating within the "arxistLeninist ideology which sought to effect a total revolution
by overthrowing domestic landlords, warlords, and native capitaUsts.

Power.

Here is a sample of their themes:
Power must belong to the people
-Gandhi, Document 41, Theme 117
We must .have poU tical power to decide our
own future
-Gandhi, Document 4, Theme 15
Power means to unite the Party, the government and the army with the people
-Mao, Document 10, Theme 70
Patriotic forces must work toward democracy
and freedom
-Mao, Document 11, Theme

79
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Gandhi's concept of power is peculiarly his own and
basically very differ.ent from that of l:ao's.

Apart.from the

fact that at different times Gandhi narrowed and broadened
his .political approach, there was also an ambivalence in
regard to political power.

Nehru remarked:

In spite of the clo'sest association with him (Gandhi)
for many years, I am not clear in my own mind about
his objectives. I doubt if he is clear himself.
One
ste.p is enough for me, he says; and he does not try
to peep into (the) future or to have a clearly
conceived end before him.19
This was because Gandhi always looked at politics more
from the standpoint of the rebel than of the ruler, of freedom
than of authority, of the individual than of the State.

20

He

believed that true power resides in the people and not in
governments or legislatures,21 and he hoped that political
power, in the ordinary sense, would not enter Indian villages.
"Power is of two kinds.

One is obtained by the fear of punish-

ment and the other by acts of love n

•

22

Gandhi was in fact

really trying to challenge the very notion of power as practiced over the lives of the people through government and legislatures.

He was anxious to increase the participation of the

people in the government and cut down the increasing power of
bureaucracy.
19J • Nehru,Nehru on Gandhi. J. Day Co., New York: 1941, p.32
20
Raghavan Iyer, op. cit. p.53

21

D.G. Tendulkar, Mahatma, op. cit., vol. 6, p.340

22young India, Jannary, 1925
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Material well-being.

Here are some of the themes on

material well-being common to hoth Gandhi and Fao:
Only national government can relieve misery
of poverty
-Gandhi, Document 46, Theme 128
Economic well-being is possible only with
pol i tical. freedom
-Gandhi, Document 17, Theme 47
After victory people will be better off
economically
-Mao, Document 7, Theme 48
Collective mutual-aid organizations will
hring economic well-being
-Mao, Document 12, Theme 87
Both perceived impoverishment of their countries as the result of
systematic "exploitation."

Once the shackles of imperialism were

removed, Gandhi and Mao believed, rapid social and economic
development would ensue.

However, a major difference between

Gandhi and Mao emerges in their means of acbieving this goal.
Gandhi calls his approach to economic equality "nonviolent
. l'Ism ,,23 Wh'Ie h means coopera t·Ive or soCIa
. 1 approac h In
. conSOC1a
trast to individualism.

For Mao, the word socialism means a

system of nationalized ownership of the means of production.
To put it differently, Gandhi demanded moral revolution to accomplish the material well-being of the people; Mao sought radical
structural change to achieve social revolution.

Gandhi was con-

cerned with means of attaining egalitarianism, Mao with the goal
23M.N:. Gandhi, Towards Non-Violent Socialism. Navajivan Publishing
House, Ahmedabad: 1951 (edited by Bharatan Kumarappa), p.9
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itself •
Briefly then,· national liberation is a goal value
which provides material well being for the poverty-stricken
people.

And political power is necessary to ensure security

of the nation and provide protection from imperialism and
exploitation.
Morality.

Both, Gandhi and Mao, sought to apply moral

values in the difficult domain of political and social action.
They maintained that a national liberation movement is a just
struggle against exploitation.
self a moral superiority,

A just cause provides in it-

A people with justice on their side

will arouse world public opinion in support of their cause.
Here is a sample from their themes on morality:
Our demand is based on justice
-Gandhi; Document 32, Theme 89
Justice demands that Britain free India
-Gandhi, Document 38, Theme 106
We have been waging a just war against the
imperialist Japanese for more than five years
-Mao, Document 6, Theme 39
We consider our war entirely just
-Mao, Document

9, Theme 64

Gandhi, however, focused on harmony and 1,:ao on conflict
as the integral part of struggle.

Gandhi defined morality as

promoting harmony in all human relationships through individual
effort.

Mao sought to define it in terms of promoting prole-
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tarian unity through submerging of the individual in the collectivity of the working masses.

Nonetheless, both their

thinking was governed by a total value jUdgement.

For Gandhi,

the enemy is the greed of materialism, the judge is the individual who frees himself from selfisbness, and the executioner is
the moral law.

For Mao, the' enemy is the capitalist system,

history the judge and its executioner the masses.

Therefore

with Mao national struggle inevitably involves class conflict;
with Gandhi it is ,any situation of human conflict, even a conflict within the individual in

ma~ing

the right choice.

Briefly, the morality for both Gandhi and liao lay in the
meeting of needs and expectations of the masses.

But whereas

Mao accepted Marxist-Leninist theory, which defined the content
of those needs and indicated long-range approaches to their satisfaction, Gandhi was content in developing a step-by-step approach
which could meet the needs of the people as and when the situa-

tion rose.

Leadership style

In view of the fact that themes of leadership style
received most attention, as already pointed out (see Table 2,
"Frequency of 'I'hemes"), one may very well as\', "Why do leaders
talk of leadership style?"
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It is important to remember that in these documents,
Gandhi and !Jao are not addressing the masses; their audience
is the party cadre, literate participants, activists and sympathizers.

As already indicated, Gandhi's messa&es appear

mostly in Young India and Harijan, the two papers that he
edited, and in his many interviews by the press and in his correspondence to the government and his friends.

Mao's messages

are addressed to party cadres through party papers and party
functions.

It is plausible to conclude, therefore, that Gandhi

and Mao aimed at training the party members to be better communicators, and at developing leaders by broadening their perspectives on national crisis and goals; above all, by personal
example of their own lives.

Gandhi and Mao groomed a disciplined group of cadres
and buil t a hierarchy-a few score .of leaders and tbousands
(not hundreds of thousands) of lesser party activists.

For

training the party member and cadre to become better communicators, both begin with the individual, and, thus conceived,
provided a comprehensive theory of learning to ensure the thorough remolding of each individual.

Mao has said that "as long

as there are people, every kind of miracle can be performed."

24

Gandhi has said, "I have an undying faith in the responsiveness
of human nature."
-Document

35, Theme 97

24"The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception of History,"
Sept., 16, 1949, Selected Works, IV, p.454
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In other words, man or woman is not an abstract unit but living
persons with concrete problems.

The key to the analysis of the person, in both Gandhi's
and Mao's terminology is the "character."

The decisive element

entering into character is the quality which permits the individual to accept his or her role in a society moving toward
egalitarianism: "humanitarianism" for Gandhi and "proletarian
collectivism" for Mao, and which permits the person to become
fully identified with the people: "lowliest of the low" for
Gandhi and "working class" for Mao.

From this point of view,

the character or nature of the individual is malleable and changeable, and the purpose of leadership training and education is
to heighten a sense of service and moral responsihility.

A few

examples will illustrate this point:
Discipline and dedication is necessary to
practice civil disobedience
-Gandhi, Document 51, Theme 143
Truthfulness must be followed in every action
of our life.
-Gandhi, Document 58, Theme 166
New education is necessary to. learn how to
serve the people
-Gandhi, Document 58, Theme 165
Discipline and devotion is the criteria for
leaders
-Mao, Document 8, Theme 53
Times of difficulty call for dedication
-Mao, Document 14, Theme 106
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Personal example and deed makes people
believe in workers
-Document

16, Theme 133

A cursory glance at Table 5, "Themes on Leadership
style," (page

111) shows that non-violence

recei~ed the most

attention from Gandhi, as one might expect, and confidence the
most attention from Mao.

A"more careful examination of the

entire table, however, shows, an underlying similarity --since
Gandhi's emphasis on non-violence was often a form of communieating confidence.

Moreover, both Gandhi and ,"ao gave special

attention to the themes of serving the people, sacrifice and
discipline, personal example, and self-reliance.
Both aimed to reduce leadership to practical precepts
and steps which may be followed and which may be employed to
communicate their policies.

The elements of 1:arxist-Leninist

approach were later briefly elaborated by Mao in On Practice
and On Contradiction, and Gandhi in My Experiments with Truth.
For both, men's knowledge develops step by step through struggle
and discipline from a lower to a higher level, that is from the
superficial to the profound, and from the one-sided to the manysided.

Gandhi's oft-proclaimed statement that he was the humb-

lest seeker after truth had the same meaning as

~ao's

implicit

belief that he was truly seeking the correct interpretation of
Marxism to the unique Chinese situation.
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TABLE 5
Theme,? on Leadership Style
Themes

Gandhi
No.
%

Rank

Rank

Mao

%

No.

Total
No.

%

1. Trust the
2

masses

2.7 . 8

9

13.8

2

11

7.9

8

5.7

6

4.3

2. Trust the
elites

8

10.8

4

2

2.7

8

3. Personal
example

8.1

4. Combine theory
with practice

5. Toleration
6. Self reliance

8

12.3

3

8

5.7

2

3.0

6

2

1.4

&

4

9.4

6

2

3.0

6

6

4.3

12

16.2

2

8

12.3

3

20

14.3

people

9

12.1

3

9

13.8

2

18

12.9

9. Confidence

9

12.1

3

17

28.1

1

26

18.7

.10. Uniqueness

5

8.7

5

3

4.8

5

8

5.7

11. Truthfulness

2

2.7

8

2

3.0

6

4

2.8

·.

13

17.9

1

13

9.3

13. Noncooperation

3

4.0

7

3

2.1

3

4.0

7

3

2.1

1

0.7

2

1.4
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fearlessness

7. Sacrifice &
discipline

8. Serve the

12. Nonviolence

14. Civil disobedience

·.

15. War
16. Anarchy
Total

·.

1
2

2.7

74

100

1.9

8
65

100

7
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Hitler remarks in Mein Kampf

25

that the strength of a

movement must be judged more by the sacrifices it can demand
than by the perquisites it

Cl'D

offer.

26

Merton suggests that

social psychologists need to study the deep and far-reaching
type of human behavior as symbolized by the effort of Prometheus to serve mankind at wbatever cost to himself.

27

Weber

maintains that such an action flows from deep conviction of its
bl e va1
·
unques t 10na
ue, ·
1rrespec t·1ve 0 f consequences. 28
The following is a sample of the

t~emes

on sacrifice:

'Do or die' means do your duty
-Gandhi, Document 49, Theme 133
Sacrifice of Congressmen has raised India's
status in the eyes of the world
-Gandhi, Document 53, Theme 147
We must make heavy sacrifices in our struggle
of deliverance
-Gandhi, Document 21, Theme 61
Struggle necessarily entails sacrifice, and
death is common
-Mao, Document 14, Theme 108
25Adolf Hitler, Hein Kampf. New York: Reynal and I1itchcock,
1941, pp.702-706
26 J • Kennedy in his Presidential inaugural address in 1961 said,
"Do not ask what the country can do for you, ask what you can
do for your country."
27R •K• Merton, Mass Persuasion, N.Y.: Harpers & Brothers.
28Max Weber, Social and Economic Organization. The Free Press,
N.Y.: 1947, p.362
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It is of great significance to die for the
interests of the people
-Mao, Document 12, Theme 103
To die for the sake of the people is to die a
worthy death
-Mao, Document 15, Theme 109
The willingness to sacrifice one's life, of course, is
the highest form of personal example for others to follow.

It

is the most powerful means of persuasion which is significantly
different from propaganda because of its "higher degree of
social interaction between the persuader and the persuadee" 29
Both Gandhi and Mao point out that it is in the interest
of the leaders to set an example of truthfulness and simple
living if they wish to carry conviction with the masses:
My deeds will carry conviction against British
false propaganda
-Gandhi, Document 38, Theme 107
Influence depends on truthfulness and sincerity
-Gandhi, D'ocument 55, Theme 153
Moral conduct makes people believe in leaders
- Mao, Document 16, Theme 129
Personal integrity determines influence
-Mao, Document 2, Theme 11
We now turn to themes that are more frequent with Gandhi.
His concept of trusteeship is a concept which does not show up in
29Karin Dovring, op. cit., p.30
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Mao's themes (it is conceivable that l1ao may perceive the party
as a trustee of the people--we have no way of knowing from the
present text).

However, only 4% of all Gandhi's themes on

leadership style refer to trusteeship.

This is somewhat sur-

prising but quite compatible with the general analysis of this
period that Gandhi was coming round to the idea that people
will have to fight for their rights; that it is not sufficient
to work for the people but that leaders must work with them.
This is clear from Gandhi's several important interviews that he
gave to Louis Fischer in June 1942, in the course of which he
drew a picture of his contemplated civil disobedience movement:
In the villages peasants will stop paying taxes ... But
refusal to pay it will give the peasants courage to
think that they are capable of independent action.
Their next step will be to seize the land.
-Document 23
Gandhi had earlier explained his concept of trusteeship in
these words:
The trusteeship theory is not unilateral, and does not
in the least imply superiority of the trustee.
It is,
as I have shown, a perfectly mutual affair, and each
believes that his own interest is best safeguarded by
safeguarding the interest of the other. 30
By focusing attention on the theme of trusteeship Gandhi hoped
to raise the social consciousness of the leaders about changes
that were necessary.

By emphasizing the needs of the poor, he

drew attention to the greed of the rich:
30IIarijan, June 25, 1938
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I visualize a system of trusteeship where there would
be no poor
-Document 57, Theme 159
In Mao's writings we find the theme -

trust the masses - occurs

five times more frequently than Gandhi's.Although both relied
implicitly on the strength of the masses, their image of the
masses was not identical.

Gandhi saw them as a potential force:

They often perceive things with their intuition, which
we ourselves fail to see with our intellect. But
whilst the masses know what they want, they often do
not know how to express their wants and, less often,
how to get what they want. Herein comes the use of
leadership .••. 31
Nonetheless Gandhi strongly believed:
The masses are pillars of strength to build
the movement on
-»ocument 37, Theme 103
Mao's experience of the masses was very different, as a sample
of his themes reflect:
Workers and peasants are more knowledgeable
than intellectuals
-Document I, Theme 4
Trust the masses and follow "from the masses,
to the masses" principle
-Document 8, Theme 55
The revolutionary years taught
motive force of the masses.

l.~ao

to place high value on the

As far back as the 1920's he was

developing techniques by which policy would be tested and
integrated with the social sources of revolutionary power in

31Young India, November, 1930
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China.

His reference to theory and practice in the text aims

to unite policy, ideology, and social practice in a continuous
process, which is the basic element of the mass line communication:
Link the general with the specific by studying facts
-Document 8, Theme 49
Marxism serves the people in a practical way
-Document 3, Theme 24
The sharpest contrast in handling of leadership style relates
to Gandhi's repeated reference to nonviolence and Lao's mention
of confidence in his ultimate victory.

HO'lever, both express

confidence in their unique weapons of struggle; Gandhi's eternally spiritual nature of the Indian peasantry gives the same
assurance of victory that Mao's inevitable course of class
development does.
The method of nonviolence has awakened the
masses
-Gandhi, Document 51, Theme 140
For the first time in history, the unique
method of nonviolence has been practiced by
vast masses
-Gandhi, Document 32, Theme 90
Nonviolence is uniquely suited to India's
dumb millions
-Gandhi, Document 24, Theme 69
The method of nonviolence will bring India's
free dom
-Gandhi, Document 53, Theme 148
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Nonviolence is a unique force for good
-Gandhi, Document 58, Theme 167
The Chinese revolution will achieve victory
-kiao, Document 13, Theme 102

We are confident the world situation will
change
-Mao, Document 5, Theme 37
We remain powerful in spite of our small
organization
-Mao, Document 4, Theme 31
We shall hecome invincible
-Mao, Document 4, Theme 32
This kind of attention also emphasizes the leader's efforts to
appear before his people with strong powers of conviction and
to present his enemies or problems as powerless, weak, or insignificant.

Even when the Congress Party and the Chinese

Communist Party were at a low ebb and the vulnerability of the
party was obvious to mO'st of their associates Gandhi and Hao
made statements of confidence using the demands on the future
as a part of their identification with strength.

Briefly then, the themes of Gandhi and

~,:ao

call atten-

tion to those elements in leadership style which are nonelitist and which diminish or even remove the psychological
distance between the leaders at the "top" and the people at
the "bottom".
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Channels of

con~unication

Despite the fact that India and China were lacking in
mass media resources, Gandhi and Mao saw an effective communication system operating in their countries.

As Margaret

Mead puts it, "the whole mesh of human social life might logically, and perhaps, in other contexts, fruitfully, be treated
as a system of human communication.,,3

2

National liberation movements call for developing leadership skills and multiple channels of communication to provide shared values and response to crisis.

The specific chan-

nels that Gandhi and Mao call attention to are those that are
most relevant for initiating the national struggle, and these
could not always be mass media as the two-step model assumes.

Gandhi and Mao were the first national leaders who
recognized in their respective countries the role of the masses
and mass action in the struggle for national liberation in contrast to earlier leaders who thought of the masses as passive
and ignorant.

Gandhi and Mao evolved a program of struggle

which would mobilize the masses against the established system.
As is evident on Table 6, "Themes on Channels of
Communication," (page 119) the most striking similarity
32· Some Cultural Approaches to Communication Problems," in
Lyman llryson, ed., The Communication of Ideas. New York:
Harper, 19q8, p.9
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TABLE

6

Themes on Channels of Communication

Gandhi
No.
'f,

Themes

1. Personal
contact

25.0

Rank

3

2. Party organization

Hao
No.

'f,

Rank

5

18.9

q

g.8

6

22.2

q

g.8

3

Total
No.

'f,

9

21.0

9.0

3. Mass organization

1

6.8

q. Arts and
literature

2

7

16.2

9.3

5. Education

6

37.0

1

7

29.9

1

13

30.2

6. Mass media

5

31.2

2

1

3.7

5

6

14.2

27

100

Total

16

100

43

. 100
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between Gandhi and }.!ao is that both gave most attention to the
role of education.
of personal contact.

Each gave significant attention to the role
T~e

sharpest contrasts are that Gandhi paid

more attention to the mass media (namely, the press) and that
Mao deals with the arts and literature, channels not mentioned
even once by Gandhi.
Here are some of their statements on education:
It is through new education that we learn to
resist selfishness
-Gandhi, Document 58, Theme 168
True education is necessary to learn to live
simply
-Gandhi, Document 57, Theme 165
Education of the masses will lead to eradication of inequalities
-Gandhi, Document 37, Theme 104
Education is necessary to arouse the villagers
-Gandhi, Document 2, Theme 7
Education implies learning the l.iarxist theory
-Mao, Document 8, Theme 58
Education through a united front can fight
illiteracy
-Mao, Document 16, Theme 124
Education should be expanded through schools,
literacy classes and other means
-Mao, Document 16, Theme 125
Education of party members will strengthen the
party
-Mao, Document 13, Theme 96
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And themes on personal contact take the following form:
There must be a living bond between the
leaders and the masses
-Gandhi, Document 9, Theme 29
Personal contact with the villagers must be
established through constructive program
-Gandhi, Document 1, Theme 5
Maintain close personal contact with the lliasses
to avoid making mistakes
-Mao, Document 13, Theme 100
Merge with the people through art and literature
-Mao, Document 3, Theme 18
The sharpest contrast appears in relation to mass media, to which
Gandhi refers eight times more than 1,:ao, and in relation to mass
organizations, to which Mao refers more than twice in comparison
to Gandhi.

Table 3 also shows that Gandhi makes no reference to

party organization while /,Iao' s frequency on party organization
is 15% of all the themes on channels of communication.
It must be remembered that Gandhi's opponent was the
British government which took special pride in its liberal tradition, and which believed in granting its colonials the so-called
right of free press and assembly.

Gandhi used these very values

as weapons against the British, so that the struggle for the freedom of the press became an integral part ,of the liberation mover;]ent.
The Indian nationalist movement always agitated against the
increasing repressive measures of the government to muzzle the
nationalist press.

Without the press, all-India conferences of
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nationalist organizations were difficult to prepare and organize.
For instance, it was to Gandhi's I1arijan

that the Congress and

its supporters turned' to for directives to conduct their poli tical activities during the great mass movement of 1942-44.

With

the 'extraordinary situation arising out of the "Quit India"
campaign launched on August 8, 1942, the government adopted a
plan of rigid control over publication of Indian news.

Gandhi

closed down the Harijan in protest against the government's banning of reports on the campaign in the press.

Throughout the

period Gandhi objected to the censorship, the arrest and de tention of working journalists and pre-censorship of messages.

And

at the same time he constantly reminded the press of its responsibilities to the people in a national struggle:
The Press should discharge its obligations and
duties freely and fearlessly and not allow itself
to be cowed down or bribed hy Government. Let the
Press be ready to be closed down rather than allow
itself to he misused by the authorities; and then
to be prepared to sacrifice their buildings, machinery and big establishment •.• Let it not sacrifice
its self-respect and submit to humiliation.33
Press can advance the cause of India's freedom
-Document 52, Theme 145
The newspaper must be resumed to disseminate
my views on national matters
-Document 1, Theme 2

----------------------

33M• K• Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi.
Publications Division, iJinistry of Information, The
Government of India, Delhi, 1958, p.203

The
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liarijan may be suppressed by tbe British but
my ideas cannot
-llocument 34, Theme 94
The press must carry a sustained agitation
against violence of the British
-Document 10, Theme 30
Indian press will help win the national cause
-Document 39, Theme 110
Mao faced a different situation.

For one thing, he had no

recourse to free press or freedom of movement under the Kuomintang regime.

According to Mao, "people have no legislative

body to make use of, nor legal right to organise the workers
to strike· 34

Therefore, Mao had no other choice but to turn to

party organization and mass organizations as the main form of
communication.

He certainly used the press as much as he could

as a supplementary instrument in organizing party and non-party
organizations.

It was the organizational weapon he had to turn

to as a way to communicate to the masses:
Launch a broad mass campaign to facilitate
struggle against the enemy
-Document 10, Theme 71
A centralised, united Party permits mobilization of the masses
-Document 8, Theme 57
It is through a united Party that we can
achieve our goal of liberation
-Document 7, Theme 47
Gandhi, as pointed out earlier, had a unique relationship with
34nproblems of War and strategy," Selected Works, II, 1954, p.267
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the Congress.

Although he dominated the party for nearly

thirty years, he was not even a member of the Congress since
1934 when he resigned from the party.

Nehru called him "per-

ruanent super-president" as no major decision could be made
without consulting Gandhi.

Furthermore, the Congress Party was

a loosely knit organization resembling a platform of national
interests rather than a close-knit organization like that of
the Chinese Communist Party.

This enabled Gandhi to act as an

independent agent whenever he felt the Congress Party was not
ready to support his actions:
Gandhi was not highly dependent on the party,
for he could often estahlish contact with the
broad mass of the people without the interven~
tion of any organization. Because he attached
a high importance to symbolic acts, and because
newspaper coverage insured that his own symbolic
acts would be widely reported .... 35
In other words, Gandhi and

~ao

made ,the fullest use of press

whenever they could and 'then they counter-balanced their weaknesses by going all out on organizational channels of communications to mobilize people.

They could not communicate with the

masses through anything but detailed, intimate organizations of
various types, and through symbolic action expressing fully
their identification with the masses.

Briefly then, in talking to their immediate followers
35 E • Victor'Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin,
Trotsky. Gandhi. Princeton University Press, 1967, p.217
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both Gandhi .and Mao -

each in his own way -

stressed the impor-

tance of multiple channels of communication in developing a
broader based leadership upon which the success of their movement depended.

Summary
These themes of Gandhi and ),:ao help illustrate the
essential elements of mass line communication, that is, the nonelitist guiding principle on relations between leaders and followers.

The illustrations were limited to the 'Quit India'

movement in India and the 'Rectification' movement in China
during 1942-44 which directed attention to the critical phases
of national struggle.

Other periods might have revealed dif-

ferent facets of Gandhi's and l'ao's messages.

In the analysis

of the four sets of themes on conditions of crisis, goal.values,
leadership style, and channels of communication, the relationship between these themes and the concept of mass line is not
directly evident or explicitly stated; nonetheless they are
closely related.

What is really focussed on in this content analysis is
the style of leadership that may carry forward a broad, popular
movement of development with main emphasis on the full participation of the masses.

The analysis of Gandhi's and Mao '.s

themes of 1942-44 period suggests that both draw attention to
this aspect of their movement.

Nonetheless, there were

..

125
significant differences as suggested by their allocation of
attention to certain themes.

In Figure 2, "Unique and Common

Themes in Gandhi-Mao Messages: 19~2-4)1", (page 127) one of the
obvious differences that have been brought out is that Ganihi
focussed on the press while 1lao paid greater attention to party
and mass organisations.
While the themes on channels of communication deal directly with a vital aspect of communication during the two liberation movements, in the case of the other themes, the connection
with communication is indirect and less obvious.

The task of

Chapter IV is to draw upon all four sets of themes, as well as
other historical matter, in an effort to make explicit Gandhi's
and Mao's communication theories, which, are implicit throughout their writings.
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FIGUllE

2

Unique and Common Themes in Gandhi-Lao Messages: 1942-1944

CRISIS

Unique
Themes of
Gandhi

violence; immorality;
exploitation; passivity
GOAL VALUES

morality
LEADEHSJJIP STYLES
nonviolence; trusteeship; civil disobedience
non-cooperation; anarchy

COMMUNICATION CHANNELS
mass media

CHISIS

Political: imperialism
Social:
false propaganda; poverty
Common
to
Both

GOAL VALUES
nationalism; pO'.ver; material wellbeing
LEADEHS:iIP STYLES
personal example; self reliance; sacrifice;
service; uniqueness; truthfulness
"

COMMUNICATION CHANNELS
">,

-"""

personal contact; education

.

-------

~ ~

CIlISIS

Party: bureaucracy; sectarianism;

Unique
Themes
of Mao

intellectualism; SUbjectivism; warlordism
LEADEHSHIP STYLES

confidence; theory-practice; toleration; war
COMMUNICATION CHANNELS
organizatioll; mass organization;

arts and literature
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CIlAPTER

IV

COMMUNICATION THEORIES OF

~:A.O

AND GA.'<DHI

With all the attention to Gandhi and Eao as leaders of
the two largest mass movements of the 20th century, it has
rarely been pointed out that to an important extent each of them
came to positions of power in their countries because of their
remarkable mastery of communication techniques.

Their writings

have until now never been examined in terms of communication
theory and practice.

We do not yet know the extent to which

Gandhi and Mao were aware of the communication process they were
engaged in and in what terms they were thinking of communication strategy or tactics.
In the case of Mao, the "mass line" theory may be treated as a manifestation of his concern with communication; and
among China specialists this has been an occasional subject for
discussion.

On examination, however, it turns out that Gandhi

also had much to say or write on communication.

While he never

took the trouble of pulling all his thoughts on the subject
together in a single article or speech, the elements of a
Gandhi theory of communication may be put together by a careful
investigation of his writings.
This chapter will therefore examine Mao's and Gandhi's
writings during the two liberation movements in terms of
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communication, with the concept of mass line as the central
element.

With the historical analysis of the two movements

(Chapter II) in which' they were involved as evidence fro~ the
field of action; and with the quantitative and. qualitative
analysis of the major themes in their recorded messages during
critical phases of the movements (Chapter III), it is now
possible to thread one's way through Gandhi's and lIao'

s wri t-

ings in search of their ideas on communication between leaders
and the masses.
Their most explicit ideas on communication, as expressed during the critical 19q2-qq period, have already been set
forth in the previous chapter.

But as one searches further,

one finds a wealth of ideas not only on communication channels
but also on other aspects of communication that may often be
more fundamental, although less obvious, and that may, in fact,
determine how communication channels are selected or used.
Many of these relate to leadership styles of communication and
the role of leaders in conveying to their followers a sense of
commitment to specific goal values that may serve as beacons
for escaping conditions of perceived crisis,
In countries like India and China, no effort could have
gone beyond abstract intellectual discussion without finding
ways of actually talking to the masses.

On the other hand, no

communication strategy can be divorced from the substance of
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what is being communicated; above all, the strategy for organizing mass action.

Therefore, in discussing Gandhi and Mao

this Chapter begins by restating more formally than in previous
chapters the general strategy of each of the two leaders and
then proceeds to the communication theories, both explicit and
implicit, that were an inherent part of their strategy.

Neither their explicit nor their tacit ideas on communication can be regarded as isolated or ad hoc improvisations.
They all seem to hang together -- even though neither Ganihi
nor Mao ever deemed it necessary to bring them together in a
separate package called "communication theory."

One might well

imagine that if either of them had been confronted with this
interpretation, he might have answered, in words comparable to
those used in Moliere's Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme:

"Faith, for

more than forty years I have been speaking communication theory
without knowing it!"!

For both Gandhi and Mao, ideological leadership provided
the strategic norms that shaped their ideas on communication.
In Mao's case, however, the "mass line" doctrine provided the
link between general theories on social revolution and specific
!

For this insight, which may well relate .to the writings of other
national leaders as well as to Gandhi and 1!ao, the investigator
is indebted to Professor Robert Lewis Shayon of the Annenberg
School of Communications, University of Pennsylvania. In 1'01iere's famous play: "~·ait.h, for more than forty years I have
been speaking prose without knowing it. I am infinitely grateful to you for telling me so,"
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theories on how leaders can best communicate with the led.

Since

this doctrine, explicitly set forth by 11ao, has many less explicit
parallels in the messages of Gandhi, the analysis will start with
Mao first and then proceed to Gandhi.

In each case, as mentioned

earlier, it is necessary to precede the formulation of their communication theories with a brief review of what is generally known
concerning their general theoretical positions.

Mao: Marxism and the "1rass Line"

Mao, of course, was very explicit about the fact that
he was writing and speaking theory, Earxist theory.

Of all

national leaders in the Marxist tradition, he went the furthest

in stressing the unity of theory and practice.

Without theory,

he repeated again and again, there could be no successful revolution.

Without testing theory in the laboratory of social

action, and distinguished from the scientific laboratory, this
kind of theory could not be valid.

With this orientation, he

became over the years a major innovator in Marxist theory, accepting received Marxist doctrine up to a certain point but then
extending it and changing it in a way that proved disconcerting,
to say the very least, for doctrinaire Marxists in other coun-

tries.
Mao's version of Marxism

Mao's movement was directed toward building a unified
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party committed to common ideas and goals.

It was Marxist to

be sure, but the emphasis was on creative adaptation to the
unique problems and need of a socialist revolution in China.
Mao and his associates found they could not rely on the Soviet
expe~ience;

(and in a sense, every successful socialist move-

ment bas had to innovate, as in the case of Cuba or Yugoslavia)
and therefore, emphasized the Sinification of Marxism,which
meant that ideology be studied in the context of Chinese experience.

Mao called for "an end to writing eight-legged essays

on foreign models."2

The value of theory to Mao could only be

in its application to the Chinese environment.

The purpose here is not to discuss :.:ao' s relations with
the Soviet Union or even to attempt a formal comparison between
Maoism and Leninism.

Although these are related subjects, the

focus of this study is on leao's communication with the illiterate masses, the aim of which was to make ::arxism intelligible
and meaningful and provide a guide for action.

1!ao repeatedly

stated ·Marxism is not a dogma but a guide to action".3

Mao believed that no political party could possibly
lead a liberation movement to victory unless it possessed
2· 0n the New Stage," translated in Schram, The Political
Thought of Mao Tse-tung, pp.113-114
.

3· 0n

Practice," Selected Works, Vol. 1, p.282
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revolutionary theory and a knowledge of history and had a
profound grasp of the practical aspects of mass movements.
Mao maintained that such a party is that which is based on the
Marxist-Leninist theory and style which can lead the working
class and the broad masses of the people to victory.

The pro-

cess of applying Marxism-Leninism to the revolutionary situation in China involved modification and adaptation but the
fundamental concept of revolution remained intact.

Mao's idea of a liberation movement is based on his

theory of "uninterrupted revolution".

As early as 1937, he

wrote, "We advocate the theory of the continuous development
of revolution, of the continuous development of a democractic
revolution into a socialist revolution".4

To put it simply,

the theory of uninterrupted revolution maintains that the liberation process continues to unfold from beginning to end.

In

other words, the movement follows the "general law of history"
and passes through a series of identifiable phases.

The point

is that the various stages of movement (including the bourgeoisdemocratic and the proletarian-socialist) can only be divided
conceptually; they form the whole of a single process.

The

principal dynamics of revolutionary development, Mao maintained,
consist of a united front, the army, and the Party.

These for

him, are the three "magic weapons" of the Chinese revolution.
4"Win the Masses in Their Millions for the Anti-Japanese
National United Front", Selected Works, Vol. 1, p. 278.
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To grasp the conditions under which revolutionary
struggle is to be conducted at a given time, l.;ao points out,
revolutionary leadership must undertake extensive analyses of
class contradiction in society.

The purpose of class analysis

is to enable revolutionaries to make the necessary, crucial
distinction betwel"n the "people" and the "enemy" at any given
point in time.

The interrelationships and interaction of

various classes determine the nature and direction of the revolutionary movement.
The terms "people" and "enemy" have historical and
developmental connotations, their content changing with the
changing phases of the revolutionary movement.

In general,

"people" is defined as all "progressive" social forces that at
any given moment support the proletariat in its quest for power;
they form, at that point, the "motive forces" of revolution.
The "enemy", by contrast, contains all "reactionary" classes
against which the revolution aims; they are, at any given point,
the "targets" of revolution. 5

The revolutionary party brings political enlightenment
not only to the proletariat but to the masses of the people as
a whole (including the peasantry and "enlightened" segments of
the bourgeoisie).

The masses are viewed as the "real heroes"

and the "makers of history".

The revolutionary guides the

5"Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", Selected Works,
Vol, 1, pp.13-20
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the masses and is the most decisive factor in fanning their
revolutionary enthusiasm, without which the party cannot lead
the liberation movement to victory.
Tbe central task, said
so as to overthrow imperialism.
is not sufficient.

~ao,

is to mobilize the masses

But mobilizing the masses alone

The Party must also attend to the living

conditions of the masses to make them realize that "we represent their interests, that our life and theirs are intimately
interwoven ll

6
•

Mao maintained that the party must operate not only as
spokesman of the "majority" of the worker and the peasant masses,
but that it must also "educate" the masses and "penetrate"into
the workers and peasants and exercise direct political leadership over them:
Do we want to win the support of the masses? Do we
want to devote all their efforts to the war front?
If we do, we must go among the masses; arouse them to
activity; concern ourselves with their weal and woe;
and work earnestly and s1ncerely in their interests
and solve their problems of salt, rice, sheiter, clothing and childbirth, in short, all their problems.
If
we do so, the broad masses will certainly give us
support and regard the revolution as their very life
and their most glorious banner .... The masses, the
millions upon millions of the masses who sincerely
and earnestly support the revolution ••. are a wall of
bronze and iron which no force can ever oreak, a0801utelynone. 'fhe counter-revolutionary lorces can never
break us, but we shall break them. By rallying millions
6WTake Care of the Living Conditions of the Masses and attend
to the Methods of Work", Selected works, Vol.1, p.149
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upon millions of the masses round the revolutionary
government and by expanding the revolutionary war,
we shall be aule to wipe out any counter-revo~utioll
and take over the whole of China.7

Marxism-Leninism was therefore to proviue lJbina with a
consistent ideology uf national political power based on a
thoroughgoing, reciprocal relationsh1p between leaders and led.
Mao's intiistence that Marxism-Leninism be fused with
spdcific h1storical conditl0ns and given "a uelin1te national
form" before it is put into practice led to three iunaamental
cnanges in conducting the Chinese
(1)
~hiang

~iberatlons

Peasantry-based Party.

movement:

This was necessitate.;. oy

Kai-shek's break with the Communists in 1927 when the

latter were driven from the cities and conflneu to the inland
hills.

Land-locked and constantly uuder

si~ge

from without,

the Communi,,'ts nad no "holce but to turn to the peasant for
support.

8

1n the "Repurt of an J.nves"igat1on into "he Peasant

Movement in tiunan, " Mao said in 1927:
"The erroneous measur~~ taken by the revolutionary
authoriLi~s concernlng the peasant movement must be
speedily cnangeu. unlY thus can any good De done
for the future of the revolution. l"or the rise of
the present peasant movement 1S a cOLossal event.
1n a very short time, in China's central, southern

7·Care of Living Conditions of the Masses·, belected darks,
vol. 1, p.150
8Franz Schurmann and Urvil~e 8chell, tlepublicdn ~nina.
Vintage Books, New York; 19~7, pp.173- 1 74
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bnd uor~hern provinces, several hundred million peasants will rise like a tornado or tempest, a force 80
extraordinarily swift and violent that no power,
however grea~ ,. will ue aule to suppress it."9

It was from the ranks of "the co=on peasants that. Alao
built the iirst rleu Army.
~hingKang-d.hd.n

and

tL~

!.lurIng the years of struggle in

t.erward., Mao hau olJen ... y l't(;ognJ.zeu

mon bond between revolutionaries and secret
armed outlaw organizations.

~nis reliec~ed

com-

and at.her

lie had consistently solicited the

support of such groups uc8p1te
hierarchy.l0

80cie~ies

a.

cri~icisms

from the party

in part. nis iuentification with

the ancient tradition of hero banuitry, in part nis populist.
~heir

sense of

i'evoiu tionary potential.

their charact.er could be changtti OJ

asser~eu ~ha~

itlt~nsive

tion once they nan joiueu the !ted Army.
and even the bourgeoisie could

Mao

political educa-

l'easanto,

~ranscend ~heir

sOluier~,

clasd ouck-

ground tnrough "UucaL ion and revolutionary process.

!.Iemo.nacy

in the arm.)', Mao bel i even, was a'n "important weapon"

1 or ensur-

·lng loyalty to the "ollllllunis'L cause, as it gave the soliders a
sense of "spiritual liberation" that was aosent in the Kuomin,11

t ang armIes.

9~elected

Works, VOl. 1, pp.21-22

10kark l:;elden, The Yenan Way, liarvara liniversity Press,
Gambriuge, Massachusetts, 1971, p.104
1i"The titruggle in
Vol.l, p.83

~he L~lll~Kang

Mountains", Selected Works,
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(2)

Alliances.

In China the urban proletariat class

was exceedingly small; !Jao put i t a t a mere two mi 11 ion people
as late as 1926.

12

Therefore, the proletariat could not lead

a liheration movement on its own strength alone; it had to
rely on all other classes, forces,
whatever reason, support its cause.

and groups that might, for
The transition to a united

front policy was a complex and challengi:::lg task for Hao.
Throughout 1936, conflicting policy lines coexisted within the
Chinese Communist Party.

Eventually, under !.iao's leadership

the party emerged as the most effective spokesman for patriotic
sentiment at a time of mounting concern about Japanese incur-

sions in China.

This led to a military detente with the warlord

and Kuomintang armies which had been directly threatening the
rural base areas of the communists; and prompted significant
support among middle school and college students, thousands of
whom flocked to Yenan.

Communist appeals provided a focus for

nationwide pressure to end the Civil War, and paved the way for
the Second United Front under Mao's leadership.

From this time

on, the public pronouncements of the Chinese Communist Farty

12nAnalysis of the Classes in Chinese Society",
Selected Works, Vol.!, pp.!3-20
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always includ.ed emotional and nationalistic appeals for total
mobilization against Japan.

(3)

13

Protracted warfare.

1:ao maintained that since the

enemy is superior in power, the war would be protracted, undergoing (from the standpoint of the revolutionaries) three stages
of development: "strategic defence," "strategic stalemate," and
"strategic counter-offensive."

Because the revolutionaries were

weak, Mao said, they were bound to lose ground in the initial
phases of the conflict. lIeanwhile, it was necessary to develop
over a vast territory a war of maneuver to harass the enemy and
undermine his effectiveness and morale.

This required mass poli-

tical mobilization, a united front of "the whole people", and
the development of peasant guerrilla warfare on a national
scale.

Having attained sufficient strength, the revolutionaries

would then launch a counteroffensive to destroy the enemy.

The

overall strategy was summed up in the following terms:
•.•• we should resolutely fight a decisive engagement in
every campaign or battle in which we are sure of victory;
we should avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign
or battle in which we are not sure of victory; and we
should absolutely avoid a strategically decisive enga- 14
gement on which the fate of the whole nation is staked.
13For instance, see "The Ten Great Policies of the Oinese Communist
Party for Anti-Japanese Resistance and National Salvation," in
A Documentary Hi~tory of Chinese Communism. Brandt, Conrad,
Benjamin Schwartz, and John i,. Fairbanks. Cambridge, 1'ass.:
Harvard University Press, 1952, pp.242-245, and the manifesto
of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee following the
Lukouchiao Incideut of July 7, 1937, quoted in Mao, Selected
Works, II, pp.57-58
14
"On Protracted War", Selected Works, II, p.180
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Furthermore, Mao maintained that there could be no delimitation, no partition between various forms of struggle like military action, political and economic agrarian policies in the
Chinese liberation movement.

In other words, the aim of the

Chinese Communist Party was not only to win a war of liberation
against

Japan,

b~t

also to promote social and political movement

on a country-wide scale, and above all, to take power.

To keep

the geographical sprawl united through ideology aud organization,
mass struggle on all fronts and in various forms had to be carried
out.
Building the Party organization on a mass base was a task
fundamental to the national struggle.

This was ac.complished by

fusing the Party and Red Army into a twin synthesis, but with the
Party in ideological control.

It was through the Red Army, carry-

ing out the policies of the Party, that the agrarian revolution,
essential for the support of the masses, could develop.

This com-

plex triple relationship of masses-Party-Army is the basis of .:ao's
forms of struggle.
Mao maintained that the Red Army was not only a military
instrument but above all a political form of propaganda, agitation,
promoting land reform and peasant struggle, educating the people wld
leading them to establish their own associations, to take power
from the landlords.

The Red Army therefore was the best training

ground for Party cadres, since armed struggle was the dominant mode
of the liberation movement.
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Basically, the forms of struggle were broadly divided among
four types of organizations.

These were the government ("soviets"),

the Chinese Communist Party, the army, and the mass organizations.
Their struggles were coordinated through formal and informal
channels of communication that included joint meetings, mutual
campaigns and interlocking leadership.1 5

The mode of struggle had two key elements: one, struggle
toward rationalized hierarchy and centralized organization, the
other toward reliance on the force generated by an aroused peasantry through land revolution and guerrilla warfare.

In 1942,

for the first time, economic development and social change in the
base areas became the key mode of struggle.

The implication of

this element of communication is that there is less need for the
use of overt party power.

In fact, the party controls by leading

and the masses "control" by participating, and this is on the
assumption that the "vanguard" cannot have interests differing
from those of the masses.

The approach emphasizes direct, open

channels of communication to the lowest levels of information.

"Mass Line"
Older forms of Marxism, as developed in other countries,
wonld have broken down through communication failures, leaving
15Mark Seldon, The Yenan Way.

p.140

Harvard University Press, 1972,

141

Mao's group as a powerless sect.

Hence, Mao developed not only

a relevant ideology but also a mass line communication doctrine.
Mao appears to be the first Chinese leader (Gandhi was the first
Indian) to develop a mass communication approach based not on
authority but on the reciprocal relationship between political
leaders and the general Chinese population.

He maintained that

the leaders should not create artificial and psychological barriers in thought or behavior that would cut them off from the
revolutionary "mass base".

The concept of the "mass line" there-

fore seems to be direct response to the traditional weak linkage
between leaders and led.

In other words, the function of mass

line was to avoid "cutting oneself off from the masses".

The aspects of Mao's communication that concern us most
are his general ideology of mass participation and his conception of the mass line as a style of communication.

Though the

formal mass line concept includes other matters, nlass line communication is perhaps the most important idea in terms of a national
liberation movement, for it determines the relationship between
the leader and the led, and it determines how the people will
participate in the national struggle.

Mao's ideology and the modes of communication that he
used can be comprehended within the framework of a series of
questions, all bearing on mass line communication.

These include:

(a) What communication approach will encourage the widest
possible mass participation in liberation movement?
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(2)

What is the correct style to achieve a syntheSis
of Party leadership and mass action?

(3)

How should one channel this activity into directions
that support national goals?

These questions combine to make the "mass line" a unifying theme
in the communication theory of Mao.
In 1938, Mao compared the difference between a style of
approach which would gain popular support and one which would
turn away such support.

He argued that "such things as selfish-

ness and self-interest, inactiveness and negligence in work, corruption, degeneration and vainglory are most contemptible; while
the spirit of impartiality, of active and hard work, of selfdenial in the interest of the public and of complete absorbtion
. ar duous wor k , comman d s respec t". 16
1n

T he most effective style,

therefore, to mobilize the masses and create an atmosphere of
popular commitment is the ,mass line reflecting service, responsibility, consultation, and common sacrifice.

Direct contact with masses.

The mass line places parti-

cular emphasis on the points of direct contact between the masses
and leaders in order that supervision and guidance may be simple
and meaningful.

Such an approach calls for a high degree of

alert response to developments within the ,masses and at the level
of actual work.
16"The role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War",
Selected Works, II, p.247
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The leader aims through the mass line not only to "elevate
the level of consciousness of the masses" but also his own by
imbibing "the opinions and experiences of the masses".

Mao for-

malized the mass line method as a general guide to 'action in
these words:
In all pra~tical work of the Party, correct leadership can
only be developed on the principle of "from the masses, to
the masses".
This means summing up (i. e., co-ordinating
and systematising after careful study) the views of the
masses (i.e., views scattered and unsystematic), then
taking the resulting ideas back to the masses, explaining and popularising them until the masses embrace the
ideas as their oun, stand up for them and translate them
into action by way of correcting and testing their correctness. And this is to be repeated over and over again, so
that each time these ideas emerge with greater correctness and become more vital and meaningful. 1 7

Stages of "from the masses, to the masses".

The process

from the masses to the party center and back emphasizes flexibility and participation under general guidance, on the one hand,
and supervision and centralized authority (democratic centralism),
on the other.

This process, however, Occurs within a well-

conceived flexible framework which has four progressive stages;
(a)

Perception:

18

In this first stage, the cadres operate

within the worker-peasant masses, studying their "scattered and
unsystematic views" and knowledge in order to identify problems,
17 nOn Methods of Leadership", Selected Works, Vol. IV, pp.111-117
18John Wilson Lewis, Leadership in Communist China.
University Press, New York: 196}, p.72

Cornell
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to coordinate views and knowledge, and to determine areas of
strength and weakness for party operation.
(b)

Summarization:

Then in the second stage, the cadres

sum up tested and scattered views and information into reports.
(c)

Authorization:

In the third stage, the highest com-

mittee responsible for the area covered by the reports receives
the cadre reports with comments from lower echelons and if necessary issues authoritative directives or instructions.
(d)

Implementation:

In this stage, these general direc-

tives are then sent back through the apparatus to be explained
and popularized among the masses "until the masses embrace the·
ideas as their own, stand up for them and translate them into
action by way of testing their correctness".
This process is c·ontinuous in which everyone participates,
from the leading cadres right down to the common worker and
peasant.

The general flow of the process emphasizes direct com-

munication and flexibility in making modifications according to
actual needs of the situation.

The cadre is to be a pupil first,

then a teacher, and is not to pretend to be knowledgeable without
concrete study.

Mao's slogan was "wi thou t

investigation no

right to speak." The mass line stipulates that cadres must adjust
to sudden changes by reappraising their own knowledge in the
light of the new situation.
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The principal;obstacles or barriers to mass line communication were seen by Mao to be "tailism", defined as the
erroneous practice of blindly following untutored popular demands;
" commandism" , "isolationism", tlbureaucratism", and· "warlordism",

were forms of practice too far removed from the people.

"Com-

mandism" and "bureaucratism", the most serious barriers, are

phenomena common to officious, arrogant bureaucrats, while "isolationism" is the failure to enlist the participation of nonparty
people, or, as Mao put it in 1938, "to think that only we our.

solves are good and everyone else is of no use".

19

"Warlordism"

was a serious problem in the People's Liberation Army during the

civil war; other critical civil "sins l ! were "sectarianism",
which created problems of unity and solidarity within the party
and masses, and "subjectivism", an attitude divorced from objec-

·
rea 1·1 t y. 20
t 1ve

Mao included the "right" and "left" approach

also as barriers to mass tine communication.

The "right" erred

by regarding the liberation movement as an exclusively partymilitary affair and opposed its "socialization" through

~ao's

united-front policies; the "left" pushed the "socialization" component to its limits thus alienating some sections of the populace.

In the revolutionary environment of the civil war, the
mass line evolved naturally in response to the demands of war-time
19"The Role of the Chinese Communist Party Party in the National
War". Selected ~orks, Vol. II, p.247
20Mao 's earliest ideas on subjectivism are found in "On Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party", Dec., 1929, Selected
Works, I, p.112
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events.

Only after prolonged immers ion in these events did

~:ao

abstract the general principles and rationalize an operational
code for the mass line method.
It was during the "low ebb" period in the history of the
liberation movement in 1927-1930 that 11ao developed the "democratic, mass line" in response to the desperate military position of the party and the Red Army.

Between 1930 and 1949, com-

munication procedures were detailed, organizations Were created,
and methods of implementing policy were acquired.

During the

rectification campaign of 1942-1944, the mass line method became
the operational code necessary to gain support of the masses.
The Japanese aggression--particularly after their fullscale 1937 invasion -- made 1:ao's mass line approach nationally
relevant and popular.

According to Eao, it integrated "the

activities of the Red Army with all the activities of the workers,
peasants, students, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie of the whole country".

21

In maintaining a correct mass line approach, "from the
masses, to the masses", it is necessary to establisb close contact "not only between the Party and the masses outside the Party
(the class and the people), but first of all between the leading
bodies of the Party and the masses within the Party (the cadre
21"On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism",
Selected Works, I, p.163
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and the membership)",

The principle of the party's organizational

unity is democratic centralism, which may serve as the model for
relationships between the party and the Chinese people (mass
) • 22
'
l 1De

Organizational communication barriers within the party,
such as subjectivism, formalism, doctrinarism and empiricism,
etc., challenged correct mass line communication.

In the main,

Mao linked the removal of communication barriers to the central
role of communication in the organizational life of the party,
Communication aims to educate the Party and those who have made
mistakes.

In other words, the main channels of communication

are education and party struggle, which are closely linked.
There are inherent contradictions within the party owing to the
presence of ideological contradictions which must be continuously
"synthesized" through struggle and reinforced by a "united, iron
discipline".
Despite the appearance of contradiction, however, mistaken democracy ("individualism", "tailism", "adventurism!l) and
excessive centralism ("commandism"t "bureaucratism", "warlordism n

)

reflect basic ideological barriers, according to Ilao, arising from
class contradictions outside the party, rather than contradictions
within party organization.

In trying to identify the areas of

tension and common expectation linking leader and led, 1Iao saw
22John Wilson Lewis, op. cit, p.184
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the need for making conflict an integral part of the political
process.

In his theoretical essay "On Contradiction," Mao states

that the resolution of contradiction through mediated forms of
social conflict provides the dynamic element to social change,
"Materialist dialectics considers external causes to be the condition of change and interna.l causes to be the basis of change,

.

external causes becoming operative through internal causes".

tlCriticism-self-criticism".

23

This was to resolve non-

antagonistic contradictions (which can be resolved without violence) and to activate the new relationships.

The formula of

"unity-criticism-unity" was worked out during the Rectification
Movement of 1942.
Small groups for study and production were established by
party cadres in which new types of intimate relationships were
cultivated to replace the former family ties.

The small size of

these groups permitted the development of reciprocal obligations
.in general agreement with traditional schemes.

Under party

supervision, these obligations were nurtured and then closely
examined and criticized in order to bring them into conformity
with the requirements of the collectivity and party leadership.
At the same time, "criticism-self-criticism" made possible for
lower-echelon party members to come forward with their own
grievances and suggestions, and thus tended to institutionalize
23Selected Works, Vol. II, p.16
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conflict in a creative way.

There has been a constant tension

between the desires of some to see all conflict ended and the
impulse in others which makes the release of aggression exceed
the limits of ordered institutional political combat.
Briefly, the whole process aims at "socialization", that
is, "to increase political consciousness, to explain social
policies, to teach specific techniques, or even to raise the
cultural level of the public."24
By constantly applying "criticism and self-criticism to
remove barriers from proper ideological practice, ideal communication relationships of the mass line are created in the organizational life of the party.

In correcting mistakes, criticism and

self-criticism become unifying forces.

Party members are thus

educated to participate "democratically" in the process of comunication so that they can distinguish "right from wrong," eliminate wrong attitudes, and improve leadership's communication
style.

In other words, methods of discussion, of criticism, of

persuasion and education are used to settle controversial issues.
Briefly then, Mao's communication theory aims to integrate through
critical inter-personal processes and active participation not
only "vertically" the different levels of the political system
but more significantly the relations among his closest associates
24Victor Li "Introduction", Allyn and Adele Rickett, Prisoners
of Liberation. Anchor Press, Doubleday Garden City,
New York: 1973
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in the Party's leading bodies.
Self-criticism.meant complete confession and symbolized
allegiance to Mao's values.

The psychological effect of public

confession as an organizational device was a major tool of the
Rectification Campaign of

19~2.

Summary
The most decisive element of Mao's communication theory
is the concept of Marxism-Leninism as applied to the "colonial,
semi-colonial, and semifeudal" country of China.

The underlying

principle is Marxism's "categorical demand,,25 in approaching
social problems that theory be integrated with the actual circumstances.
Mao's most characteristic communication practice was to
initiate and promote a close relationship between the leaders and
the masses so as to arouse active

participat~on

and support of

·the people.
The rationale for Mao's theory and practice was that the
masses are the creators of history.

Mao had a profound faith in

the creative force of the people, and that is why he insisted that
the main task of the Chinese Communist Party is to work in closest
connection with the people.

Communists must proceed "from the

25"On the Hight of Nations to Self-Determination", February, 191~
Lenin's Selected Works, IV.
International Publishers, New York:
19~3, p.255, "Letter on Tactics", April, 1917, Ibid., VI, pp.32
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real needs ofithe masses".

All measures of the Party would fail

.
' 11 l.ng".
.
26
un 1 eSB th e masses " are conSC10U8
an dw1
Such a close connection with the popular masses, however,
could only be achieved if Party functionaries had·had moral character, were genuinely dedicated, and behaved with modesty.

A

Chinese Communist, Mao maintained, "should not slight or look
down upon such persons (backward people), but become friendly
towards them, unite with them, and persuade, and encourage them to
go forward".2 7

To overcome communication barriers and to avoid

becoming opinionated and domineering, the Party members must go
through the process of criticism-self-criticism.
Class analysis is the foundation of Mao's mass line communication.

Class analysis provides the communication technique

to separate the reliable from the unreliable, friends from enemy.
Class analysis, therefore, determines not only the nature of
direction of the movement but also the relation of the Communist
.Party to the masses, which is the most important criterion in differentiating that party from other parties.
Briefly then, the mass line communication theory of Mao
can operate only through well-trained cadres -- having an advanced ideological consciousness -- who comprehend the union of
26· The United front in Cultural Work", Selected Works, IV,
pp.225-227
27 nThe Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War",
Selected Works, II, p.247
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revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice.

The operational

eode of mass line permits the cadres to penetrate the intimate
faee-to-face social relationships within the general society.
Mao maintained that the communication effectiveness of lowerlevel cadres will be judged by their success in educating and
organizing the masses, continuously raising the level of mass
consciousness and by the degree of mass unity and activism.
In this sense, mass line communication may be seen as creating a
new and ideal relationship between the leaders and the people.
Basically, there are four main elements in 1,:ao' s communication theory:
(1)

Organization, as the network of communication;

(2)

Ideology, as the unifying content of communications;

(3)

Criticism, as the dynamic to overcome communication
barriers;

(4)

Mass Line, as the motivating force to the national
liberation movement.

Gandhi

Non-violent Liberation and Tacit "Mass Line"

In a certain sense, Gandhi was still more of an innovator
than Mao.

He explicitly rejected the Marxist interpretation of

history:
The Marxist regards the mind 'a reflex of the material
environment', I cannot accept that ... If I have an awareness of that living principle within me, no one can
fetter my mind.
The body might be destroyed, the spirit
will proclaim its freedom. This to me is not a theory;
it is a fact of experience.28
28Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, The Last Phase, Vo1,2, p.137
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In 1922 Gandhi.wrote, "History is more a record of wonderful
revolutions than of so-called ordered progress.,,29

Since Gandhi rejected Marxism he had to provide an alternative to it; he had to start from scratch in formulating a socalled "non-violence" ideology of national liberation to help
unite and guide his diverse followers among both the rural masses
and the urban elites.
This ideology, although less explicit than Mao's (and
perhaps because it was less expiicit) became an immediate inspiration to the other national liberation movements throughout
Asia, the Middle East and Africa, where scores of former colonies
achieved independence with little or no blood-shed.

It also pro-

vided the direct inspiration for Martin Luther hing and other
leaders of the "non-violent" civil rights movement in the United
States.

Part of its power stemmed from Gandhi's vague but rheto-

rically powerful visions of a socialistic and egalitarian society; this aspect was widely adopted by the leaders of other
independence movements.

Whether they ever understood his special

modes of communication -- his tacit "mass line", if you will -is another matter.

One thing is sure: no other leader of a "war

without violence" was ever able to develop such intimate bonds
of communication and understanding with illiterate masses.
29Young India, February, 1922
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Gandhi's version of liberation
Gandhi's ideology rests on two main norms, nonviolence
and truth, which linked Gandhi with traditional India and united
him to the common people.

Gandhi conceived of nonviolence

at

several levels and at the ground level, as it were, it was frankly
a political tactic.

Violence for freedom would merely stiffen

British resistance, putting the British on grounds where they
felt sure of themselves, and alienate world opinion.

There was

a great deal of this nonviolence. from expediency, as Gandhi himself said:
The English are splendidly armed; that does not
frighten me, but it is clear that, to pit ourselves
against them in arms, thousands of Indians must be
armed. If such a thing be possible,how many years
will i t take? 30

Gandhi's non-violence, therefore, was

simply the only

intelligent, realistic, expedient program which he had at his disposal.

Also the "morality" which surrounded this policy of non-'

violence was to a large degree a rationale to cloak a pragmatic
action with a desired and essential moral theme.

And so the next

aspect of non-violence was its use as a moral method,
Non-violence does not mean meek submission to the will
of the evil-doer, but it means the pittlng of one's
whole soul against the will of the. tyrant .•. And so I
am not pleading for India to practice non-violence
because she is weak.
I want her to practice nonviolence being conscious of her strength and power.3 1
0
3 M. K • Gandhi, Hind Swara,j. Navajivan, Ahmedabad, 1938, p.50
31Young India, December, 1938
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Nonviolent action, to put it differently, became not passive
resistance, but a moral principle taking the initiative in active
struggle; a link was forged between a means of mass struggle and
a moral preference for nonviolent means.
At the third and highest level of Gandhi's thought, nonviolence was an inner spiritual principle.

It aimed at the inner

conversion of an opponent by the power of love and suffering.
Expressed in a paradox, Gandhi's method was to contrive to be
"consti tutionally unc onsti tutional". 32

Gandhi maintained that

"a nonviolent rebillion is not a programme of seizure of power.
It is a programme of transformation of relationship ending in a
peaceful transfer of power".33
Briefly then, nonviolence became the revolutionary weapon
of the weak against the strong in the battle of national freedom.
The weak must not surrender.

The weak must not obey.

Instead of

inflicting suffering, the weak must invite suffering on themselves
and put the oppressor to shame and make his weapons as useless as
possible.

Large masses of people must act collectively, fearlessly,

and nonviolently against terror and injustice. This help give the
participants a sense of their own power, as Nehru put it, "a black
pall of fear was lifted from the people's shoulders". 34
32Spear, op. cit., p.363
33Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The last Phase: Vol.2, Navajivan,
1958, p.323
34Nehru, Nehru On Gandhi. The John Day Company, New York: 1948,

p.70
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Indeed, Gandhi bnilt his nonviolent liberation movement
with specificallY the "dumb millions" of India in mind.
We have been trying to act on the masses from
the commencement of our struggle. We regard
them as our mainstay, for it is they who have
to attain swaraj (freedom).
It is neither the
sole concern of the monied men nor that of the
educated class. 35
He believed that the traditional Indian meekness and obedience
of the "lowliest of the low" could be transformed into strength
and courage.

Gandhi's decision to make the Harijans ('untoucha-

bles', the lowest caste) and the women his special causes was a
shrewed political attempt to recruit support from this otherwise
unmobilized groups.

The only effective sanction against injus-

tice, Gandhi stressed, is enlightened public opinion.

In so

doing, Gandhi reversed the ancient Indian maxim, "As the king,
so the people", and declared "As the people, so the king".3

6

Swaraj, which was India's political slogan for freedom
and independence, was used by Gandhi and particularized to mean
self-rule, self-control.

In other words, the goal of Gandhi's

(nonviolent mov.ement was not only to free India from colonial rule
but also to remold or create a new man and woman.
Gandhi meant by swaraj.

This is what

It literally means "self-rule" and in

its original connotation meant autonomy or the moral self where
strict control is exercised over the senses.
35Young India, April 20, 1921
36Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, The Last Phase. Navajivan, 1958,
Vo1.2, p.51
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In December 1929, the Congress met at Lahore and passed
the resolution declaring that the word "Swaraj" in Article I of
the Congress Constitution shall mean 'Complete Independence,.37
In Gandhian interpretation it came to mean willingn.ess to suffer
in the cause of freedom,
Whatever awakens people
and whatever gives them
and peaceful resistance
porate suffering brings

to a sense of their wrongs
strength for disciplined
and habituates them to corus nearer Swaraj.38

Gandhi, therefore, used swaraj to mean not only national selfgovernment but also to mean any government responsible to the
people, and even to mean the acceptance of nonviolent noncooperation which would give the nation the self-confidence necessary for
exerting its will over the government. 39
Real swaraj will come not by the acquisition of
authori ty by a few but by the acquisition of ·{he
capacity by all to resist authority when it is
abused.
In other words, swaraj is to be attained
by educating the masses to a sense of their capacity
to regulate and control authority.40

The ideal society towards which Gandhi worked, he described it as sarvodaya, which literally means "uplift of all".

B~ed

upon nonviolence it is envisaged in terms of harmonious,

37 p • Sitaramayya, History of the Indian Congress. Vol. 11 , S. Chand &
Co., New Delhi, 1947, p.209
38Young India, March 8, 1928
39D•G• Tendulkar, Mahatma. Delhi 1961, Vol.2, pp.73-74
40Young India, January 29, 1925
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casteless, classless society with equal opportunity for all.

As

Gandhi put it:
India has enough and can have enough--

if some of her sons did not corner the
good things and deprive the masses of
their due. 41

Therefore, Gandhi's two norms, nonviolence and truth lie
at the heart of his entire social and political ideology.

With

nonviolence as the means, and truth as the common end, Gandhi
formulated his version of a nonviolent socialist society.

But

hefore such a society could materialize, Gandhi believed, India
had first to accomplish the immediate goal of freedom from foreign
control.

To

Gandhi, a radical change in the

social and economic

order was, indeed, the meaning and essential purpose of overthro-,ying foreign rule.

Without it, independence would be an empty

achievement.
Economic equality is the master key to nonviolent
independence ••• A nonviolent system of government
is clearly an impossibility so long as the wide gulf
between the rich and the hungry millions persists.
The contrast between the rich palaces of New Delhi
and the miserable hovels of the poor, laboring class
cannot last one day in a free India in which the poor
will enjoy the same power as the richest in the land.
A violent and bloody revolution is a certainty one
day unless there is a voluntary abdication of riches,
and the power that riches give, and sharing them for
the common good. 42
41

J.e.

Kapur "India in the Year 2000", The Futurist, August, 1974,
pp.160-166

42

Quoted by G. Myrdal in Against the stream.
New York: 1972, p.237

Pantheon Books,
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Gandhi's vision of a nonviolent socialist society was
based on the belief that onCe the power was transferred to the
masses of the Indian people, these masses would assert themselves
and carry out the economic and social revolution.

This belief,

in turn, was based on the assumption that the colonial rule had so
suppressed the forces for progress that once the shackles of
imperialism were removed, rapid transformation will begin.
Myrdal points out that Gandhi was one of the first leaders
either in India or anywhere else in South Asia who drew public
attention to social and economic equalization,
Gandhi's egalitarianism became one of the links
between him and the rationalistic intellectuals
of Nehru's type, who, unlike Gandhi, were relatively unconcerned with religion. lt3
Gandhi and Nehru together persuaded the Congress to declare
at their session in Karachi in 1931 tbat "in order to end the
exploitation of the masses, political freedom must include real

ec~nomic

freedom for the starving·millions".1t1t

For Gandhi the really significant choice did not lie between capitalism and socialism, but between centralization of power
and a system based on decentralization of authority.
Nehru wants industrialization because he thinks that
if it is socialized it would be free from the evils
43 Ibid p.235
44 Ibid p.236
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of capitalism. My own view is that the evils are
inherent in industrialism, and no amount of socialization can eradicate them.45
Gandhi's sarvodaya vision was based on those primary
associations in which communication of human beings is as of person to person; and industrialization was to disrupt this as little
as possible.

Nonviolence and centralized power were incompatible

according to Gandhi.

In support of small-scale village industry,

he explained, • ... millions of people can take their share in this
work and progress can be arithmetically measured,·46 and insisted
that decentralization of industry ·preserves the purity and compactness of domestic life, artistry and creative talent, as well
as .the people's sense of freedom, ownership and

dignity.·4 7

Therefore, Gandhi's swadeshi (home-spun cloth, emphasizing self-sufficiency) movement not only served an economic function in the actual supply of cloth, it also carried significant
ide\IOgiCal implications.

Gandhi 'wrote in Harijan on November 30,

t934,
I have no partiality for return to the primitive
methods of grinding and husking for the sake of
them.
I suggest the return, because there is no
other way of giving employment to the millions of
villagers who are living in idleness.

45Dhawan, The Political Philosophy of
Navajivan, Ahmedabad: 1951, p.185

~'ahatma

Gandhi,

46Harijan, Angust 18, 1940
47Dhawan, The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi,
Navajivan, Ahmedabad: 1951, p.185
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Swadeshi was necessary for economic decentralization which
Gandhi conceived as a measure to prevent concentration of wealth
and power.

The central effort during the years of the nationa-

list struggle for swaraj lay in the propagation of khadi (homespun 'cloth), as Gandhi said, "You cannot get swar.ij by mere
speeches, shows, processions, etc.

What is needed is solid,

steady, constructive work.,,48
It was the'constructive program, Gandhi believed, that
gave content to the expectations of rural people and invited
their active enthusiasm and participation in the liberation movement.
(1)

In general, the program included the following points:

comm~nal

unity; (2) removal of untouchability; (3) prohibi-

tion; (4) Khadi; (5) other village industries; (6) village sanitation; (7) new education; (8) adult education; (9) uplift of
women; (10) health education; (11) propagation of national education; (12) promotion of economic equality.4 9
Among these items, the production of home-spun cloth was
central.

In hand-spinning Gandhi saw at once not only the eco-

nomic solution, but also an answer to the psychological and political problems of the nationalist movement.
Khaddar has the greatest organising power in it
because it has itself to be organised and because
it affects all India. If Khaddar rained from heaven
it would be a calamity. But as it can only be manufactured by the willing co-operation of starving
48Young India, September 5, 1929
49Gnndhi, Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place,
Navajivan, Ahmedabad: 19 1'1, p.28
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millions and thousands of middle class men and women,
its success means the best organisation conceivable
along peaceful lines. 50

It might be argued that the spinning of thread might not
do much to alter economic conditions in the country, nonetheless,
the experience of working together in great mass meetings gave
people an exhilarating sense of participation (which Gandhi calls
"organising power") in the political process.

Another action

that gave the same feeling was making a bonfire of foreign cloth.
To wear

fOr~ign

clothing was sinful, Gandhi argued, because it

deprived the Indian weaver of the right to work.

"I must refuse

to insult the naked by giving them clothes they do not need,
instead of giving them work which they sorely need.,,5

1

Briefly, Gandhi worked for self-sufficient rural republics, as he explained to Nehru,
The essence of what I have said is that man should rest
content with what are his real needs, and become selfsufficient. 52
Finally, and perhaps most important of all, Gandhi insis.ted on personal service for others as an essential ingredient of
leadership,

Therefore, the concept of trusteeship in Gandhian

language means service as a mode of behavior.

This behavior is

grounded in his doctrine of aparigraha: nonpossession or voluntary poverty.

Recognizing that absolute non-possession is an

5 0 Sa klatvala and 11.1'. Gandhi, Is India Different? The Class Struggle
in India : Correspondence on the lndian Labour Lovement and !\~odern
Conditions. London: Communist l'arty of Great Britain, 1927, p.23
5 1 Young India, November 11, 1929
52Ci ted by J C Kapur in "India in the Year 2000", The Futurist
August, 1974, pp.160-166
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abstraction and unattainable, Gandhi suggested that "if we strive
for (non-possession), we shall be able to go further in realizing
a scale Of\eqUality on earth than by any other method".53

Eco-

nomic equality was essential, Gandhi maintained, because "violence
is bred in inequality".
mass poverty.

He went

His deep concern was with the problem of
so far as to say that for the poor the

economic is the spiritual
as bread and butter,55

54

and that to them God can appear only

The cause of poverty was, in his view,

the covetousness of the rich and the exploitation of the needy
by the greedy.

The redistribution of income is more important

than the raising of output, and the fulfilment of the basic needs
of the masses requires not raising of expectations but of the
limitation of the wants of the richer classes.

Gandhi set out to

regulate the rich by persuading them to hold property not for personal benefit but rather as a 'trust' for the welfare of the masses.
This nonviolent method was based on the belief that "change of
heart" could be brought about if' persuasive appeals were made to
-their conscience.
Gandhi's idea of service as a mode of behavior included
manual labor; he went so far as to suggest that it should be a
qualification for the franchise, "it should be neither property
nor position but manual work ••• "

In this way "all who wish to

53N K'Bose "An Interview with Mahatma Gandhi", National Herald,
Dec. 28, 1938
54Young India, May 1927
55young India, October, 1931
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take part in the Government and the well-being of the State",
could prove themselves, and the labor-test would be far superior

,

6

to that of either literacy or property.5
The trusteeship concept, therefore, aimed'toward removing
psychological and other kinds of barriers associated with class
or status, between the leaders at the 'top' and the masses at
the 'bottom'.

A genuine posture of 'humility' and 'lowliness';

Gandhi believed, must be the basis for effective leadership.

The most important characteristic of Gandhi's version of
liberation was that it must be in harmony with basic values,

If

the goal is a nonviolent society, the mode also must be nonviolent; if human freedom is the end, coercive modes (except moral
coercion) are ruled out; if truth is to be the basis of the new
society, then false propaganda or distortion of truth are inadmissable; if the aim is dispersal of power, the mode cannot be
centralized power, and so on.

Furthermore, Gandhi maintained that

·technical media by itself cannot be effective.
I now come to the means of propagating what is called
the 'Gandhian' ideology. The propagation of truth
and nonviolence can be done less by books than by
actually living those principles. Life truly lived
is more than books.
I do not say that we may not
issue books and newspaper.
I only say that they are
not indispensable •.• We must make a sincere effort to
enter our opponent's mind and to understand his viewpoint. That is what is meant by nonviolence waDdng
straight into the mouth of violence.
If we are armed
with that attitude of mind, we may hope to propagate
56Dhawan, op. cit., p.282
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nonviolence principles. Without that, book and newspaper propaganda is of no avail.57

Gandhi's national movement addressed itself to the most
fundamental questions in communication: how to persuade individuals and groups to adopt new ways of thought and action?

The

method of persuasion that Gandhi offered was given the name of
"satyagraha" (truth force).

The main elements of this method were

new education, and complete identification with the masses in
manner of speech and life style.

Gandhi's "Mass Line"
As one examines carefully Gandhi's ideas not only on
channels of communication but on the entire problem of links between the leaders and the led, it is hard to avoid noticing their
similarity with Mao's ideas on the "mass line".

One might well

imagine that if he had enjoyed the opportunity of reading a systematized statement of the mass line, he might well have exclaimed
. "Faith, for forty years, I have been using the mass line without

knowing it".
There were three basic elements in Gandhi's mass line:
truth force (satyagraha), new education (nai talim), and symbolic

actioa.

The"L.lll"""is 'maay"ways comparable to -- and of course

different from -- Mao's stages of "from the masses, to the masses",
criticism and self-criticism, and direct action.
57Hari ,ian, May 13, 1939
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Truth force is basically a method of persuasion by personal example and deed.

To the persuasion of words it adds the

persuasion of a leader's sincerity; more potent and simple and
therefore better understood by the masses.

58

Gandhi called it

"a programme of propaganda",59 and declared that "public opinion
.
60
is a mightier force than gunpowder".

Gandhi believed that

people interpreted messages in terms of their conception of the
leader's character and reputation.

In his autobiography he dis-

tinguishes between an argumentative speech and an emotional
appeal

61

and comes to accept the limits of a logical argument,
•••• one who hears or reads a word does not always
understand it in the speaker's or writer's sense.
Therefore the heart, that is devotion, faith and
knowledge grounded in experience are invested with
greater importance. Logic is a matter of mere intelligence, which cannot apprehend things that are clear
as crystal to the heart. On the other hand the
intellect often believes in certain things, but if
they do not appeal to the heart, they must be
rejected. 62

In other words, effective leadership means the ability to com.municate intuitively with the masses,
58Richard B. Gregg, The POIVer of Non-Violence. Navajivan Press,
Ahmedabad: 1960 (2nd edition), p.67
59Young India, August, 1925
60Young India, March, 1929
61y K Gandhi, The Story of l:y Experiments with Truth.
Navajivan Press, Ahmedabad: 1956. pp.11'2-113
62Gilbert Murray, Talking to Gandhi.ii.
1957, p.12

Orient Longmans,
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They often perceive things with their intuition,
which we ourselves fail to see with our intellect.
But whilst the masses know what they want, they
often do not know how to express their wants and,
less often, how to get what they want. Herein
comes the use of leadership •... 63

Gandhi recognized the need for inspired leadership in
political and social activity and maintained that anyone who
followed satyagraha courageously was capable of leading the
nation.

Satyagraha may use any of several modes of nonviolent

action.

Those which were most commonly used during the libera-

tion movement are non-cooperation and civil disobedience.
In principle, noncooperation is simply the refusal to
cooperate with a requirement which is taken to violate fundamental "truths" or refusal to cooperate with those responsible for
such violations.

Noncooperation may include strike, walkout,

hartal (voluntary closure. of shops and businesses, usually for a
twentyfour hour period), and resignation of offices and titles.

Civil disobedience is the direct contravention of specific laws and may include such activities as non-payment of taxes.
The civil character is maintained in principle by the inviting of,
and voluntary submission to, sanctions provided by law for action
contrary to the legal norm.

64

Until their national liberation

63Young India, November 1930
64Joan V. Bondurant, "Satyagraha versus Duragraha: The Limits of
Symbolic Violence", in Gandhi: Ilis Relevance for Our Times.
Ed. Ramachandran & Mahadevan, New Delhi: Gandhi Peace }'oundation, 1967, p.39
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movements had used two weapons to achieve its ends, namely, constituional agitation and violent revolution.

In contrast, Gandhi

developed the unique weapon of non-violent direct action, which
he defended in these words,
I was a believer in the politics of petitions,
deputations and friendly negotiations. But all
these have gone to the dogs.
I know that these
are not the ways to bring this Government round.
Sedition has become my- religion. Ours is a nonviolent battle. 65
This was thus a kind of a political battle which generated the
maximum Indian strength while using British strength to its own
di sadvan tage.
I believe, and every body must grant that no Government
can exist for a single moment without the cooperation
of the people, willing or forced and if people sUddenly
withdraw their cooperation in every detail, the Government will come to a standstill. 66
By withdrawing the cooperation and obedience of the subjects,
Gandhi sought to cut off important sources of the ruler's power.
At the same time noncooperation and disobedience created severe
enforcement problems.

And in this situation, severe repression

against nonviolent people would be likely not to strengthen the
government but to alienate still more Indians from British rule
and at the same time create not unity in face of an enemy but
dissent and opposition at home.
It is not a matter of carrying conviction by argument.
The matter resolves itself into one of matching forces.
65young India, July 10, 1929
66

Young India, December 20, 1930
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Conviction or no conviction, Great Britain would defend
her Indian commerce and interests by all the forces at
her command.
India must consequently evolve force enough
to free herself from the embrace of death. 67
The basic elements of truth force or satyagraha struggle can be
cited as follows:

(1) complete self-reliance; (2) propaganda to

be an integral part of the movement; (3) demands to be consistent
with truth; (q) search for avenues of cooperation with the adversary on honorable terms;

(5) no compromise on basic principles;

and (6) full agreement on fundamentals before accepting a settlement.
As a means of communication, satyagraha seeks to effect
change and it operates within a conflict situation.

It employs

force, although the character and result of the force of satyagraha are essentially different from those of Mao's means of communication.

According to the Congress Party, there was a signi-

ficant change in the country's political climate.

For the first

time in Indian history the issue of independence was not the sole
concern of the elite but became the focus of attention of people
at large.

Even the Government was forced to admit the nationalist

character of the movement.

In a statement submitted to the

British Parliament, the Government of India made the following
observations regarding the general results of the earlier movement in 1920's:

67Young India, February. 1931
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Mr Garidhi's intensive movement during the years 1921
and 1922 has diffused far and wide, among classes
previously oblivious to political considerations, a
strong negative patriotism born of race hatred of the
foreigner. The less prosperous classes both in town
and the country-side have become aroused to certain
aspects--even though these be mischievous, ·exaggerated
and false--of the existing political situation. On the
whole, this must be pronounced, up to the present, the
most formidable achievement of the noncooperation movement. That it has certain potentialities for good will
be maintained by many; that it will immensely increase
the dangers and difficulties of the next few years can
be denied by few. 68
At the same time, the Report of the Congress Enquiry Committee
noted with enormous satisfaction:
Witnesses from all parts of the country speaking from
direct knowledge have testified to the outstanding
features of the crisis through which the country is
passing. These are: (1) the general awakening of the
masses to their political rights and privileges,
(2) the total loss of faith in the present system of
Government, (3) the belief that it is only through its
own efforts that India can hope to be free, (4) the
faith in the Congress as the only organization which
can properly direct national effort to gain freedom, and
(5) the utter failure of repression to weaken the people.
Our own personal observation in the course of our tour
round the whole country fully corroborates the evidence
on these points .••• 69

Gandhi's new emphasis on mass participation led him to
develop the concept of new education, which he called Nai Talim,
geared to the needs of the masses.
68
Accounts and Papers, 1922, Vol.XVI, p.l-08. Parliamentary papers
69Sitaramayya, Historv of the Indian National Congress.
S. Chand & Co., New Delhi, 1947, p.201
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Mass line - education.

Gandhi's first concern was to

replace English by a national language, not only to remove the
symbol of alien domination but also to open up channels of communication between the people and their leaders.
Among the many evils of foreign rule this blighting
imposition of a foreign medium upon the youth of the
country will be counted hy history as one of the
greatest •. It has sapped the energy of the nation, it
has shortened the lives of the pupils.
It has estranged
them from the masses, it has made education unnecessarily
expensive. If this process is still persisted in, it
will rob the nation of its soul. The sooner, therefore,
educated India shakes itself free from the hypnotic
spell of the foreign medium, the better it would be
for them and the people,70
.
Gandhi maintained that Indian leadership could not in fact lead
a profound national regeneration unless able, quite literally, to
speak to the people in their own language.

"Every time I am

obliged to speak in the English language before an audience of
my countrymen, I feel humiliated and ashamed.,,7

1

He had said

earlier:
In my opinion the existing system of education is
defective, apart from its association with an utterly
unjust Government, in three most important matters:

(1)

It is based upon foreign culture to the almost
entire exclusion of indigenous culture;

(2)

It ignores the culture of the heart and the hand
and confines itself simply to the head;
Real education is impossible through a foreign
medium.7 2

70Youn~ India, July 5, 1928
71Young India, January 13, 1927
72young India, September 1, 1921

r
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Gandhi maintained that new education must be closely linked to
the many pressing social and political problems.

For one thing,

the country had to be self-supporting and geared toward meeting
the needs of the majority rather than a select few.

Gandhi put

great stress upon constructive work and training of teachers,
"maximum of work a':ld minimum of speech must be our motto".73
The most important element of training was character-building
rather than intellectual brilliance:
It is possible for a teacher situated miles away to
affect the spirit of the pupils by his way of living.
It would be idle for me; if I were a liar
to teach
boys to tell the truth. A cowardly teacher would never
succeed in making his boys valiant, and a stranger to
self-restraint could never teach his pupils the value
of self-restraint.
I saw, therefore, that I must be
an eternal object-lesson to the boys and girls living
with me. They thus became my teachers, and I learnt I
must be good and live straight, if only for their sake.
I may say that the increasing discipline and restraint
I imposed on myself at Tolstoy Farm was mostly due to
those words of mine.7q

It would seem then that Gandhi's mass line education
was primarily concerned with creating prereqnisites and conditions under which a sound communication process could operate,
Education should be sO revolutionalized as to answer
the wants of the poorest villager instead of answering
those of an imperial exploiter.75

73 Hari ,ian, June, 1939

Q
7 My Experiments with Truth. p.q1q
75Har i,ian, August 21, 1937
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Symbolic action.

Gandhi had to work harder than

identify himself with the masses.

~;ao

to

Unlike Mao, he represented

also the rich and to be credible with the "lowliest of the low"
Gandhi not only wore loin cloth but went to great length to adopt
~'urthermore,

he lived day in and day

out open to public, view, as on a stage.

He took the people and

poverty as a way of 1 ife.

even his opponents into confidence not only in regard to his
actions but even his motivations,
Secrecy, in my opinion, is a sin and a symptom of
violence, therefore, definitely to be avoided,
especially if the freedom of dumb millions is the
goal. Hence all underground activity, in my opinion,
is taboo. 76

It was not surprising that the masses looked upon Gandhi
as a living symbol of the moral power and goodness in man.

lIe

had an exceptional insight into the power of symbolic actions on
the minds of men and women.

As Nehru remarked, Gandhi had "a

curious knack for doing the right thing at the psychological
moment".77

Wolfenstein points out that,

In part as a result of his barrister's training,
Gandhi's mind always had a legalistic bent. He
thought in terms of 'formulas, vows, and symbolic
acts.78

'Gandhi's famous vows served a vital function in focnssing
76Jlarijan, July 9, 19qq
77 J • Nehru, Nehru on Gandhi, op. cit., p.22
8
7 E • Victor Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality:
Lenin. Trotsky, Gandhi.
Princeton Vni versi ty l'ress,
1967, p.277
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on public programs during the national struggle.

Many of his

programs were symbolic in the setting of the India Gandhi was
attempting to elevate into self-respect and freedom.

For

nationalism to be aroused among people who had been dominated
by an alien culture for so long, it meant rejecting the principal symbols previously incorporated into the indigeneous culturZ?
For instance, rejection of high technology, boycott of all foreign goods, insistence on the use of vernacular language, and
wearing of khaddar (coarse hand-spun cotton), were to become in
the minds of all Indians the mark of a man or a woman who sought
India's freedom.

The symbol of the spinning wheel, which Indian

peasants had ceased using before the last years of the nineteenth
century, was an effective way of drawing attention to the colossal
problems of poverty, unemployment, low production and general
apathy in rural life of India.

In a country of extraordinary

diversity of dress and manners, the adoption of the simple white
"Gandhi cap" cut across high caste and low, rich and poor, and
gave a sense of national identity.SO

The Salt March of 19.30 was Gandhi's most dramatic symholic act when he marched a couple of hundred miles through the
summer dust of Indian country roads to a lonely beach and there
to pick up a fleck of forbidden salt and defy an unjust law.
79Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Sociolo~y of Revolution.
and Philadelphia, 1925, passim

London

80Ainslie T. Embree, India's Search for National Identity
New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1972, passim
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It was a simple act but it did more than any act of any leader
before to unite the Indian people and hasten the end of British

. I n d'1a. 81
ru 1 e 1n

This act of defiance focussed symbolically the

attention of the whole world on the unjust Salt Act, which affected the lives of the majority of the poor in India.
Summary
The most decisive element of Gandhi's communication
theory is the concept of satyagraha (truth force) which is both
a philosophy of life as well as the technique of stupendous mass
action for paralysing the total structure of a despotic government.

The basis of this mass movement, however, is always indi-

vidual awareness through suffering, and the success of satyagraha
depends on individual discipline and total commitment.

Without

discipline struggle becomes dehumanized because the relationship
between protestor and opponent falls out of a communication context.

More precisely, discipline gives to satyagraha the power

-to individualize and concretize conflict so that strong interpersonal communication can be established.

Gandhi perceived the

communication process as the context wherein human relationships
are either openly developed or violently repressed.

Satyagraha,

therefore, became in the hands of Gandhi the communication tool
for the development of human relations.
81S. Bose, The Indian Struggle. 1920-3q.
Company Ltd., 1935, pp.70-73

Gandhi's communication
London, Wishart &
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theory, in other words, is geared toward the building of human
relationships via two-way communication based on mutual trust.

In armed struggles, the stress is on collective action
and defense.

In satyagraha, the aim is moral victory of the

"heroic meek" through active nonviolent resistance which touches
the conscience of the imperial oppressor, assuming, of c·ourse,
th a t th e opponen t h as

1" t

t

0

some d egree. 82

This theory is based

on the acceptance of the concept of suffering for the vindication
of truth and justice.

Suffering sends three messages.

First,

it awakens the individual to a sense of his or her dignity and
power.

Second, it makes a direct appeal to the oppressor's sense

of morality.

Third, it intensifies favourable public opinion.

Gandhi's communication practice is based upon traditional
Indian concepts to which he gave new meaning.

He attributed sym-

bolic value to many of the traditions and concepts derived from
the Indian experience.

The spinning wheel, homespun cloth, fast-

"ing and vows, the term Harijan (the children of God) possessed
powerful symbolic value because they translated profound ideas
into the simple realities of Indian life.

This was the functional

aspects of the communication symbols as distinguished from the
essential core of Gandhi's communication theory.
82Gandhi would never have had a chance against a totalitarian
state such as that of the Nazis.
It is dubious whether under
those circumstances the idea of nonviolent resistance would
even have occurred to Gandhi. lie believed in "arousing the
world", which is only possible if the world gets a chance to
hear what you are doing.
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Gandhi relied On word-of-mouth propaganda because of its
grass-roots nature and because of its high persuasive quality.
He also made full use of the print media to disseminate his
ideas in India as well as in other countries.

This messages and

style of communication aimed to establish emotional identity and
a non-manipulative, noneliti·st relationship between leaders and
led.
The main elements of Gandhi's communication theory may
be listed as follows:
(1)

credibility of leadership through moral conviction,
right means, and total identification with needs
and aspirations of the people;

(2)

decentralization of power based on face to face
contact between leaders and masses. In other
words, social control by self-organization;

. (3)

(4)

mass line education to overcome communication
barriers; adoption of national language in place
of foreign medium;
noncooperation wit~ the exploiting regime and the
pursuit of a general policy to serve the genuine
needs of the people.

CHAPTER

V

GANDHI AND MAO AS COMMUNICATORS: SUM.MARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The problem dealt with in this study is how did Gandhi
and Mao succeed in communicating with hundreds of.millions of
illiterate masses against tremendous odds without the use of
modern mass media.

If they 'had not solved the problem of commu-

nication, they would have been would-be leaders with very few
followers and their movements would have been doomed to failure.
The major method has been that of content analysis in
the context of the broader patterns of historical change in the
countries involved.

The historical analysis of the growth of the

Indian and Chinese liberation movements indicates that though
Gandhi and Mao helped mobilize the people in their respective
countries, there were important differences between their movements.

The major difference, of course, is that Gandhi led a

struggle for national independence only (with the hope of a decentralized democratic socialism after independence); Kao was the
leader of a struggle not only to throw out all foreign invaders
but also to effect a total social revolution based on the complete overthrow of domestic landlords, warlords and native
capitalists.

It is interesting to

not~

on the assumption that

such things can be roughly estimated,that in India, where the
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caste and linguistic barriers to communication were greater, the
societal changes were iess substantial and that in China, where
the task of communicating with the masses was less formidable,
the societal changes were remarkably greater.
Detailed content analysis of the major themes during the
critical war-time years of 19q2 through 19qq shows that Gandhi,
although leader of an essentially non-socialist movement, gained
additional support by disseminating messages that provided overtones of a socialist utopia to appeal to his more radical followers.

In contrast, Mao, as leader of a movement for socialist

revolution gained additional support for liberation movement by
appealing to those primarily interested in indigenous capitalism
or in national independence.

The analysis shows that the immed-

iate concern was to unify their respective countries against
foreign aggression by submerging national conflicts.

Both Gandhi

and Mao demonstrated how economic deprivation was brought about
by the repressive policies of the imperialists, destroying the
·modicum of security necessary for national development.

Thus,

nationalism became an effective ideology for sustaining mass
participation in the liberation struggle.
Tentative Propositions
In building mass participation without such advanced
means of communication as radio and television, and without much
access to the other media then controlled by their adversaries,
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Gandhi and Mao were, respectively, uniquely Indian and uniquely
Chinese.

Either one would have been a fish out of water in the

other country or, for that matter, in any other country.

None-

theless, there were many common charateristics of their communication behavior.

These may be briefly, although still tentati-

vely, summarized in the following three interrelating propositions:

1.

Gandhi's and Mao's operational doctrine was based on
the mass line theory.

The first proposition is the most fundamental.

It pro-

vides the foundation for both their modes and styles of communication, which are summarized in tbe next two propositions.
The mass line theory developed a new code of morality providing a non-elitist guiding concept which aimed at "leadership
without elitism," as discussed in Chapter IV.

New relationships

were forged between the masses and leaders through direct

con-

tact and personal example, rather than relying merely on formal
. institutions.

In other words, the communication process was

facilitated by the mass line, with more intimacy and interchange being fostered between leaders and led.
In an effort to narrow the distance between the leaders
and the led, the mass line theory structured mental activity into
a leadership process which gave content to the required nonelitist practice in communicating with the masses.

Gandhi and

Mao sought the elite actions needed to activate the potential of
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the great mass force, but both claimed that the elite was not
superior to the masses and that they must remain in close contact
with the masses to gain knowledge and wisdom.

This meant a dif-

ficult process of educating the elite to look less at themselves
in self-admiration and more at the masses of the people, their
problems, their
inherent wisdom.

potentialiti~s,

their modes of thinking and their

In doing this -- and here is the essential

paradox of the mass line communication -- a steady flow of elite
communication through small-circulation newspapers provided an
indispensable communication link among the formal and informal
leaders of the party groupings and non-party organizations that
finally became rooted in the masses and led the masses of their
countries to successful liberation against foreign control.

The

deliberate transformation of an elite struggle into an open popular movement of such scope is probably without parallel in the
history of national movements.
This transformation was possible because the substance
of the messages themselves was based on widespread popular needs
and sentiments.

Both of these leaders, as already shown in

detail, stressed the broad themes of conditions of crisis and
goal values, thereby drawing attention to the serious deprivation
the masses were experiencing and making them susceptible to
appeals justifying new and intensified revolutionary activity.
They also helped establish a sense of communality and understanding between leaders and the led, a sense that was deepened
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by Gandhi's and Mao's stress on the various themes relating to
leadership style and channels of communication.

More specifically, the themes of sacrifice, service,
truthfulness, personal example, and self-reliance called attention to the varying forms of struggle; while all the other themes
focussed on means of mobilizing elites and masses for the many
forms of action required to overthrow imperialism and build some
new form of confidence and self-respect among the people as a
whole.

The mass line communication, in other words, aimed at

active mass participation by those at the bottom of society,
rather than merely large-scale indocrination of relatively inert
masses by those at the top.

An interesting contrast, however, emerges between Gandhi
and Mao in their image of the masses.

Although Gandhi perceived

the masses as "pillars of strength," he thought more in terms of
potential force for future purpos'es of social struggle.

lIe did

1l0t think the "dumb semi-starved millions scattered over the
length and breadth of the land in its 700,000 villages" were
ready yet to challenge the power of the established regime, "some
day we shall have to start an intensive movement without the rich
people and without the vocal educated class.

But that time is

not yet", Gandhi wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru on April 1, 1928.

1

To put it differently, Gandhi did not base his movement on the

lAs cited by J C Kapur, op. cit., p.163
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independent strength of the masses whom he loved and trusted no
doubt but did not think sufficiently strong for purposes of social
struggle.

Mao, on the other hand, as the analysis in Chapter III

and IV shows, believed that his movement could not succeed without the "conscious and willing" support of the masses with their

"boundless creative power" . .
Furthermore, Gandhi's focus on harmony and Hao's

on

con-

flict as the integral part of struggle necessitatffia critical
assessment in terms of its implications for mass line communication.

Gandhi would yield to none in his desire for the elimi-

nation of exploitation, but he insisted that the individual exploiter must be approached with love and forbearance ratber than
hate.

He believed in arousing the conscience of the opponent

so as to effect the structure and dimensions of interpersonal communications.

The concept of conscience may have ultimate signi-

ficance on its own in a moral sense, but its practical import
for Gandhi lay in its connection ,with his plea for heroic and
rebellious action on the part of the masses.
Gandhi's concept of trusteeship, therefore, may be seen
as a way of drawing attention to exploitation and greed of the
rich, rather than merely as a principle stating that rich must
become 'trustees' for the welfare of the masses'.

In this sense,

Gandhi would appear closer to Mao than it seemed possible at
first glance.

Gandhi provided moral options to the rich but it
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was nonetheles.s a method of arousing the masses against injustices of the established system.

It is no accident, therefore,

that education of leaders received high priority from both
Gandhi and Mao.
The final element in the mass line approach, in addition
to the general concept and the specific themes, was a communication style that enabled them to effect a synthesis of the new
political awakening with the tradition and sentiment of the historic past.

Gandhi built a movement on the basis of his own

personal suffering, while being the spokesman for an anticolonial
Congress party organization.

Gandhi's adoption of poverty as a

way of life and his complete identification with the masses made
the Congress party more credible with the public at large.

The

important element of Gandhi's credibility was not only the prestige it gave to the Congress party but also that it was a continuing factor in political and social cohesion.

In times of poli-

tical upheaval, the Indian elite could rely on the symbolic
image of Gandhi as the "Father of the nation" and extend the
"system of admiration" across the country.

What impressed the

Indian elite and the British government was the fact that Gandhi's
communication style succeeded

in unlocking the door to the

hearts of the people where they themselves could not.hope for a
hearing.

Mao's leadership, during this period, on the other hand,

was more of an institutional nature; although Mao was theoretically accepted by his party as 'first among equals,' so to speak.
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Mao was primarily the leader ,and ideologist for a revolutionary
organization, as well as a man who adjusted maximally to wielding power once his communist party came to power.

In other words,

what Mao achieved in terms of intimacy and close connection with
people's masses through party and mass organizations, Gandhi
accomplished in larger part through immense personal appeal and
prestige.

For both the primary function of their organizations

was to bring leadership into contact with their natural. sources
of strength, the great mass of the people.

Here, clearly, are

leaders different from each other and yet, at the same time,
sharing important communication characteristics in their effort
to reach the different masses of their respective countries.
Both sought mass participation in the liberation movements but
it was not of the same nature; the styles and the means of communication had to be adapted to and directed by the conditions in
each country.
While Gandhi often stated that he was a man of action
only and not interested in theory, this study unquestionably reflects his involvement for more than two decades in developing an
ideology and a doctrine which was communicated to followers in
his own country and admirers throughout the world.

Like Mao, he

was at the interface of theory and practice throughout his life.
Gandhi perhaps underestimated his theoretical contributions to
the movement,

On the other hand,

~;ao

perhaps overstated his

theoretical behavior in order to help him develop in China the
kind of prestige that Stalin developed for himself in the Soviet

186

Union as the gr.eat theoretician of Marxism.

Thus first proposition in the study suggests that the
liberation movements led by Gandhi and Mao have important implicatiops for communication theory.

One of the major elements

until now recognized mainly by a few students of Indian and
Chinese history but practically unknown to communication researchers -- was the formulation of a mass line theory which, properly
interpreted, provides a significant contribution to human knowledge about communication.

2.

Both Gandhi and I.:ao developed multi-modal and mul tidirectional communication strategies.

Figure 3, "Multiple Channels of Communication of Gandhi
and Mao," (page 188) shows that the messages were transmitted by
a complex network in which organizations and individuals were
linked by all available modes of communication.

The most impor-

tant elements were:
(a)

close, primary, interpersonal relations in
which basic mutual identifications were
developed and maintained;

(b)

party organization and mass organizations
which through their communication networks
linked up leaders and masses;

(c)

the press which played a significant role
in disseminating Gandhi's and ~ao's ideas
and in educatiug leaders.

Gandhi's and Mao's multi-modal low technology style was
a successful attempt to cope with a real problem under circums-
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FIGURE

3

Multiple Channels of Communication of Gandhi and 1,ao
Channels

1. Personal

Gandhi
contact with the masses through
walking tours and train
journeys; adoption of loin
cloth to identify with the
poor; spinning wheel to focus
on self-reliance; Gandhi-cap
signifying united action

austere living;
simplicity of language and style;
accessibility to
the masses;

nOD-

elitist attitude

2. Party orga- Congress Party as an expression
of national interests; Congress
nization
Party as an instrument of
political struggle through
social and moral reform;
extraparty leadership

Chinese Communist
Party as an instrument fOT structural
change; institutional leadership

3. Mass orga-

women; students;
soldiers; workers;

nization

4. Arts and
literature

5. Education

6. Mass media

women participation for the
first time; liarijan mobilization; peasants; youth and
students; big and small
business; professionals

peasants; sought
.support from secret
society and other
armed outlaw organizations;
intellectuals

reinterpretations of ancient
scriptures; devotional
singing

revolutionary poetry;
dramatic representation of history
in terms of revolutionary struggle of
the masses

ashram discipline;
spiritual training;
character building

Marxism-Leninism;
character building;
Red army discipline

national press; inter-

party press;
leaflets; posters;
loudspeakers;
pamphlets

national press.; own press

(Young India and lIari,jan);
leaflets; posters;
loudspeakers; pamphlets
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tances where .other resources were lacking.

Despite poverty,

illiteracy and lack of normal communication facilities both
nations were successfully organized to listen and receive the
messages.

Both created an intimate mass communication system at

fantastically low capital costs, though very high labor oriented.
Gandhi's daily

pr~yer

meetings, Mao's discussion meetings, and

various mass campaigns were attended by hundreds of millions of
people substituting for audio-visual or scarce print media.

A

highly economical wired loudspeaker system substituted for radios
that even in battery form would have been too expensive.

The

system also provided secure communication for mobilization in the
villages and in Mao's base areas, and did double service as a
telephone system for official business.

During campaigns the

walls were plastered with posters and hand-written slogans; news
sheets by illegal printing presses were produced and distributed.
These activities form a most important part of any liberation campaign, particularly in the early stages when the population is
being mobilized to support the cause.

Furthermore, Gandhi and

Mao conducted their national struggle in three main languages
directed at diverse audiences:
(a)

combative language directed toward their opponents;

(b)

communication with intellectual elite in 'modern'
idiom and style; and

(c)

use of 'traditional' imagery and symbols while
communicating with the masses.
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lIe spoke in a low singsong. His tone was always conversational, even when he was addressing millions of people.
Whatever he said was to the point, and he used mostly simple
words to say simple things. He never resorted to histrionics, or any rhetorical device, although he was fond of using
parables and proverbs, and quotations from the Bhagavad Gita
and other sacred books. 2
Edgar Snow says of Mao that he never talked above the heads of
his audience but he never talked down to them either; he was
intimate and always in contact. 3
Furthermore, these messages flowed in both directions
to and from the leader, his closest associates, the leaders
of party, and their opponents; and from all of the party double
(not only from the leader himself) to the masses.

Here the

central concept is multiple flow of messages from the leader to
subleaders (handful of speCialized spokesmen, who in turn are
linked to hundreds or thousands of lesser party activists who
communicate to the masses) and back, while at the same time the
leader maintains direct contacts with the masses.

This may be

illustrated as follows:

2ved Mehta, "Mahatma Gandhi and his Apostles, "The New Yorker,
May 10, 1976
3Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, Grove Press, Inc. New York:
1961, p.53

190

This study shows that Gandhi and Mao throughout their
liberation movement consistently employed the expressed values
of their opponents when demanding freedom for their countries.
Their language was highly combative and their argument carefully
devel~ped

on moral grounds to embarrass and defeat their enemies.

Their style of communication expressed confidence in their ultimate victory.

Both used words as weapons to damage the self-

esteem of their opponents and in so doing raised the struggle to
a higher level of morality and justice.
In their communication to the intellectual elite Gandhi
and Mao sought to change centuries old colonial ways of thinking
and acting which served imperialist interests rather than the
interests of their own people.

They set out to awaken the elite

to the national calamity if they continued to live their life so
far removed from the mainstre@of the life of the masses.
The reliance of this study on the anglicized translations
of Gandhi's and Mao's statements 'does not permit enough attention to the 'traditional' aspects of their language addressed
to the masses, except by reading reports of eyewitnesses or
journalists.

It is reported, for instance, that their style

was simple and earthy, and that their use of words had a traditional quality which made it easy for them to communicate effectively with peasant audiences.
one of Gandhi's followers:

Here is an eyewitness account of
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FIGURE

q

Multiple Flow of Messages
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hundreds or thousands)
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Subleaders

I

3.

Leader

--

Masses

They both developed unique styles of non-charismatic
leadershi p.

For many decades, almost all discussions of leadership
bow to the idea of charisma.

1Iax Weber, who introduced the term

into sociological usage, defines it as,
a certain quality of an individual personality
by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary
men and treated as endowed with supernatural,
superhuman .•• regarded as of divine origin •.. q
In contrast, the third proposition states that despite false
interpretations by admirers of "charismatic leadership," neither
Gandhi nor Mao had charisma in the

traditional sense.

They were

qMax Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. The Free
Press, New York: 19q7
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successful communicators not because they were "charismatic"
leaders, but because they were rather super-ordinary - in the
sense of being very natural, very human and a part of nnt apart
from, the masses.

To put it another way, their leadership quality

lay not in "divinity" but rather in their ability to communicate
simply and meaningfully with their audiences the broader prohlems of their liberation movements.

Both established reciprocity

and a unique relationship with their respective masses based on
intimate appeal and identification.

As Jawaharlal Nehru said of

Gandhi, "he did not descend from the top; he seemed to emerge
from the millions of India, speaking their language and incessantly drawing attention to them and their appalling condition.,,5
And Edgar Snow said of Mao, "There is a real flow of intimacy
between him and the people.

He always seems to be in contact.,,6

Furthermore, the concept of symbolic action is central to
Gandhi's and Mao's noncharismatic leadership.

It is through sym-

bolic action that they both expressed fully their identification
with the masses.

Gandhi's loincloth and Mao's rustic living ful-

filled a triple function.

It emphasized simplicity of living,

coarse home-spun cloth became a militant symbol of self-sufficiency, and it identified Gandhi and
people.

~ao

with the poorest of

Gandhi's Dandi March (Chapter II and IV) and Mao'·S

5Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India. John Day, N.Y.: 1946,
p.209
6Cited by Han Suyin, op. cit., p.379
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Long March 7 were to be the eminently practical and highly symbolic focus of their liberation movements.

It is here that they

take a stand as rebels 'against the State and say "no" to exploitation, and imperialism.

The symbolic action is rooted in both

denial (to the metaphor of progfess through compeiition and acquisition of material goods) and affirmation (to common participation and collective endeavor, justice, and egalitarianism).
Gandhi's and Mao's peculiar genius lay in their understanding of
the existing social structure, with the enormous importance of
its traditional symbols, which could be made part of the new
political process.
In conclusion, one might say that in the early 1940's,
many observers of the Indian and Chinese scene knew that imperial
control of India and China were immutahle facts.

They could also

see that the foreign forces dominating the two countries had at
their command not only armies but all the then-available media of
communication: the press, the radio, the schools and the major
'bureaucratic organization.

Indeed, the foreign dominators them-

selves seem to have confidence in their own invincibility.

7Mao did not lead the Long March the way Gandhi led his.

However,
it was during the March that Mao emerged as a significant leader
of the Chinese Communist Party. For Mao, the Long 1!arch served as a
political symbol for the Chinese people, "Long March is the first
of its kind in the annals of history, that it is a manifesto, a
propaganda force, a seeding machine ... Ithas proclaimed to the
world that the Red Army is an army of heroes. It has announced to
some 200 million people in eleven provinces that the road of the
Red Army is their only road to liberation ... The Long ~Iarch ... has
sown many seeds which will sprout, leaf, blossom and bear fruit,
and will yield a harvest in the future". In "On Tactics Against
Japanese Imperialism", Selected Works, I, p.161
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Historians may review endlessly all the many factors that led to
their downfall by the end of the 1940's, and no one could ever
single out one factor aOnd give it a quantitative value as above all
the other.

Yet this study makes it now obvious that among the ne-

cessary -- although not sufficient -- factors were the communication
doctrines and practices of the two major leaders of the antiimperial movements, Gandhi and Mao.

By converting tbeir communica-

tion theories into practice, they proved the non-invincibility of
those who dominated the formal media of communication in these two
countries.

They demonstrated for these two vast countries the

enormous power of communication strategies based, as the study has
shown, on the principles of mass line, multi-modal and multi-directional communication, and non-charismatic leadership.
Possible Implications for Communication Theory and Research
Is it possible that any of the conclusions discussed so far
in this chapter may have a bearing on theory and research in communication on the relationship bet~een communication and development?
There seems to be a growing body of research on communication and development in the countries of Third World.

Much of this

research recognizes the fact that masses of the people of these
countries are still illiterate, as they were when Gandhi and Mao led
their people in search for new roads to development.

Thus, through-

out these countries the same question arises that confronted Gandhi
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and Mao as leaders of their respective liberation movements.

There

are good reasons, therefore, to give more attention to India and
China both before and after their liberation, as well as more attention to the forms of communication used by the anti-liberation
forces.
More attention to India and China before and after Liberation
This is necessary not only because they are the biggest
countries in the world, which is important, but also because they
illustrate different tendencies in developments one taking the form
of state-supported capitalism, and the other that of peasant-based
socialism.

This calls attention to the problem of conflicting deve-

lopment philosophies, which is the inescapable environment of any
serious communication research.

Therefore, the social scientists

who are concerned with the use of communication as an instrument of
development, must begin with some philosophical framework concerning the nature of development itself.
Anyone examining the role of communication in India and
China today is bound to be impressed by the degree of conflict
between competing interests reflected in the rapidly changing
seqnence of events.

The source of the social conflict is the fact

that a majority of the "westernised" (or "capitalist-roaders")
leaders perceive themselves as directly dependent for fraternal
values upon the western (or socialist) community, while the "native"
intelle£tuals are more rooted in the parochial perspectives of the
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social context.

The latter reject foreign "solutions" while the

former attempt a near-total incorporation of western capitalist or
socialist models.

Bringing the conflicting issues into the open,

therefore, may mean the opening up of new approaches and possibilities.·

This is particularly true in the developing countries where

development is a process of struggle between divergent ideologies
and power groups.
also
This studyLindicates that Gandhi and Mao were the "synthesizers" combining traditional symbols with the new political development.

One such statement from Mao, which is very similar to the

many that Gandhi made, illustrates their role as "synthesizers":
We must meet these foreign materials as we do our
food ••• separated into essence to be absorbed and waste
matter to be discarded ••• so-called "wholesale-Westernization" is a mistaken viewpoint. China has suffered a great
deal in the past from the formalist absorbtion of foreign
things. 8
The success of their movements indicates that they would have been
swamped by the "westernised" or the "native" leaders if not for
their almost intuitive contact with the masses who provided the
necessary leverage and a strong base for their movements.
ComparativQ studies of messages during both pre-and postrevolutionary periods might give more useful insights into the present development process.

Although the period of 19q2-qq was

critical to the success of the liberation struggle, content analysis
SHan Suyin, op. cit., p.qOl
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of messages during the third of a century after 1944 could reveal
different findings.

For instance, more research might reveal an

element of elitism in Mao's mass line after the communist victory in
1949.

Even more significant may be an analysis of the messages

during the entire period of national movements revealing the changing
relationship between communication and social, economic, political
and cultural development.
Furthermore, the underlying assumption here is that the antiliberation forces had the weapons and the mass media hut perhaps
not the same kind of party and non-party organizations as did the
liberation forces.

Fuller study of the messages and the channels

of communication of the anti-liberation forces might be very revealing.
This study suggests broader applicability, indicating the
possibility that themes developed for liberation movements and the
styles of communication of Gandhi. and Mao may not be unique to
those two countries.

With certain adaptations they may suggest

general imperatives for successful communication with the masses
under similar social conditions where the leaders of national liberation movements feel they are fighting, if not for a new social
order, then atl east f or national independence.

Therefore, it would

seem that content analysis, is an indispensable starting metbod
to illuminate aspects of messages that are most relevant to national
policy

issues.

A macro-systemic approach will help put tbe
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communication issues in the context of developing countries' social
systems and their internal conflicts as represented by different
kinds of social movements for change and development.
A major program of combined research and action called
Development Support Communication, is being carried out under the
auspices of the United Nations' Development Program.

DSC, which

recognizes the connection between development and communication, is
an ongoing activity in a few developing countries, such as India,
Tanzania, and Guyana.

In the further development of research along

these lines, it may be fruitful to state the three pro[ositions
discussed above, as preliminary hypotheses or questions to guide
the research.

For instance: (1) To what extent i~ - or should be -

some version of mass line being used or developed by Third 1'-'orld
leaders; (2) to what extent are the multi-modal and multi-directional communication strategies being adopted in Third

~\·orld

countries or being designed by DSC services; (3) to what extent is
leadership seen in non-charismatic terms as distinguished from
efforts to use the new mass media to develop the imagery of
"superhuman 1t leaders?

Empirical pursuit of these questions may throw light upon
the efforts being mounted to surmount what seems to be invincible obstacles to development.

In many parts of the world poverty,

tribalism, caste, disease, natural disasters and neocolonialism
seem to be immutable facts.

In so far as communication research
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may prove to be a hlepful factor, it is possible that in some
of these countries, as in India and China, these barriers to
developmemtnt might be surmounted by further development of the
ideas of mass line, multi-modal and multi-directional modes, and
non-charismatic leadership.

-:oio:...,
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Gandhi's Major Messages, 1942-44
By Type of Documents
1

Editorial, Jan. 18, 1/12
"Peace Organization."
pp. 55-57

2

Editorial, Jan. 19,
"Real War Effort."
pp. 57-59

3

Speech, Jan. 21,
pp. 59-63

4

Interview, Jan. 22,

5

Article, Jan. 23,
p.66

6

Conference, Feb. 1, '42
pp. 67-71

5p-1,700 words

7

Article, Feb. 11,
pp.7 1 -72

1p-350 words

8

Interview, Feb. '42
p.73 "Non-Violent Revolution"

!p-175 words

9

Article, '42
·Plea For Calmness"
p.74

1p-350 words

10

Article, '42
"Criminal Assaults"
pp.76-79

3p-1,050 words

11

Directive, March 7,
pp.79-80

12

Interview,
pp.80-82

13

Article, March 16,
"Scofched Earth"
pp.82-83

14

Interview,
pp.83-84

Length (est. words)
3p-1,050

'42

Silver Jubilee
Convocation of
the Benares Hindu
'Varsity

'42

'42 Congr.ess Workers

'42

' 42

'42

'42

'42

Occasion

5p-l,660 words

2ip-788 words
1p-325 words

1p-350 words
2p-700 words

'42

1p-350 words

1p-350 words
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15

Article, '42
"Non-Violent Resistance"
pp.84-86

2p-700 words

16

Article, April 13, '42
"That Ill-fated Proposal"
pp.90-92

2p-680 words

17

Article, April 26, '42
pp.93-96

Harijan

3tp-1,137 words

18

Article, May 3,'42
pp.98-100

Harijan

1tp-525 words

19

Article, May 11, '42
"To Every Briton"
pp.100-102

2p-700 words

20

Press Conference, May 18, '42
pp.103- 1 11

7tp-2,625 words

21

Article, May 31,
p.111

Ilarijan

tp-175 words

22

Interview, May 31, '42
pp.111-114

Rashtriya
Yuvak Sangh
members

2tp-875 words

23

Interview, June,
pp.114-127

'42

24

Interview, June,
pp.127- 1 33

'42

International
News Service

5p-1,700 words

25

Interview, June,
pp.133- 1 37

'42

Associated
Press

5p-1,700 words

26

Letter to a correspondent
June, '42
pp.137- 1 39

27

Letter June,

28

Letter, June 14,
pp.141-11'4

29

Letter, July,
pp.144-145

'42

'42

'42

l1p-3,850 words
Louis Fischer

'42

2p-680 words

The Times

tp-175 words

Chiang Kaishek

3p-1,050 words

President
Roosevelt

1j-p-525 words
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'42
pp.145-146

30

Article,

31

Editorial, July,

Ip-350 words
'1,2

Hari,jan

I-h-525 words

Press

10p-3,500 words

pp .147-48
32

Interview, '42

pp.152-162
33

Letter '1;2

31;

Letter, '1;2
pp.16 J!-165

35

Letter,

36

Itp-525 words

pp.162-163
Itp-525 words

'1;2
pp.165-168
Interview,

'1;2

Hari,jan

3p-l,050 words

Press

Itp-525 words

Hari.ian

3tp-l,225 words

pp.168-170
37

Article, Aug. 2,

'1;2

pp.173-176
38

2p-700 words

Letter

pp.176-78
1942
39
40

Manchester
Guardian

2tp-875 words

pp.179-181
Letter

British rulers

Ip-325 words

Letter

p.182
U

2tp-875 words

SEeech

pp.187-190
42

Letter

British Rulers

Itp-437 words

pp.217-218
43

Letter

.

..

Ip-325 words

..

.

Ip-325 words

pp.227-228
44

Letter

p.228
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45

Letter
pp,230-231

British Rulers

lip-525 words

.!2!!1
46

Letter
pp.236-237

n

"

2p-640 words

47

Letter
pp.240-242

"

"

2p-700 words

48

Letter
pp.243-44

"

n

1p-350 words

49

Letter
pp.262-274

"

"

12p-4,200 words

50

Letter
pp.276-287

"

"

10p-3,500 words

Congressmen

3ip-l,225 words

1944
51

Speech
pp.313-317

52

Article
pp.320-22

2p-700 words

53

Interview, July 14, Press
pp.324-27

3p-1,050 words

54

Interview
pp.330-33 1

1-h-525 words

55

Article, August 9
pp.335-337

56

Article, O~tober
pp.363-366

3p-1,050 words

57

Interview
pp.366-369

3p-1,050 words

58

Speech, November 19, '44 All-India
pp.369-371
Basic Education
at Sevagram

'Quit India'
anniversary

"

2p-700 words

2p-700 words
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Pages
Speeches

4

Editorials

3

Words

16

Articles
Directives
or
Resolutions

1

Interviews
or
Press Conferences

15

Letters

19

TOTAL

58

158

5 0 ,077

Not included: "Death of Kasturba" (Gandhi's wife)

pp.293-309

"Gandhi-Jinnah Talks"

pp.338-356

SOURCE:

Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (8 vols.!
1951-54) by D.G. Tendulkar, Vol. VI, published by the
Government 0 f India, 1953
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Mao's Major Messages. 1942-44
By Type of Documents
1

Speech, Feb.l, 1/,2
"Rectify the Party's
Style in Work"
pp.28-45

Occasion

Audience
Inauguration
of the Central
Party School of
the Chinese
Communist Party

Length
(est. words)
18p-7,000 words

2

Speech, Feb.8, '42
"Oppose the Party
'Eight-Legged' Essay"

Cadres meeting in
Yenan

17p-6,500 words

3

Speech, May 23, '42
"Talks at the Yenan
Forum on Art and
Literature" pp.46-62

4

Editorial, Sept.7, '42
"An Extremely
Important Policy"

Liberation Daily

3tp-l,440 words

5

Editorial, Oct.12, '42
"The Turning-Point in
World War II"
pp.98-103

Liberation Daily

5tp-2,240 words

6

Speech, Nov.6, '42
"In Celebration of the
Twenty-Fifth Aniversary
of the October Revolution"
p.l04 .

lp-240 words

7

Article, Dec. 1942
Report: Economic and
"Economic and Financial Financial Problems
Problems During tbe
Anti-Japanese War"

6p-2,200 words

8

Resolution, 1943
"On Method of
Leadership"
pp.111-117

6{-p-260 words

9

Editorial, July 12,'43
"Some Questions Put To
The Kuomilltang"
pp .118-125

31p-12,400 words

Central Committee of
the Communist Party

Liberation Daily

7{-p-2,840 words
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10

Directive, Oct.l,. '43
Central Committee of
5p-2,000 words
"Spread In The Base
the Chinese Communist
Areas The Campaign For Party to the membership
Rent Reduction, For
production, And For The
Government and Protection
Of The People"
pp. 126-130

11

Editorial, Oct. 5, '43
Liberation Daily
"A Comment On The
Eleventh Plenary Session
Of The Kuomintang's
Central Executive Committee
And The Second Session Of
The Third People's Political
Council"
pp. 131-147

12

Speech, Nov. 29, '43
"Let Us Get Organised"
pp. 148-156

13

Article, April 12, '44
"Our Study And The
Current Situation"
. pp.157-170

14

Speech, Sept.8, '44
"Serve The People"
pp.219-220

15

Editorial, Oct. 11, '44
"On Chiang Kai-Shek's
Speech On The Double
Tenth Festival"
pp.221-224

Reception to the
labour heroes of
the Shensi-KansuNingsia border
region

17p-6,700 words

9p-3,500 words

Preparatory to the
13tp-5,270 words
Seventh National
Congre~s of the Party
MemRrial meeting
lip-600 words
for Comrade Chang
Szu-teh, held by orgs.
subordinate to Central
Committee of Chinese
Communist Party
Hsinhua News Agency

3p-l, 200 words
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16

Speech, Oct. 30, "'44
"The United Front in
Cultural Work"
pp. 225-227

Speeches

7

Editorials

5

Articles

2

Directives
or
Resolutions

2

TOTAL

NOTE:

SOURCE:

16

Conference of
Cultural and
educational

2{-p-870 words

workers'

Pages

Words

. 111

57,600

Not included "Appendix: Resolution On Some Questions In
The History Of Our Party." From page 171 to 218, probably
drafted by Uao.
It was adopted on April 20, 1945.

English edition of The Selected Works of ';ao 'fse-tung,
Vol. IV, based on the Cbinese edition, People's
Publishing House, Peking, July 1952.
(Lawrence & Wishart
Ltd., London: 1954)
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Gandhi's Major Themes, 1942-44
Theme
No.

Document 1, 1942

1

The elite must work for the welfare of the masses

2

The newspaper must be resumed to disseminate my views
on national issues

3

Imperialism is the enemy facing our country

4

'Back to the villages' is the most effective program
to serve the people

5

Personal contact with the villagers must be established
through constructive _program
Document 2, 1942

6

The rich must work for the common good

7

Education is necessary to arouse the villagers

8

Spinning will provide employment
Document 3, 1942

9

The Congress Party must serve the interests of the poor

10

The students must learn their national language

11

English language has enslaved the Indian mind

12

Universities must serve the needs of the masses

13

Universities must work toward communal harmony

14

Students must become models of simple living
Document 4, 1942

15

We must have political power to decide our own future

16

We are confident of our victory
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17

Production of cloth will provide employment

18

Influence depends On serving the masses
Document 5, 191'2

19

Hindustani helps personal contact with illiterates

20

Hindustani creates national unity
Document 6, 1942

21

Experts must help and advice the villagers

22

Cooperatives are economically beneficial to the masses

23

We must pay attention to humanitarianism
Document 7, 1942

24

The rich must become trustees of their wealth for the
common welfare of the poor

25

Preserving the cattle is economically beneficial
Document 8, 1942

26

Power of nonviolence is unique

27

Adoption of nonviolence has increased the prestige of
the Congress
Document 9, 1942

28

Nonviolence is the most effective method to fight a
powerful opponent

29

There must be a living personal bond between the leaders
and the masses
Document 10, 1942

30

The press must carry a sustained agitation against
violence of the British
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31

Best weapon is fearlessness
Document 11, 1942

32

Elite with skills should help the villagers

33

Constructive programs will improve economic conditions in
villages
Document 12, 1942

34

Able-bodied person should be given employment instead
of charity

35

Self-reliance inevitably means real independence
Document 13, 1942

36

Humanitarianism must be given top priority in military
preparations
Document 14, 1942

37

Retreat is often a unique method of resistance
Document 15, 1942

38

Nonviolent resistance is uniquely suited to the practice
of the dumb millions

39

Confidence in our mission is the basis of our struggle
for independence

40

Nonviolence is the best method to pursue our goal

41

Our goal must be the determined pursuit of the constructive
program
Document 16, 1942

42

National harmony must be established

43

Nonviolence must be followed scrupulously by rank and
file
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44

India must have control over her own defence
Document 17. 1942

45

It is morally wrong for Britain to enslave Asian and
African raCes

46

Britain is following the imperialist policy of 'divide
and rule'

47

Political freedom will enable Indian leaders to solve
national problems

48

We trust the masses never to take to violence

49

Nonviolence will be
adopts it

succe~sful

if the whole nation

Document 18, 1942
50

Britain is morally indefensible while she rules India

51

Morality demands that British withdraw
Document 19, 1942

52

Britain will gain morally if they leave India voluntarily

53

Britain is exploiting India

54

Britain's war is impoverishing India

55

Britain's immoral domination of India must end
Document 20, 1942

56

Unadulterated noncooperation will sterilize opponent's
weapons

57

Britain's war will have moral basis only if she grants
India's freedom

58

We must maintain unity to achieve independence

59

Free India will be a moral force for the good of mankind
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Document 21, 1942
60

We should rely on ourselves to get rid of the British

61

We must make heavy sacrifices in our struggle of deliverance
Document 22, 1942

62

Imperialism is the greatest of evils

63

Noncooperation means not. to do the ruler's bidding at any
cost

64

Confidence in nonviolence will overcome slavery
Document 23, 1942

65

Britain will benefit morally if she withdraws voluntarily

66

Self-reliance is the best way to fight for independence
Document 24, 1942

67

My moral appeal to Britain to free India is made in
Britain's own interest

68

Masses must be organized to strengthen the movement

69

Nonviolence is uniquely suited to India's dumb millions

70

Thousands of villagers are being oppressed by the British

71

The Congress Party is committed to serving millions of
the poor in India
Document 25, 1942

72

Britain is exploiting India

73

I want unadulterated independence

74

Britain is spreading false propaganda against India

75

It is immoral for any nation to hold another in bondage
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Document 26,

lq~2

76

Discipline and sacrifice are necessary for nonviolence

77

Confidence in nonviolence is protection against aggression

78

Britain is oppressing the people of India

79

Britain is 'alone responsible for violence

80

I prefer anarchy to the present slavery of India
Document 28,

19~2

81

We must be self-reliant "in working out our own salvation

82

I will run the risk of anarchy to win freedom
Document 29,

19~2

83

Britain is exploiting India and Africa

8~

Britain's acceptance of my proposal will put her on a
moral plane
Document 30,

19~2

85

Civil ,disobedience is necessary for India's survival

86

Passivity has led to most of our difficulties
Document 31,

87

19~2

Britain practices the most organized and successful
violence in India the world has seen
Document 32,

19~2

88

Our demand is unconditional freedom

89

Our demand is based on justice
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90

For the first time in history the unique method of nonviolence has been practiced by vast masses
Document 33, 1942

91

Congress must represent national interests

92

It is India's moral right to demand British withdrawal

93

Our demand "is wholly just and vindicates justice
Document 34, 1942

94

Harijan may be suppressed by the British but my ideas
cannot

95

Hari,jan propagates my ideas on nonviolence
Document 35, 1942

96

We appeal for British withdrawal in the name of justice

97

I have an undying faith in the responsiveness of human
nature
Document 36, 1942

98
99

We have to make many sacrifices for our liberty
Initi~l

act of justice is necessary for Britain to win

the war
100

Britain intends to continue imperialism
Document 37, 1942

101

Congress must represent national interests of all

102

Autocracy must be converted into genuine trusteeship

103

The masses are pillars of strength of our movement

104

Education of the masses will lead to eradication of
inequalities

217

Document 38, 1942
105

My movement serves the downtrodden masses

106

Justice demands that Britain free India

107

My deed will carry conviction against false. propaganda
Document 39, 1942

108

Indian national government will be based upon the will
of the majority of the people

109

I have unflinching confidence in the efficacy of nonviolence

110

Indian press will help win the national cause

111

National unity will end communal disharmony
Document 40, 1942

112

British are repressing an authentic national movement

113

British oppression is causing suffering to millions

114

It is the duty of the masses not to betray the movement
by violence
Document 41, 1942

115

We must fight imperialism and not the British people

116

Congress must represent the whole nation

117

Power must belong to the people
Document 42, 1942

118

We must prepare for much higher sacrifices
Document 43, 1942

119

My activities are humanitarian and not political
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Document 44, 1942

120

Congress policy must remain unequivocally nonviolent

121

The British in India are responsible for violence

122

The British repression is hreeding discontent
Document 45, 1942

123

The British Government is spreading false propaganda

124

My method is trusthfulness in the face of falsehood

125

The law of nonviolence knows no defeat
Document 46, 1943

126

The British are responsible for violence

127

British repressiveness is daily increasing

128

Only national government can relieve misery of poverty

Document 47, 1943

129

Civil disobedience, is a legitimate method against the
British

130

I appeal to Highest Tribunal for justice

131

I reiterate openly my confidence in nonviolence
Document 49, 1943

132

I am confident national movement cannot be defeated
because nonviolence knows no defeat

133

'Do or Die' means do your duty

134

My method is based on nonviolence

135

Congress is committed to attaining India's freedom
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136

The British Government has invited violence when the
people want to proceed peacefully
Document 50, 1943

137

'Quit India' movement aims to free India

138

Adoption of nonviolence has raised the prestige of Congress

139

The British Government is imperialist, not democratic
Document 51, 1944

140

Method of nonviolence has awakened the masses

141

Wealthy must work for the'welfare of the masses

142

Only a national government can help the suffering poor

143

Discipline and dedication is necessary to practice civil
disobedience

144

Harijan helps to convey my message to the people
Document 52, 1944

145

Press can advance the cause of India's freedom
Document 53, 1944

146

Nonviolence is my basic belief and practice

147

Sacrifice of Congressmen has raised the status of India
in the eyes of the world

148

The method of nonviolencw will bring India's freedom

149

British rule is causing progressive poverty of people
Document 54, 1944

150

Only national government can establish democracy

151

'Quit India' resolution demands that India be governed
by Indians
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Document 55, 1944
152

Civil disobedience is necessary to resist domination

153

Influence depends on truthfulness and sincerity

154

My movement aims toward achieving the welfare of the masses
Document 56, 1944

155

Discipline is as necessary for civil disobedience as it is
for an armed struggle

156

Sacrifice is necessary to achieve independence

157

Education must help students to gain national consciousness

158

Duty toward the country must be kept in mind by the labor
when making demands
Document 57, 1944

159

I visualize a system of trusteeship where there would
be no poor

160

Discipline and sacrifice is real bulwark of people against
injustice

161

Congress is fully committed to serving the toilers of
the land

162

Noncooperation is the soverign remedy for safeguarding
farmer's interests
Document 58, 1944

163

You must take up the challenge of serving the villagers

164

We must establish a living personal link between ourselves
and the people

165

New education is necessary to learn how to serve the
people

166

Truthfulness must be followed in every action of our life
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167

Nonviolence is a unique force for good

168

It is through new education that we learn to resist
selfishness

Mao's Major Themes,
Theme
No.

19~2-~~

Document 1, 191,2

1

IVe must build up a centralized, unified Party

2

Intellectuals must serve the people

3

We must integrate theory with practice

4

Workers and peasants are more knowledgeable than
intellectuals

5

National unity is necessary for which we are striving

6

Tolerance is a more effective treatment than violence
in cases of political illness

7

Sectarianism within Party creates factional struggles

8

Subjectivism is incompatible with Party principles

9

Party serves the masses
Document 2.

19~2

10

Learn the language of the masses which has content

11

Personal integrity determines influence

12

Learn from the common people how to bring change

13

Do not bluff people

14

Communist movement is scientific as it is based on truth

15

Agitation must be based on facts

16

Formalism has no real content
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17

Speak simply and directly to the rank-and-file worker

18

Merge with the people through art and literature

19

Serve the broad masses of the people

20

Cadre must undergo a long process of re-education

21

Cadre must gain knowledge of Marxism-Leninism

22

Imperialist culture undermines people's culture

23

Learn to understand the masses through their art and
literature

24

Serve the people in a practical way through l.:arxism

25

Sectarianism disrupts the Party

26

Experts should serve chiefly the masses

27

Political struggle must be communicated through art and
literature

28

Serve the masses to gain support

29

We are confident of

30

Party organization must be effectively channeled to
reach the masses

31

We remain powerful in spite of our small organization

32

We shall become invincible

33

We shall finally defeat the enemy

34

Fascism is based on aggression

35

We must stop fascist aggression

~ur

victory
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36

Stalingrad victory is a unique event for the world

37

We are confident the world

sit~ation

will change

Document 6, 1942
38

We are confident of our own future victory

39

We have been waging a just war against the imperialists

40

Our Anti-Japanese war calls for sacrifice

41

The dawn of victory is already in sight
Document 7, 1942

42

Economic well-being of all is our slogan

43

Economic development will provide supplies

44

Do not tax the people too heavily

45

Serve the people to lighten their burden

46

Bureaucracy is harmful to the party

47

A united Party will achieve our goal

48

After victory people will be better off economically
Document 8, 1943

49

Link the general with the specific by studying facts

50

Link the leadership with the masses by personal example

51

Publicise general directives by personal contact

52

Conduct mass campaigns to establish links with masses

53

Discipline and sacrifice are the criteria for leaders

54

Personal contact is the best way to reach the masses

55

Trust the masses and follow "from the masses, to the
masses" principle
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56

Bureaucratic leadership is harmful

57

A well organized Party permits mobilization of masses

58

Education means learning the Marxist theory
Document 9, 1943

59

The Kuomintang-capitalist party has set itself against
the Chinese people

60

'rhe Communist Party stands for a united China

61

The ;,uomintang is collaborating with the Japanese
imperialists

62

It is the duty of the Euomintang to strengthen Resistance
to the enemy

63

Kuomintang is increasing the danger of a civil war

64

We consider our demands entirely just

65

The Kuomintang-capitalists are plotting the "dissolution"
of the Communist Party which will weaken China
Document 10, 1943

66

Rent reduction is mass organized struggle of the peasants

67

Press reports on the struggle will arouse the masses

68

Party members must set a personal example among the masses

69

Bureaucratic approach is harmful to economic development

70

POlVer means unity between the Party, the government, the
army and the people

71

Launch a broad mass campaign to facilitate our struggle
Document 11, 1943

72

The Soviet Union will annihilate fascism and liberate
people
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73

Japanese imperialists will try to destroy Communists in
China

74

Fascism will be buried beneath the waves of change

75

The world will enter a great age of liberation

76

Civil war will lead to the extinction of the Euomintang

77

I~omintang

78

All patriotic forces must unite and save China

79

Patriotic forces must work toward democracy and freedom

80

An unprecedented great change in human history is
imminent

is deceiving people by false propaganda

Document 12, 1943
81

We must combine fighting with mass organization

82

We shall certainly crush the Japanese imperialists

83

We are confident of winning

84

Self-reliance is of great significance to our struggle

85

](uomintang is inflicting poverty on the people

86

Mutual-aid organizations will bring economic wellbeing

87

Mutual-aid was wisely discovered by the masses themselves

88
89

. Personal contact with the masses must be established
Bureaucracy leads to communication barriers with the
masses

90

Warlordism is the result of isolation from masses
Document 13, 1944

91

Learn from past experience in order to avoid making
mistakes
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92

Toler,ation can unite comrades

93

Concrete analysis of concrete conditions is Marxism

94

Chinese revolution is unique in its unusual protractedness

95

Unique feature of the Chinese revolution is the vital
importance of rural base areas

96

Education of inner-Party comrades will strengthen Party

97

Chinese Communist Party has overcome enormous difficulties

98

We must study facts and problems of big cities

99

We must organize the masses in the big cities

100

Maintain close contact with masses to avoid mistakes

101

Learn the method of analysis of concrete facts

102

Chinese revolution will,triumph
Document 14, 1944

103

It is of great significance to die for the interests of
the people

104

We trust the judgement of the masses

105

Our goal is to liberate the entire nation, particularly
the masses

106

We must be courageous in times of difficulty

107

It is our duty to struggle hard for the sake of people

108

Struggle necessarily entails sacrifice, and death is
common

109

To die for the sake of people is to die a
worthy death

110

Mass

111

Mass mourning honoring the dead will express national
unity

mem~rial

meetings should become a regular practice
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112

Wee are marching toward a common national goal
Document 15, 1944

113

Japanese imperialism is daily menaning China

114

J:uomintang lacks competence in political, military,
economic or cultural field

115

Chiang Kai-shek must strengthen the United Front against
enemy

116

Chiang Kai-shek must meet people's demand for democracy

117

Chiang is preparing for civil war against the Chinese
Communist Party

118

Chiang will not succeed in any of his schemes

119

Chiang is repressing people into holding their tongues

Document 16, 1944
120

Japanese imperialism is mustering up all its strength
for a last dying kick

121

War is our first priority in our struggle

122

Culture helps army to fight enemies in their minds

123

Under the present system broad masses are still illiterate

124

Education through a united front can fight illiteracy

125

Education should be expanded through schools, literacy
classes and other means

126

Serve the people through trained doctors

127

Discipline is the first principle of the united front

128

Education through united front is important

129

Cultural workers must serve the people with enthusiasm

130

Cultural workers must work in close contact with the
masses
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ma~ses

131

The

are capable of making up their own minds

132

Our cultural work will activate the masses

133

Personal example and deed makes people believe in
workers
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Reliability
The reliability of the analysis was achieved by measuring
agreement among two coders.

Using Scott's inter-observer agree-

ment coefficient for nominal scales;

Po

Pe

1

Pe

=

where Po is the proportion of observed agreements and Pe is the
proportion of agreements that would be expected by chance.

If

the reliability test produces the forlowing contingency table

Coder 1
1

Coder 2

2 ..... j

1

n' l

2

n' 2
n ..

1

n ..

1

1J

n.
J.

n •.

then the observed proportion of agreements is
Po

=

1
n ••

:L

n ..

11

i

and the expected proportion is:
Pe

=

1

2

n ••

L..

n •.

n ..

1

1

i

We accept variables as reliable if

71

is

.7 or larger.
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